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SUMMARY 
The relevance of psychology in Africa is increasingly debated by psychologists. The 
subject stands accused of continuing a colonial tradition of oppression through its Eurocentrism 
and failure to attend to the needs of African societies. The relevance debate raises questions 
around the relationship between power, knowledge, psychology, and African history. This study 
attempts to excavate the conditions of possibility of the debate, by construing an archaeology of 
psychological knowledge as technology of power in the African context. It assumes a 
constructivist stance, employs textual and narrative analogies, and follows Foucault's 
conceptualisation of the relation between power and knowledge. 
Five strata of knowledge emerging historically in Africa, each embodying distinctive 
approaches to knowledge, are described: Indigenous African knowledge, African Islamic 
knowledge, African Christianity, knowledges of Enlightenment, and knowledges of resistance. 
These knowledges, their psychological dimensions, as well as the circulation of power within 
and between them, are explored, and historical processes of subjugation and resistance 
highlighted. Western psychology, as technology of modem power, is situated within modernism 
and the narratives of Enlightenment, which also provided the conditions of possibility of 
colonialism. The dominant narratives of relevance are related to those of African resistance and 
the limitations of psychology are conceptualised in terms of those pertaining to modernism. 
Possible postmodern avenues to the liberation of both psychology and its subjects, that are 
relevant to African contexts, are suggested. 
I 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of psychology in Africa is embedded in the history of knowledge and power 
in Africa. The discipline of psychology arrived in Africa as part of a general process of transfer 
of knowledge from the West, during a period of western political domination (Bulhan, 1981, 
1993b; Sinha, 1984b, 1986). Psychology's role as representative of western power is, however, 
increasingly being questioned by Africans and the role of western knowledge in power relations 
in Africa has become central to postcolonial African thought (Cesaire, 1969; Curtin, 1972; 
Fanon, 1967a; Hountondji, 1983; July, 1968; Lambo, 1972; Mowoe & Bjornson, 1986; 
Mudimbe, 1988; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981; Senghor, 1966; Serequeberhan, 1991). 
It is against this background that a process of self-questioning has emerged in 
psychological discourse in postcolonial Africa (Akin-Ogundeji, 1991; Desfarges, 1982; 
Durojaiye, 1987; Ezeilo, 1992; Moghaddam, 1987; Nsamenang, 1993; Witkin, 1981). A similar 
process is evident in other developing countries that were formerly dominated by the West and 
are now in a process of reconstruction (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974; Gilgen & Gilgen, 1987; 
Kagit9ib~i, 1984; Kim & Berry, 1993; Mehryar, 1984; Sinha, 1984a, 1986; Turtle, 1989) and 
has recently achieved prominence in South African psychological discourse (Anonymous, 1986; 
Biesheuvel, 1987, 1991; Dawes, 1985, 1986; Holdstock, 198lb; Manganyi, 1991; Mauer, 1987; 
Nell, 1990). Such discourse revolves around the relevance of psychology in Africa and forms 
the background to the aims of this study. 
The Relevance of Psychology in Africa 
Psychology in Africa currently stands accused of, both wittingly and unwittingly, 
continuing a historical tradition of serving imperialist and colonial powers (Bulhan, 1981, 
1993a, 1993b; Hickson & Kriegler, 1991; Holdstock, 1981b; Karani, 1987; Okonji, 1975), 
having supported apartheid (Nicholas, 1990a, 1993a; Nicholas & Cooper, 1990), remaining an 
elitist profession (Hickson & Kriegler, 1991; Rock, 1994; Seedat, Cloete & Shochet, 1988), and 
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exploiting rather than serving the needs of African communities (Berger & Lazarus, 1987; 
Bulhan, 1993a; Serpell, 1984). This is attributed to psychology's Eurocentrism (Desfarges, 
1982; Durojaiye, 1982; Holdstock, 198lb; Littlewood, 1993; Nicholas, 1993a; Nsamenang, 
1993; Serpell, 1984), bourgeois ideology (Hickson & Christie, 1989), and its suffering from the 
illusion of being politically and scientifically neutral (Bulhan, 1993a; Butchart & Seedat, 1990; 
Cooper, Nicholas, Seedat & Statman, 1990; Dawes, 1985; Karani, 1987; Liddle & Kvalsig, 
1990; Retief 1989). Thus Dawes, in Nell's (1990a) overview of the "relevance debate" in South 
Africa, identifies the main criterion for relevance emerging from the debate as 
to expose the interests which are served by uncritical psychological theory and practice, 
and to call for a reconceptualisation of the subject matter of psychology which takes 
account of the social/ideological discourses which structure the individual person, the 
psychologist as theorist, researcher and practitioner, and the knowledge which they 
produce. (p. 130) 
Different operationalisations of this criterion emerge from the debate. It is proposed that 
psychology should be overtly political in aim (Cooper et al., 1990; Freeman, 1991; Nicholas, 
1990a), and align itself with the oppressed (Anonymous, 1986; Bulhan, 1985, 1990; Dawes, 
1986; Manganyi, 1991; Nicholas, 1990b, l 993b ). It should study the process of oppression and 
become an instrument of liberation (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974; Bulhan, 1993b; Nicholas & Cooper, 
1990; Seedat et al., 1988). It should address itself to the mental health of blacks (Freeman, 
1991; Karani, 1986) and the restructuring and development of society (Nsamenang, 1993; Sinha, 
1984b). 
Psychology's Eurocentric heritage is identified as a major obstacle to relevance (Boussat 
& Dupuy, 1975; Brownell, De Jager & Madlala, 1987; Desfarges, 1982; Erinosho, 1979; 
Hickson & Christie, 1989; Mgcobo, 1981; Munro, 1978, 1986). Bloom (1976) describes the 
predicament as follows: "In Africa particular problems arise ... from the conflict between the 
positivist, empirical and materialist approach of psychology, and the moral or religious and 
non-empirical cognitive systems that characterise much of African traditional thought" (p. 131 ). 
Western scientific knowledge is depicted as "alien to the thinking of many Africans" (Abdi, 
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1985). The issue is especially pertinent in the application of psychotherapeutic approaches, 
where questions around the role of indigenous healers and independent African churches in 
mental health care abound (Awanbor, 1985; Erinosho, 1979; Ghanjaoui, 1984; Kottler, 1988; 
Mkhize, 1981 ). Community approaches are favoured as more relevant to the needs of African 
society than traditional therapeutic approaches focusing on the individual (Dawes, 1986; 
Hickson & Kriegler, 1991; Perkel, 1988; Seedat et al., 1988). 
Bodibe (1993), Bilhrmann (1984), Holdstock (1979, 198la, 198lb), and Sinha (1973) 
argue that psychology should look towards a holistic and "intuitive" mode of thought such as 
that found in Africa, in order to transcend some of the limitations of positivism. Bulhan ( 1990, 
1993b), Kriegler (1993), and Simone (1993) plead for an Afro-centric psychology and various 
authors view the indigenisation of psychology as an essential criterion for relevance (Bodibe, 
1993; Kottler, 1990; Munro, 1978; Okatcha, 1977; Perkel, 1988; Turtle, 1989; Vogelman, 1986; 
Wickert, 1967; Wober, 1975). This view is, however, is contested by Nell (1990), who 
re-asserts psychology's universality and views the quest for an indigenous psychology is an 
attempt at disempowering psychologists. 
The idea of the "disempowered psychologist" in Africa is prevalent not only in South 
African but also in African psychological discourse. Psychologists are dismayed because the 
profession is virtually unknown in Africa and has made almost no impact on actual social 
problems (Abdi, 1985; Akin-Ogundeji, 1991; Bakare, 1975; Butchart, 1993; Dawes, 1986; 
Gilbert, 1989; Liddle & Kvalsig, 1990; Mauer, 1987; Mauer, Marais & Prinsloo, 1991; Nell, 
1992; Okatcha, 1977; Strumpfer, 1981). It is described as underdeveloped (Bakare, 1975; 
Brownell et al., 1987; Ezeilo, 1992; Liddle & Kvalsig, 1990; Nsamenang, 1993), powerless 
(Nell, 1992), impotent (Mehryar, 1984), insignificant, and a "fledgling science" (Nsamenang, 
1993). 
Psychology is not viewed by administrators and policy-makers as relevant to postcolonial 
African ideals and has featured low on the list of priorities of post-independence universities 
(Akin-Ogundeji, 1991; Dawes, 1986; Wickert, 1967). If it is offered at universities, it is usually 
subsumed under education departments (Akin-Ogundeji, 1991; Okatcha, 1977), and the few 
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independent psychology departments tend to replicate western curricula (Dawes, 1986; Tyson, 
1987). Psychological research and conferences in Africa focus mainly on applied fields and are 
directly or indirectly dependent on funds from the West (Hare, 1972; Wickert, 1967; Wober, 
1975). It is questioned whether Africans always benefit from this research (Bulhan, 1993a). 
Although psychology has a strong presence at South African universities, psychologists 
are mainly employed in health sectors, research organisations, schools, business, and industry, 
and government departments (Raubenheimer, 1987). The question is raised whether they 
merely serve the economic and political interest of those in power, rather than the community 
(Cooper et al., 1990; Foster, Nicholas & Dawes, 1993). The psychologist occupies a 
marginalised position in health care (Foster et al., 1993; Nell, 1992, 1993). Psychologists "have 
become so accustomed to this scandalous subjugation to the medical, and psychiatric systems 
that they do not even question it" (Nell, 1993, p. 213). 
The Psychology of Oppression and the Oppression of Psychology 
Power is both implicitly and explicitly addressed in the relevance debate. Two views of 
the relationship between psychological knowledge and power emerge. 
The first view assumes that psychology is a "powerful agency of socialisation and social 
control" (Cooper et al., 1990, p. 60). Its power resides in its ability to generate knowledge that 
has far-reaching effects in society, but in the past this knowledge was employed in the service of 
dominant oppressive powers. The proposal is made that it should align its power with the 
oppressed, those outside its traditional margins, as an aid to their liberation. Thus emerges a 
"psychology of oppression" (Bulhan, 1985; Nicholas, 1993a) as powerful instrument of 
liberation. 
The second view of psychology that underlies the relevance debate is that of 
powerlessness. It is portrayed as impotent, underdeveloped, and ineffectual in meeting the 
actual (overwhelming) needs of African communities. Professionally, it is dominated by the 
demands of the medical, military, educational, and industrial fields. Its "irrelevance" pertains to 
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powerlessness; its powerlessness emanates from its marginal, elitist position in relation to 
African culture and society. Psychology in Africa is depicted as alienated, oppressed, and in 
need of liberation and empowerment. 
The relationship between psychological knowledge and power, as reflected in the 
relevance debate, thus raises the following questions: What kind of power does psychological 
knowledge embody? What kind of power does this knowledge lack? Whom does it serve/rule 
and how? Is it a helpless pawn, serving whomever may be in power, or a powerful agent of 
empowerment? The "relevance" discourse locates the answers to these questions in history. An 
awareness of psychology's historical roots is viewed as essential (Butchart & Seedat, 1990; 
Dawes, 1986; Fanon, 1967a; Holdstock, 1981b; Manganyi, 1991; Seedat, 1990; Vogelman, 
1986) and the relationship between psychological knowledge and power demands to be 
explicitly addressed (Beit-Hallahmi, 1974; Bulhan, 1993a; Dawes, 1985; Karani, 1987; Kottler, 
1990; Littlewood, 1993; Nell, 1993; Simone, 1993; Swartz & Foster, 1984; Vogelman, 1986). 
As this study aims to investigate the relevance problem within a historical context, it is 
necessary to outline its frame of reference regarding knowledge, power, and history. 
Frame of Reference of the Study 
This study adopts a postmodern (K vale, 1992c) stance in that it employs textual 
analogies such as narrative and discourse in preference to the positivist analogies traditionally 
employed by modernistic psychology, such as man-as-machine and man as quasi-organism 
(Bruner, 1987, 1990; Geertz, 1983; Sarbin, 1986). Postmodern thought (Kvale, 1992c; Waugh, 
1992) assumes a constructivist, relativist approach to knowledge (K. J. Gergen, 1985, 1992, 
1994; Sarbin & Kitsuse, 1993), a narrative approach to history (Rusen, 1993; H. White, 1973), 
and explicitly addresses the circulation of power in discourse (Foucault, 1980b). 
Knowledge 
A constructivist, self-reflexive view of knowledge does not assume the existence of an 
6 
objective reality independent of the observer and is not concerned with establishing "truths". 
What is considered to be true varies according to different cultural and historical contexts (K. J. 
Gergen, 1992, 1994; Maturana & Varela, 1992; Sarbin & Kitsuse, 1993; Turner & Bruner, 
1986). Knowledge is viewed as a process mediated through language, who's narrative 
conventions constrain what can be known. "Understanding the world is thus not a product of the 
world as it is, but of textual history" (K. J. Gergen, 1992, p. 22). Knowledge is created through 
discourse and is shaped by a storehouse of culturally and historically generated meanings and 
narratives (Bruner, 1990; K. J. Gergen, 1994). It is always informed by epistemic contexts, 
including cultures, ideologies, religions, and worldviews, and in its tum informs these contexts 
(Neimeyer, 1993; Richer, 1992; Said, 1989). It manifests itself in and is generated by social 
relations: "The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of 
historically situated interchanges among people" (K. J. Gergen, 1985, p. 267). 
This study will make no effort to establish what "really" happened in Africa's discursive 
history. Instead, it seeks answers to the question of how it came about that certain forms of 
knowledge have assumed hegemony while others were subjugated, negated or disregarded, and 
where psychology fits into the larger discursive fields dictating at any time what may be known 
and what may be regarded as true. 
A relativist view of knowledge has been accused of obscuring the differential effects of 
power, leading to nihilism and social anomie (Geertz, 1984; Kvale, 1992c). However, Fish 
(1990) has demonstrated that the concept of power is compatible with a relativist position as 
implied by the systemic paradigm and Foucault's (1977, 1980b) analyses of power and 
knowledge in the social sciences clearly adopt a relativist position even though they investigate 
and elucidate the processes of domination and resistance underlying discursive fields. This 
study aims to search for similar processes in the role of psychology in Africa and will follow 
Foucault's (1980a, 1980b) approach to the study of knowledge and power. 
Knowledce and Power 
In contrast to the popular view of power as an inhibiting, repressive force, limiting 
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options, Foucault (1977, 1980b) views power as "positive", in the sense of its generating 
knowledge, constituting action, and creating alternatives. Power and knowledge are 
inseparable, so much so that Foucault (1980b) has coined the terms power/knowledge and 
knowledge/power to refer to this process. We are all acting within and through a given field of 
power/knowledge and exercising this power/knowledge over others. A domain of knowledge is 
necessarily a domain of power, and vice versa. Power is mediated through truth. "Each society 
has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth, that is, the types of discourses which it 
accepts and makes function as true" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 131). The knowledges producing these 
discourses assume ascendancy over others. Alternative knowledges become disqualified. 
Foucault (1980b) refers to disqualified knowledges as subjugated knowledges. They include 
local and erudite knowledges that have been superseded by the dominant knowledge aspiring to 
truth. "In our society, 'truth' is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions 
that produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 
131). 
In studying the history of western systems of thought, Foucault (1970, 1977) found that 
the emergence of the human sciences was dependent on the simultaneous emergence of new 
forms of power, and that the expansionist quality of modern power was dependent upon 
progress in the construction of certain scientific knowledges that aspire to "truth" status, 
including psychology. These knowledges are variously termed "technologies of power" 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 238), "technologies of normalisation" (Rabinow, 1984, p.22), and 
"technologies of the psyche" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 185), indicating their active role in mediating 
power relations. They have their origin in the elaboration of a range of practices for discipline, 
surveillance, and administration of the social body via dividing practices, scientific 
classification, normalisation, and subjectification (Foucault, 1977). 
The "technologies of power" were developed to recruit persons in "knowing" themselves 
and others (thus exercising power over themselves and others) via norms (Foucault, 1977). 
Thus, power is rooted at the local level, in the knowledge that circulates in interpersonal 
relations; it is in fact rooted in the psyche. Foucault is interested in an ascending rather than 
descending analysis of power. 
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There is a trend in dominant western knowledge to limit the use of the term "knowledge" 
to scientific or rational knowledge and exclude myth, belief, intuition, religion, and other forms 
of "local knowledges" (Geertz, 1983) from the definition (MacGaffey, 1981). However, 
following Foucault (1980b), this study will view knowledge from as wide and inclusive a 
position as possible, in all its possible manifestations. It will explicitly aim at including 
subjugated and regional knowledges in order to describe the circulation of power through 
different kinds of knowledge and the historical process of domination and subjugation of 
knowledges in Africa. 
The Archaeological Approach 
Foucault's approach to the histories of various discourses and practices has variously 
been termed archaeology (Foucault, 1972, 1973) in his earlier writings, genealogy (Foucault, 
1980b) in his later writings, and interpretative analytics, an effort at combining the two, by 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982). These terms tend to overlap to a large extent (Gutting, 1994). For 
heuristic purposes, this study will employ the term archaeology to designate "a 'domain of 
research' which explicates the system of knowledge that accounts for the types of theories and 
practices present at a particular historical period" (Bernauer, 1981, p. 231 ). 
Foucault's archaeologies are concerned with the "field" within which ideas, statements, 
discourses, and epistemes are generated, as well as sudden transformations in their coherence 
(Foucault, 1970). He studies the conditions of possibility of various discourses, the a-priori of 
their existence (Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1977). It should be emphasised that Foucault's 
archaeologies are above all "histories of the present" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 241). Their ultimate 
aim is to ground current knowledge within a historical critique. By historically contextualising 
current knowledge and practices, they are relativised and their apparent taken-for-granted truth 
brought into question. This study will enquire into the criteria that have historically afforded the 
status of truth to various narratives and discourse, including the science of psychology, as part of 
the history of knowledge in Africa. 
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Objectives and Overview of the Study 
The central objective of the study is to construe an archaeology of psychological 
knowledge in Africa, so as to excavate the conditions of possibility of the relevance debate. Its 
specific aims are: 
To identify and describe the different strata of knowledge (Foucault, 1970) historically 
emerging in Africa, 
to investigate the kinds of knowledge, including psychological knowledge, embodied in 
each, 
to describe the nature of power embodied in each stratum as well as the circulation of 
power within and between them, 
to situate psychological knowledge as technology of power within these fields of 
power/knowledge, and 
to suggest possible avenues of liberation of psychology that are relevant to the African 
context. 
Chapters 2 to 6 are chronologically arranged according to different strata of knowledge 
emerging historically in Africa. Each stratum is assumed to embody a different approach to 
knowledge in general, and psychological knowledge in particular. These approaches, and the 
power relations implied by each, are explored. Although psychology, as a science, formally 
entered the African stage during the Enlightenment (chapter 5), it was superimposed on existing 
knowledge concerning human conduct, derived from indigenous African thought (chapter 2), 
and African Islam and Christianity (chapters 3 and 4 ). These strata continue to co-exist with 
western knowledge to the present, and provide a storehouse of alternative knowledge competing 
with western secular knowledge. 
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Chapter 5 is concerned with the colonial importation of western secular knowledges of 
Enlightenment to Africa, including psychology as technology of modem power. Chapter 6 deals 
with African reactions to, appropriation of, and resistance against the knowledges of the 
Enlightenment. Chapter 7 situates the current relevance crisis in psychology within the context 
of the historical strata of knowledge and explores possible avenues of liberation of psychology 
and psychologists. The study concludes with a brief coda. 
Note on Gender Terminology 
The discourse on Africa, and the literature that this study refers to, are dominated by men 
writing about other men, and frequently employ gender-biased language. The conditions of 
possibility of this bias are to be found in the dominant view of "man" emerging from the 
knowledges of Enlightenment, and is explored in chapter 5. This study cannot avoid reflecting, 
to some extent, this bias. The pronoun "he" and other gender-biased terms such as "man" and 
"mankind" are used deliberately (and without interrupting the text with explicit indicators such 
as "[sic]", so as to avoid clumsiness) when quoting from or paraphrasing writing that employs 
these terms, but a more gender sensitive language and approach is employed whenever possible. 
It is hoped that future research will address this issue by further excavating the hitherto 
subjugated knowledges of African women. 
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CHAPTER2 
INDIGENOUS AFRICAN KNOWLEDGE 
We deem it essential to preserve a difference 
between us, an elite no matter how small, who see 
the world as it really is, and them, who see it only 
through a glass, darkly. (MacGaffey, 1978, p. 110) 
A distinction between western and indigenous African ways of knowing is central to the 
relevance debate in psychology. Authors such as Awanbor (1985), Bakare (1975), Bloom 
(1976), Bodibe (1992, 1993), Brownell et al. (1987), Gobodo (1990), Holdstock (198lb), and 
Nsamenang ( 1993) assume the existence of a distinctive African cosmology and system of 
knowledge which preceded colonisation. There is wide agreement that many aspects of 
pre-colonial African knowledge are not only historical curiosities but have managed to survive 
intact to this day (Abraham, 1962; Edgerton, 1980; Elliot, 1984; Erinosho, 1979; Jackson & 
Sears, 1992; Kamalu, 1990; Mbiti, 1971; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Others (Hountondji, 1983; 
Nell, 1990; Swartz & Foster, 1984) warn that a concern with indigenous African knowledge may 
mask oppressive power relations in the present. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to assume an ethnophilosophical or 
ethnopsychological stance towards present knowledge but to arrive at a description of the 
functioning of indigenous African knowledge, as this forms the first layer of knowledge from 
the archaeological point of view assumed in the present study. This description will serve as a 
background to the subsequent historical layers of knowledge, which all embody different 
relations to the first. These relations are central to the state of African knowledge in the present 
and will be explored in the following chapters. 
The chapter takes as point of departure an introductory consideration of the discursive 
context surrounding the study of early African knowledge. This is followed by a brief 
explication of the relation between knowledge, culture, and cosmology, which underlies this 
12 
discursive context. A synopsis of indigenous African cosmology follows, as this serves as the 
context surrounding African epistemology, specialised "psychological" knowledge, and the 
relation between African knowledge and power, as explored in the subsequent sections. 
The Mirage, the Mute, and the Myth 
There is no direct access to the knowledge of pre-colonial Africa, as it was almost never 
recorded in writing and was obtained by birthright, revelation, and initiation. It is and will 
remain a mirage which has only recently been (re)constructed by anthropologists, theologians, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and philosophers. All written representations of indigenous African 
knowledge are subject to the constraints of these zones of discourse, have been created by and 
for westerners or western-educated Africans, and may in fact reveal more about recent western 
thought than about that of pre-colonial Africa. 
All of these discourses have as their essential point of reference the historical existence, 
organization, and culture of African peoples, who themselves remain mute in these 
discussions because their institutions do not include the printing press.... It is a feature 
of all of the discourses ... that participants constantly challenge the validity of each other's 
representations concerning the mute. (MacGaffey, 1981, pp. 227-228) 
Indigenous African knowledge was orally and symbolically transmitted (one exception 
being ancient Egyptian knowledge which included writing). Social scientists have indirect 
access to this knowledge via, inter alia, myths transmitting historical and social knowledge over 
generations. From these myths are constructed "scientific" narratives called histories or thought 
systems. From a constructivist stance, these narratives may, however, also be viewed as 
"myths", confirming a certain view of the world. A paradoxical situation arises, where African 
knowledge becomes a "body of work in 'social science' which is, in fact, myth, and 
which itself deals, in part, with a body of 'myth' which is, in fact, social science" (MacGaffey, 
1978, p. 101 ). These two kinds of myths/narratives both satisfy their audiences by confirming 
their views of the world, "but the context of the one is the lawsuit between two clans, or a 
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divinatory seance; of the other, the university seminar, the university press, and the research 
grant" (MacGaffey, 1978, p. 118). 
The conditions of possibility (Foucault, 1970, p. xxii) surrounding this mythical 
discourse will be further explored in later chapters. One feature of this discourse is that it 
assumes a unity between African knowledge, culture, and cosmology (and often fails to perceive 
the same unity between western knowledge of other cultures and western culture and 
cosmology). 
Knowledge, Culture, and Cosmology 
Culture may be viewed as the organised pattern of thoughts, beliefs, values, and 
behaviour that is learned and shared by a group of people, and which is passed from one 
generation to another (Bodibe, 1993; Schoeman, 1987). A culture functions as a unity which is 
organised around a set of core principles called a worldview or cosmology, referring to 
consensually validated assumptions and meanings in terms of which people interpret all aspects 
of reality (Hammond-Tooke, 1986; Kalu, 1980; Schoeman, 1987). Knowledge, culture, and 
cosmology function as a whole and mutually confirm each other. Although they function 
dynamically and are subject to constant change and local variations, the following section will 
focus on what is considered the relatively universal and enduring aspects of African cosmology. 
It will generalise, as does the prevailing "scientific" myth. 
African Cosmology 
Holism 
African knowledge is rooted in a holistic view of man and the universe (Kamalu, 1990; 
Lambo, 1973; Manganyi, 1973; Mbiti, 1971; Ngubane, 1977; Nobles, 1980; Ruch & Anyanwu, 
1981 ). An essential unity is assumed between body and soul, subject and object, humans and 
society, humans and the divine, and humans and the material world. Most of the dualisms 
displayed in western thought are transcended, united, or nonexistent in African thought. It is 
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integrative and synthetic rather than analytical (Keita, 1984; Udechukwu, 1980). 
The Integration of Opposites 
Holism implies an integration of opposites (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981 ). Kamalu ( 1990) 
and Keita (1984) trace this aspect of African thought to the ancient Egyptians. African ritual, art 
and symbols are concerned with restoring unity between opposing forces, within the community, 
and between humans and the spiritual world (Biihrmann, 1984; Udechukwu, 1980). 
Religiosity 
The distinctions between the material and spiritual and between the sacred and the 
secular do not apply in African knowledge (Mbiti, 1971 ). The African cosmos is profoundly 
religious (Kalu, 1980; Lambo, 1973; Modum, 1980; Richards, 1985). Man is firstly a religious 
being and lives in constant interaction with religious forces and beings. All aspects of daily life 
are religious and worship permeates social life (Mbiti, 1971). Natural phenomena and objects 
have strong religious significance so that "the physical and the spiritual... dove-tail into each 
other" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 57). The religious universe is actually experienced in the natural and 
social world (Onyanwu, 1975; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
Indigenous religious practices vary at tribal level. Religious ideas spread spontaneously. 
There are no missionaries nor conversions. Each society's religious system is integrated into its 
social structure and one acquires a religion by birth (Mbiti, 1971). However, all religions share 
certain characteristics, such as monotheism. God is the ultimate explanation of all things 
(Kamalu, 1990; Keita, 1984; Makinde, 1988; Mbiti, 1971; Senghor, 1965). Most African 
peoples approach God indirectly, through intermediaries such as priests, diviners or other 
specialists. Acts of worship are offered to the living-dead, regional spirits, local divinities or 
directly to God, and are aimed at maintaining the balance between man and the spiritual. When 
this balance is upset, misfortune, and suffering may result. The practice of religion is never a 
private affair, but involves at least two or more parties (Abraham, 1962; Mbiti, 1971). 
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The Ontological Hierarchy 
Cosmology and ontology coincide in a hierarchical view of the universe (Abraham, 
1962; Makinde, 1988; Mbiti, 1971; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Inanimate things are located at 
the bottom of the hierarchy, followed by plants and then animals. Humans are set apart from the 
preceding in that they have an immortal soul or spirit (Abraham, 1962; Mbiti, 1971; Ruch & 
Anyanwu, 1981), an idea that is traced to the ancient Egyptians (Kamalu, 1990; Keita, 1984; 
Olela, 1986). 
As long as a person exists in the memory of those who are still alive, she belongs to the 
living dead and is considered a member of the community (Kalu, 1980), for instance by 
appearing in their dreams (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). The living-dead possess special 
knowledge of and are considered guardians of family affairs, traditions, and ethics, but have the 
power to bring both fortune or misfortune. This places them in a paradoxical position: They are 
respected and wanted, yet not wanted (Mbiti, 1971 ). 
Once the living-dead disappear from the memory of the living, they become spirits; 
nameless, depersonalised beings, who are less directly involved in the living community. In 
some societies minor deities are above the spirits in the hierarchy. Deities may assume the form 
of personified natural phenomena or heroes. God, who is all-knowing, is at the top of the 
hierarchy. 
The living human forms part of a hierarchical society, that may be headed by a king, 
followed by village and town heads, household heads (males), elders, women, and children 
(Makinde, 1988). Kings have divine authority and can exercise the power of life and death. 
Those members of society who are endowed with specialised knowledge serve as intermediaries 
between the living and the spiritual. These include heroes, sages, rain-makers, diviners, other 
healers, and priests (Fortes & Dieterlin, 1965; Mbiti, 1971). 
This ontology functions as a complete unity. To remove any category would be to 
destroy existence. "One mode of existence presupposes all the others" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 16) and a 
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balance must be maintained between all of them. 
The Life Force 
The cosmos is assumed to be drenched in forces and powers, all emanating from God. 
God is present in creation through the life-force, power or energy which permeates all beings 
(Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Mbiti, 1971; Modum, 1980; Richards, 1985; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
The universe is a closed system of forces, individual and distinct, but also interdependent and in 
equilibrium. This dynamic view puts greater emphasis on the links or relations between beings 
than on the beings thus linked (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
Being, or the life-force, is unstable equilibrium, always capable of growing stronger or 
weaker (Senghor, 1965). Every individual has his or her own life-force, which can vary 
qualitatively and quantitatively (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981 ), but is under 
guidance of the soul. Some humans and spirits have the power/knowledge to tap or manipulate 
the life-force, either for the good or ill of their communities (Mbiti, 1971; Minkus, 1984). 
Interaction between humans, between humans and nature, and between humans and God are 
those between vital forces, souls, and powers (Lowery-Palmer, 1980). Standards of behaviour 
are aimed at maintaining, respecting, and strengthening the relationship between vital forces 
(Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
Anthropocentrism 
Humans occupy a central and privileged position in the universe (Kalu, 1980; Senghor, 
1965). "Everything is seen in terms of its relation to man" (Mbiti, 1971, p.16). Man is, in turn, 
viewed in terms of his relation to the universe (Abraham, 1962; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). If the 
self becomes disordered, the universe is experienced as disordered; if the universe is disordered, 
the self becomes disordered. "Man somehow mirrors and contains the universe" (Lambo, 1973, 
p. 314). 
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The universe is anthropocentrised. Spiritual beings and God are viewed in human terms 
and the spirit world is assumed to function like human society (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; 
Onwuanibe, 1984). Forces, knowledge systems, and even illnesses and medicines are 
personified (Makinde, 1988; Minkus, 1984). A universe or history before or outside humans 
and the community is inconceivable. Knowledge attains truth value in terms of its value to the 
community, never in terms of some "outside" value such as "objectivity" (Abraham, 1962). 
We do not know the world of nature but of culture. This cultural world is not that of 
natural evolution but of cultural evolution. We cannot project our ideas and thought into 
the world of nature said to have existed before man and culture. (Ruch & Anyanwu, 
1981, p. 97) 
Communalism 
Humans do not occupy their central position in the universe in isolation, but always as 
part of a community (Abraham, 1962). Communalism is a central value in all African societies 
(Kamalu, 1990). Mbiti (1971) refers to a sense of kinship binding together the life of the tribe. 
Abraham (1962), and Lambo (1973) emphasise the spiritual nature of this kinship. Nkrumah (in 
Makinde, 1988) describes traditional society as communal, egalitarian, and humanistic. The 
state, clan, and other units all function as families. Similarly, Nyerere (in Makinde, 1988) likens 
the "communal spirit" to the "family spirit". 
"The family is the microcosm, the first cell. All the concentric circles which form the 
different levels of society ... village, tribe, kingdom, empire ... reproduce in extended form the 
family" (Senghor, 1965, p. 43). The family includes the living, the unborn, and the ancestors 
(Mbiti, 1971 ). The family is the clan, "the sum of all persons, living and dead, who 
acknowledge a common ancestor" (Senghor, 1965, p. 43). Genealogy bestows personal identity 
and establishes relationships between individuals. Each person has literally hundreds of fathers, 
mothers, uncles, wives, and children. "The African is thus held in a tight network of vertical 
and horizontal communities, which bind and at the same time support him" (Senghor, 1965, p. 
43 ). The individual is incorporated into the community through rites that continue throughout 
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his or her life. Ultimately, the individual can only say "I am, because we are; and since we are, 
therefore I am" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 108). 
Many authors tend to emphasise the positive aspects of communalism in African 
societies, such as mutual support and protection. It is, however, a paradoxical feature. 
Although it offers protection to all members of the community, it also makes every member 
"dangerously naked in the sight of other members" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 209) and vulnerable to 
accusations of evil, often blamed on a closely related member of the community. The 
community is "the centre of love and hatred, of friendship and enmity, of trust and suspicion, of 
joy and of sorrow, of generous tenderness and bitter jealousies ... , of security and insecurity" 
(Mbiti, 1971, p. 209). Similarly, Lowery-Palmer (1980) refers to interpersonal relations as 
"uncertain and dangerous. In relating to other individuals, one proceeds with caution" (p. 62). 
The strength of communal values in traditional societies has led to the conclusion that 
individualism was actively prohibited (Lowery-Palmer, 1980) and a "remote concept" (Makinde, 
1988, p. 60) in such societies. Mbiti (1971) goes as far as saying that "a person cannot be 
individualistic, but only corporate" (p. 209). Abraham (1962) stresses that allowances were 
made to incorporate the uniqueness of each person and that the group was never 
over-responsible. However, subservience to the clan was a moral and spiritual necessity. 
Oruka (1990) ascribes the idea of the suppression of individuality to the attitude of 
researchers, who tend to focus on communal rather than individual knowledge. Individual 
sources of innovative knowledge were not recorded, but that does not deny their possible 
existence. Individuals who made outstanding contributions to society, such as kings or heroes, 
achieved mythical status. Bird and Kendall (1980) use hero myths to describe the relation 
between the individual and the community as one of dialectic tension and interdependence. The 
hero, someone with special powers, is an agent of disequilibrium who works against the 
stabilising and conservative forces of society. However, he may have the power to act when 
social conventions immobilise others. His motivations may be selfish, but he becomes a hero 
precisely because his acts ultimately benefit society. The social system operates in such a way 
that the hero and group are interdependent. The hero may venture forth into unknown territory, 
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but has to return to the praise songs of the community to receive glory. 
Concepts of the Person 
The person is firstly defined in terms of the community: "The reality of the communal 
world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories" (Menkiti, 1984, p. 171). 
Persons become persons only after a long process of social and ritual transformation (Menkiti, 
1984) and personhood may be conferred by the community only after initiation in puberty 
(Mbiti, 1971). "An ontological progression exists between infancy and ripening in old age" 
(Menkiti, 1984, p. 173). Man is born as an "it" and returns to this state when he enters the 
spirit-world (Mbiti, 1971 ). The person exists between the times of entry and exit from the 
community. 
The African view of the person is an essentialist one (Kalu, 1980). A person is an 
irreducible essence which is constant and unchanging (Abraham, 1962, p. 42), and an integral 
part of the metaphysical universe (Abraham, 1962; Onwuanibe, 1984). However, humans 
transcend the world through immortality (Onwuanibe, 1984). The person is essentially spirit, 
who is only encased in a body for a while (Abraham, 1962; Onwuanibe, 1984). The relation of 
body and soul is always an integrative, holistic one, as is evidenced in the following examples of 
African views of the person. 
The Yoruba have a tripartite concept of the person: Body (am), soul (emi), and inner 
head/destiny ( ori). Like the soul, the ori is spiritual. One's destiny is not determined by the ori; 
moral effort and sacrifice may influence it (Makinde, 1984, 1988). The ori serves as an 
explanation of irrational behaviour, but the soul is more important. The soul's physical 
counterpart is the human heart, and its physical attendant, the human blood (Makinde, 1984). 
BOhrmann (1984), Lowery-Palmer (1980), and Ruch and Anyanwu (1981) point to similar 
bodily locations of "psychological" and spiritual functions: "Some cultures have a whole 
detailed anatomy of psychological functions" (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981, p. 158). They warn, 
however, against viewing these localisations in too literal a fashion and emphasise their 
symbolic and metaphorical meaning. 
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Although Gyekye (1984) views the Akan concept of the person as essentially dualistic, 
others (Abraham, 1962; Kalu, 1980) identify five aspects: The body, the soul, the "destiny", a 
moral/educable aspect, and an inheritable/temperamental aspect. The inheritable aspect is 
passed down the lineage, so that the clan as a whole is viewed as having a distinct personality 
(Abraham, 1962). 
These views of the person coincide in that immortal spiritual forces are viewed as 
primary determinants of human behaviour (Onwuanibe, 1984). 
According to African cosmology, the past carries over into the present by virtue of the 
presence of spiritual beings. Consequently, Mbiti (1971) regards time in African indigenous 
thought as a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present, and "virtually no future" 
(p. 17). If future events are certain to occur, or fall within the inevitable cyclical rhythm of 
nature, they constitute what Mbiti calls "potential time", not "actual time". The present and the 
past dominate African understanding of the individual, the community, and the universe (Kalu, 
1980). 
Time is reckoned in terms of events or phenomena in relation to one another (Kalu, 
1980; Mbiti, 1971). "Time is a measure of life, not of non-human events" (Ruch & Anyanwu, 
1981, p. 116). Ayoade (1986) differentiates between two measures of time: Human indicators 
(including egocentric and communocentric events) and environmental indicators 
(celestial/cosmic and terrestrial/ecological events). Since events define time, humans "make" as 
much time as they want (Mbiti, 1971). Similarly, Ayoade (1986) describes Africans as 
"potential conquerors of time" (p. 107) rather than helpless victims thereof. 
The African conception of time differs essentially from a linear conception of 
past-present-future (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Mbiti (1971) replaces these terms with 
micro-time, ~' and macro-time or Zamani. Sasa denotes the period of immediate concern to 
people. It is "an experiential extension of the Now-moment. ... It is the time region in which 
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people are conscious of their existence" (p. 22). It has its own short future, a dynamic present 
and an experienced past. The individual and community directly participate in and experience 
Sasa. Ruch and Anyanwu (1981) agree that the Now (described in similar terms to the Sasa) is a 
dominant concern in African thinking. 
Sasa, the period of conscious living, continually disappears into Zamani, the period of 
myth. Zamani denotes not only the long past, but also the present and future, on a wider scale. 
It is the period "beyond which nothing can go. Zamani is the graveyard of time ... the dimension 
in which everything finds its halting point... the ocean of time in which everything becomes 
absorbed into a reality that is neither after nor before" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 23). 
Mbiti ( 1971) uses these time dimensions to explain the mythical nature of history in 
Africa. In contrast to the view that history progressively moves forward towards a future climax 
or golden age, African history finds explanations in the Zamani which is represented in myths, 
offering a source of knowledge around Sasa. Ruch and Anyanwu (1981) agree that both the past 
and the future serve as mythical background to the Now. Mythical time is cyclical, for "peoples 
expect human history to continue for ever, in the rhythm of moving from the Sasa to the Zamani 
and there is nothing to suggest that this rhythm shall come to an end" (p. 24 ). The cyclical 
dimension of African time is also stressed by Kalu (1980) and Richards (1985). 
Human life has a cyclical rhythm, and revolves around key transitional events, each of 
which is marked by rituals and ceremonies. Unusual events that do not fit into these cycles 
disturb the ontological harmony and demand special attention in the form of religious activity 
(Mbiti, 1971). The life span of an individual may be viewed as a gradual movement from the 
Sasa to the Zamani. After having died, the person lingers in the Sasa and only "passes out of the 
horizon of the Sasa period" and sinks into the Zamani when the last person who knew him dies 
(Mbiti, 1971, p. 25). This view of immortality explains the importance of marriage and family 
ties. Unless a person has close relatives to remember her when she dies, she will pass directly 
into oblivion. Surviving relatives keep the mystical ties with the living-dead alive through 
symbols of communion, fellowship, and remembrance. 
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Although Mbiti's (1971) view of African time is widely accepted, some authors such as 
Ayoade (1986) and Makinde (1988) have criticised his view of a "futureless" time conception. 
These authors, however, refer to societies that currently function in a "traditional" way, whereas 
Mbiti's time perspective applies to pre-colonial societies. He explicitly states that missionary 
teaching and westernisation have changed the African conception of time (Mbiti, 1971, pp. 
27-28). 
Space and Time 
Space and time are closely linked, and often the same word is used for both. The 
Zamani (spiritual, mythical time) is also mythical space, and as such it is both timeless and 
spaceless (Richards, 1985). Lambo (1973) speaks of "a space-time continuum in which space, 
time, and matter are all parts or aspects of the same primeval reality" (p. 314 ). As with time, 
space is not "measured" in a linear way, but is defined in terms of the activities of the 
community. "What matters most to people is what is geographically near, just as Sasa embraces 
the life that people experience" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 27). Lowery-Palmer (1980) illustrates this in 
the thought of the Yoruba, who associate nearness to one's natal village with safety and distance 
with spiritual danger. 
Space is further defined in terms of African cosmology: Man is often depicted at the 
centre of space, with God above and the spirits below (Kalu, 1980 ). The spiritual world is 
spatially conceived of as an alternative reality existing parallel to and geographically 
overlapping with the living world (Lowery-Palmer, 1980). The land is the concrete expression 
of both the Zamani and the Sasa. It binds people to their departed, who are buried within or 
close to the living quarters. Being removed from the communal land or having to travel far 
endangers these ties and demands special rites of protection. Dying or being buried far from the 
ancestral home may remove a person from the remembrance of the living and disturb communal 
relations (Oruka, 1990). 
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African Epistemology 
The Idea of Knowledge 
The dominant view of knowledge in African societies that follows from descriptions of 
African cosmology is that it is something given through oral tradition and accepted as 
authoritative. Knowledge is associated with the total community, rather than with innovative 
individuals. It is carried over from the past, rather than being actively created in the present. 
The indigenous African orientation to time precludes the idea of knowledge cumulatively 
progressing towards a final truth and discourages critical thought. "The stereotype of the 
uncritical, unreflective, 'closed' nature of African systems of thought has proved extraordinarily 
resilient and resistant to criticism. One obvious reason for this is that most of the evidence 
available supports it" (Hallen & Sodipo, 1986, p. 121). 
This may, however, be an oversimplification following from western preconceptions and 
research methodology. In a careful translation of the knowledge concept in Yoruba thought, 
Hallen and Sodipo (1986) found that senior diviner/sages differentiate between two kinds of 
knowledge: Oral traditional knowledge (similar to "belier' in English) is viewed as second-hand 
information that one agrees to accept; but "knowledge" is defined as something one knows at 
first hand, notably from sensory evidence, and is ranked as superior to the first. Hallen & 
Sodipo (1986) find it ironic that 
the model of African thought systems produced by English-language culture should 
typify them as systems that treat second-hand information (oral tradition, "book 
knowledge", etc.) as though it were true, as though it were knowledge! This is precisely 
what the Yoruba epistemological system ... outspokenly and adamantly refuses to do. But 
the English-language system does - grossly. Therefore it, in the end, fits its own model 
for traditional thought systems better than the Yoruba ever can! (p. 81) 
Hallen and Sodipo (1986) differentiate between the recording and expression of 
knowledge, on the one hand, and the attitude towards knowledge, on the other. African 
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knowledge is orally recorded and expressed, in the form of relatively "unreasoned" metaphor. 
This does not necessarily imply, however, an uncritical attitude towards such knowledge. 
Although they successfully challenge the stereotype of African knowledge as being uncritical 
and unempirical, Hallen and Sodipo (1986) themselves equate knowledge with empirical and 
critical thought, and tend to exclude belief from knowledge. Beliefs (traditional oral 
second-hand information) are extremely powerful determinants of behaviour and cannot be 
separated from knowledge (Sogolo, 1993 ). Both define reality and arrive at truth claims. The 
unity of belief and knowledge is best illustrated in the divination process (Peek, 1991 ), which is 
characterised by a non-rational, non-empirical mode of knowing, producing agreed-upon rather 
than empirically validated truths. The diviner's credibility is dependent on an authorising 
process which is employed in all societies to arrive at a consensually validated reality. The 
legitimation of divinatory truths may depend on a fixed system of esoteric knowledge, it may be 
a function of social authority or spiritual validation, or it may result from a debate about an 
oracular message between client and diviner. 
The Ori(tins and Limits of Knowledge 
The ultimate origin of all knowledge is God. The distribution of knowledge follows the 
ontological hierarchy. God may pass on some knowledge to lesser deities whose knowledge 
may be partly shared by specialists, who may help others to attain knowledge via inter alia 
divination. Divine knowledge may be communicated to humans by spirits or gods through 
dreams or spirit possession (Biihrmann, 1981, 1984; Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
As most events are caused by invisible, spiritual agents of which precise knowledge is 
unattainable, imperfect knowledge is accepted as part of life and a striving for final truths, 
irrelevant. Humans strive to acquire more knowledge, but what is known is very little compared 
to what may potentially be known. All knowledge gained is derivative, imperfect, and 
incomplete (Abraham, 1962; Mbiti, 1971; Makinde, 1988; Minkus, 1984). 
Within the Ifa system of knowledge, as practised by the Yoruba, Ifa is both personified 
as a deity and viewed as a repository or infinite source of knowledge and wisdom. It functions 
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as an oracle (Makinde, 1988) and is similar to an omniscient intelligence. It possesses the 
forces and powers of nature, as well as knowledge consisting of several branches: Nature, 
animals, plants, oral incantations, divination, medicinal plants, and healing. Ifa not only knows 
but controls language, culture, philosophy, and religion (Makinde, 1988). Knowledge is thus 
viewed as inseparable from power and from the functioning of society as a whole. 
Ruch and Anyanwu ( 1981) emphasise the anthropocentric nature of African knowledge. 
No knowledge of reality independent of human experience is possible. Knowledge is 
subjective: "Self-knowledge is the basis of all knowledge" (Myers, 1984 ), but the self is always 
an extended self, including the ancestors, nature, and the community (Myers, 1986). Truth 
includes communal, aesthetic, imaginative, emotional, and intuitive knowledge. Lived and felt 
realities, such as the spiritual nature of the world, derive from individual, social, and historical 
experience (Myers, 1984). "Vague", "subjective" concepts such as spirit and ancestor "embody 
so many qualities that nobody can clearly and precisely limit them in human experience. These 
'concepts' are not even defined. They should be regarded as symbols, not concepts" (Ruch & 
Anyanwu, 1981 ). Meaning is transmitted through imagery and symbolism, which convey 
multiple meanings (Dixon, 1976). Thus understanding is synonymous with unification and truth 
essentially a unifying principle (Myers, 1984). The "vagueness" of African representations of 
reality may be related to the "diunital" logic employed (Dixon, 1976). In contrast to either/or, 
dualistic logic, diunital logic refers to "both-and". Distinctions are made, but are always viewed 
in terms of a united whole (Dixon, 1976). 
These features of African knowledge insulate it from attack or doubt (Horton, 1973). 
"Failures of prediction or incomplete knowledge can be accounted for without jettisoning the 
basic causal explanations" (Minkus, 1984, p. 141). The insulating effect of African knowledge 
systems has led authors such as Horton (1973) to suggest that these systems of thought preclude 
critical thinking and are essentially closed, in contrast to "open scientific" thinking. Horton 
(1973) ascribes this to the system of convergent causality (A, B, C, D, ... may all lead to result X) 
underlying African thought, whereas science searches for linear cause-effect chains and final 
truths. Horton's claim will be reconsidered after a closer look at the concept of causation in 
African knowledge. 
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Causation and Chance 
In an anthropocentric universe, causes of events are attributed to God, spiritual forces, 
and other people (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Makinde, 1988). Manifestations of evil and good 
fortune are mostly attributed to malicious human or spiritual agents, but the manifestation of 
goodness and good fortune are attributed to God (Mbiti, 1971 ). The attainment of good fortune 
is associated with a moral life, respect for others, observation of taboos, and the attainment of 
ritual and practical knowledge. However, such good behaviour is always attained through the 
mediation of spiritual and human benefactors. "To blame oneself or another for misfortune is 
acceptable; to claim total responsibility for one's own good fortune ... would be regarded as 
somewhat sacrilegious" (Minkus, 1984, p. 141). 
Although there is a clear understanding of the laws of nature, the concepts of chance and 
accident are said not to exist in traditional thought (Makinde, 1988; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981; 
Shelton, 1968) or "to play a minimal role indeed" (Sodipo, 1973, p. 15). The ultimate cause of 
an apparent chance event is a~ways attributable to a person (Minkus, 1984 ). Although Sodipo 
(1973) challenges the idea that chance is absent from African thought, Sodipo agrees that 
personalised causes are preferred because they fit into African religious cosmology. In a 
dynamic universe dominated by spiritual forces, "natural" explanations are inadequate simply 
because they do not include the spiritual dimension (Lowery-Palmer, 1980). Only an intelligent 
being can have "principle causality"; non-intelligent beings may at the most be endowed with a 
"derivative instrumental causality" by a principal intelligent cause (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981, p. 
110). Although Akan causal theory includes spiritual forces (in medicine and charms) which 
operate "automatically" (Minkus, 1984, p. 118) once their mechanisms have been set into 
motion, even these forces are dependent on the actions and wishes of personalised beings. 
Humans, by participating in the life force, are not passive spectators in the universe; they play an 
active, causative role in it, but are also vulnerable to and dependent on other humans and 
spiritual forces. 
Horton's ( 1973) claim that convergent causality operates in African knowledge is 
confirmed by the above. His claim that African knowledge is closed and uncritical will be 
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considered in the following section. 
Ways of Knowing 
There is no subject-object split in indigenous African thought (Onwuanibe, 1984). Subject and 
object are united in "a world consciousness which transcends both" (Lambo, 1973, p. 314) and 
in an "act oflove, from which the fruit of knowledge is born" (Senghor, 1965, p. 32). The other 
does not become object: "African reason is intuitive and participates in the object" (Senghor, 
1965, p. 34). For the African, knowledge is at once discovery and creation; the reason of the 
African is a "reason-by-embrace" (p. 33). Senghor (1965) describes the process of knowing as 
an emotional, social, and intuitive process. Similarly, Ruch & Anyanwu (1981) emphasise the 
personal nature of knowledge, which is attained through total experience: "Knowledge, 
therefore, comes from the co-operation of all human faculties and experiences. He sees, feels, 
imagines, reasons or thinks, and intuits all at the same time. Only through this method does he 
claim to have the knowledge of the Other" ( p. 94). However, personal experience is always 
connected to collective and shared experience (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
Senghor's (1965) view of African knowledge as being intuitive and "irrational" is 
criticised by for instance Bloom (1976), Horton (1973), and Oruka (1990). There is little doubt 
that common-sense and rational knowledge are essential for survival in any society and that 
African specialists employ a rational, critical, sceptical, and pragmatic attitude to information 
(Bloom, 1976; Horton, 1973; Peek, 1991; Sanda, 1978; Sogolo, 1993). Horton (1973) searches 
for similarities between the rational aspects of African traditional thought and western science 
and finds similarities in the nature and functions of theoretical thinking. Both systems of 
thought search for explanatory theory, place things in a causal context wider than that provided 
by common-sense, abstract and analyse, re-integrate, draw analogies, and construct models 
(Horton, 1973). However, Horton (1972, 1973) also finds differences between the two. These 
are to be found in the personalisation of forces in African thought, versus impersonal forces in 
science, as well as African thought being closed, "characterized by lack of awareness of 
alternatives, sacredness of beliefs, and anxiety about threats to them" (Horton, 1973, p. 481), 
whereas science is supposed to be open. 
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Horton's views have been criticised by Pratt (1972), Nduka (1974), and Sanda (1978). 
Sanda's argument is most incisive: Horton's science/non-science dichotomy is questionable, 
especially as far as the social sciences are concerned. In fact, most of the "limitations" he 
ascribes to African knowledge, may be equally applicable to the social sciences. "Freyerabend 
( 1975) says myth is much closer to science than even Horton is prepared to admit. Science owes 
its pre-eminence not so much to its superior rationality as it does to the political power of those 
whose ideology it is" (MacGaffey, 1981, p. 266). 
If one assumes that theoretical, rational, and critical ways of knowing are found in 
traditional African thought, this does not, however, preclude the use of intuitive, non-rational 
modes, as in divination, which involves a combination of "logical-analytical" and 
"intuitive-synthetic" modes of thinking (Peek, 1991). It is precisely the non-rational, puzzling, 
randomising nature of the divination process that creates opportunities for innovation in ideas 
(Parkin, 1991). The diviner is the articulator of new ideas that have not yet come into general 
social currency (Oruka, 1990). This challenges the stereotype of African knowledge being static 
or closed to innovation, but also the accompanying stereotype that innovation is always the 
result of critical, analytical, and rational thought. 
If truth is viewed as a consensually validated reality, the distinctions between rational 
and non-rational or scientific and non-scientific ways of knowing move to the background. In 
summarising a volume of work on African divination, Peek (1991) concludes: "Throughout this 
volume we see that "'truth' is in the action generated, the social reality constructed, and resultant 
well-being of the people; it is not to be found in an abstract system" (p. 135). 
The Transmission of Knowledge 
Knowledge of God's existence is intuitive and available to all humankind (Abraham, 
1962; Oguah, 1984 ). Other knowledge is obtained by birth, through revelation or initiation. 
The exchange of knowledge between different groups is spontaneous and expert knowledge may 
be borrowed or assimilated between groups, explaining the communality of fundamental beliefs 
across the continent (Mbiti, 1971 ). 
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Elders and specialists are viewed as repositories of knowledge and wisdom and it is their 
collective responsibility to educate the young. The emphasis is on practical wisdom (Abraham, 
1962), which is communicated in a variety of ways: Nonverbally through musical instruments 
such as talking drums, personal dress and masks, art and other symbols, as well as orally via 
narratives, riddles, songs, myths, folktales, and legends (Oreh, 1980). 
The deepest expression of African cultural reality has been through art, music, folksong 
and myths rather than logical analysis. Through these procedures, the African culture 
constructed an edifice of truth that enabled the people to achieve a relative balance with 
their environment. (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981, p. 89) 
The oral literature of Africa is recited or sung and often accompanied by musical 
instruments. It includes legends, songs, myths, proverbs, folk-tales, place legends, myths of 
origin, and salutation poetry. Although these transmit religious and other knowledge (Boateng, 
1985; Mbiti, 1971; Nwoga, 1980), they constitute "a way oflife, rather than an exclusive area of 
life" (Nwoga, 1980, p. 58). The major genres are characterised by a metaphorical process and 
fall into a cyclical, not linear, mode. As history, they serve more as comments than as records; 
as "a way of observing a society that reveals the way a community feels about itself'' (Scheub, 
1985, p. 2), and are continually adapted to fit present realities (Abraham, 1962). 
Proverbs contain "whimsical and pragmatic wisdom" (Abraham, 1962, p. 72) of the past 
in a distillated form and serve to stimulate discussion and argumentation in the present (Gyekye, 
1975). Proverbial sayings are widespread and their themes similar across the continent 
(Boateng, 1985). Abraham (1962) further identifies wellerisms, aetiological tales, fables, 
cantefables, and mixtures of verse and narrative as part of the oral tradition. Trickster stories, 
similar to riddles, have an educative function. However, it is notable that characterisation, the 
"distinct individual" (Abraham, 1962, p. 96) is absent from these stories. There are only human 
types. 
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Fernandez (1980) describes riddles as 
iconic thought primarily producing and working with images more or less visual and 
concrete in effect. .. the information it communicates is not coded in rules to be abstracted 
and applied. It is the nature of iconic thought to have much more of a personal 
component and also to excite contextualization. (p. 57) 
Riddles have no single correct answer and are posed to a group. Each member of the group 
ventures answers drawn from personal experience and the final answer is determined by 
consensus and circumstance. Fernandez terms this process edification by puzzlement (p. 44), as 
it uses metaphor to tie together different aspects of experience into an integrated world view. 
Riddles do not only have an instructive function; they illicit creative, contextualised, and 
edifying knowledge. They offer a stark contrast to western intellectual exercises such as the 
"riddles" posed in intelligence tests, where rules have to be extracted and applied within limited 
and self-contained contexts. 
Peek (1991) and Fernandez (1991) view edification by puzzlement as a fundamental 
process in the African oral tradition and as underlying the creative resourcefulness of the 
divination process. "A divination system is often the primary institutional means of articulating 
the epistemology of a people .... Divination systems do not simply reflect other aspects of a 
culture; they are the means ... of knowing which underpin and validate all else" (Peek, 1991, p. 
2). The process of edification by puzzlement may thus be viewed as fundamental to the process 
of knowing, as well as the transmission of knowledge, in African cultures. 
The element of edification through a unification of opposites is also present in myths. 
Ray (1980) illustrates how myths of the origins of death are concerned with the complementarity 
of life and death and their significance within a total cosmology. Myths explain the place of 
humans in the universe, but the knowledge conveyed is less concerned with facts than with 
providing a feeling of security in the present through a sense of connectedness with the past. 
Myths always have a social and ethical dimension and display the logic of analogy (Ruch & 
Anyanwu, 1981). African languages lend themselves to imagery by analogy. "The object does 
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not mean what it represents but what it suggests, what it creates" (Senghor, 1965, p. 85). "The 
myth employs certain fundamental moral, social, ritual, and cosmological ideas, and 'projects' 
them on to the primordial past in order to explain the ultimate origins of the cosmos and life and 
death" (Ray, 1980, p. 61). 
Ritual. Art. and Symbolism 
Africans used art instead of writing to represent their thoughts (Abraham, 1962). Most 
African art is not representational, literary or descriptive, but abstract and symbolic (Kamalu, 
1990). Art displays a moral-philosophical orientation and portrays the forces of the universe. 
Art is "direct, magical, attempting a sort of plastic analogue of onomatopoeia, to evince and 
evoke feelings the subjects induced in one" (Abraham, 1962, p. 112). Art, like oral literature, 
serves to provide a synthesis between opposites and to represent the spiritual, as in the wearing 
of ceremonial masks (Kamalu, 1990; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981 ). By symbolising the immaterial 
it unites spiritual beings with humans (Udechukwu, 1980). "African art was the emotional and 
intellectual peg on which tribal cultures hung spiritual truth" (Udechukwu, 1980, p. 86). 
Rituals, such as those practised at birth, initiation, marriage, and funerals, serve to 
integrate the individual into the community, but also have an educational purpose. During each 
rite, the person is introduced to knowledge appropriate to his or her age and status in society. 
Rituals and feasts serve as moral and social control and surveillance, provide entertainment, and 
transmit knowledge (Oreh, 1980). Spiritual beings are included in rituals, music, and dance. 
Through these symbolic acts, humans influence the links with those around them. Life is 
dominated by the active influence of these links, thus life is interspersed with symbolic acts 
(Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981 ). 
Rituals and myths are closely related. The ritual is "the myth in action" (Ruch & 
Anyanwu, 1981, p. 108), promoting spiritual harmony and wholeness (Modum, 1980) by 
depicting the interrelationships among beings. "It is through ritual that the unexplainable is 
understood, that chaos is made to be ordered within the logic of tradition" (Richards, 1985, p. 
213). Ritual transcends the limitations of space and time, unites humans with the spiritual 
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(Richards, 1985), and serves as renewal, replenishment, redefinition, and rebirth. It is "a 
statement of continuity, unity and community" (Richards, 1985, p. 218) and plays an important 
part in specialised knowledge. 
Specialised Knowledge 
All African societies designate certain people as having specialised knowledge, such as 
healers, rain-makers, and rulers. "Specialists are in effect the repositories in knowledge, 
practice, and, symbolically, of the religious life of their communities" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 193). 
The duties and kinds of knowledge of specialists overlap to a large extent and vary between 
different societies, so that a clear classification is impossible (MacGaffey, 1980). In the 
discussion that follows, the emphasis will fall on specialists whose domain of power/knowledge 
has specific relevance to psychology. However, these specialists are regarded as experts in 
almost every facet of individual and community life (Lambo, 1973). In an anthropocentric 
society, knowledge is essentially for and about humans, and all specialists are ultimately 
concerned with "psychological" issues. 
Kinds of Specialists 
Herbalists 
Herbalists (also called traditional doctors, traditional healers, or medicine-men) are 
concerned with the prevention and treatment of sickness, disease, and misfortune (Mbiti, 1971). 
Herbalists, such as the inyanga in Zulu culture, primarily employ herbal and other medicine 
(Corin & Bibeau, 1980; F. S. Edwards, 1986), though some use divination as well. 
Diviners 
Diviners (like the isangoma in Zulu culture) are healers who use divination as part of a 
healing process (Corin & Bibeau, 1980; F. S. Edwards, 1986). They serve as a medium or link 
between the living and the living-dead and receive messages from the spirit-world. Divination 
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is the process whereby a person becomes possessed by a spirit so that the spirit may 
communicate directly through the diviner (Mbiti, 1971) or indirectly through devices or objects 
(Peek, 1991 ). "A divination system is a standardized process deriving from a learned discipline 
based on an extensive body of knowledge.... Divining processes are diverse, but all follow set 
routines by which otherwise inaccessible information is obtained" (Peek, 1991, p. 2). 
Priests 
Diviners and herbalists have religious functions; priests may have healing functions 
(Mbiti, 1971). Priests may also serve as mediums with the spirit world and perform similar 
functions to healers. Among the Akan of Ghana, the priest is a source of knowledge and 
information (Abraham, 1962). In the Yoruba system oflfa divination, the Ifa priest/ess serves as 
general sage, diviner, and herbalist. 
Training 
Healers and priests organise themselves into professional bodies, exercising control over 
the profession, guarding privileged knowledge, and controlling the training and qualifications of 
healers. Most healers enter the profession after receiving a call from the ancestors, in the form 
of a temporary illness, spirit possession or similar psychological state, which is then identified 
by a healer as such (Buhrmann, 1981, 1984; Mbiti, 1971). Some enter the profession by birth. 
Healers serve a long and arduous apprenticeship. Ifa priests and priestesses are trained in 
"convents" and their training may last from childhood until their middle years (Makinde, 1988). 
Training involves the whole person, who gradually gains entry into privileged knowledge 
(Buhrmann, 1984 ). The healing art is attained "through self-denial, dedication, prolonged 
meditation and training" (Lambo, 1973, p. 312). Training ends with a formal and public 
initiation ceremony which earns the healer great respect in the community (Lambo, 1973). 
Functions 
Healers discover the cause of sickness, personal or interpersonal problems, identify the 
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person responsible, identify the nature of the disease or problem, apply treatment, and prevent 
its recurrence. They purge witches, detect sorcery, remove curses, control the living-dead and 
spirits, and play the role of counsellors, judges, comforters, and supporters during crises (Mbiti, 
1971 ). In addition, healers and priests play a central role in communal rites and important 
seasonal activities, thus having preventative and integrative functions in the community (Corin 
& Bibeau, 1980; S. D. Edwards, 1990). 
Explanations of Misfortune 
Explanations of personal misfortune follow the general view of causality in African 
society: Sickness, disease, and misfortune are believed to be caused by the ill-will or ill-action 
of one person/spirit against another, often through the agency of witchcraft or magic (Boussat & 
Dupuy, 1975; Mbiti, 1971). Minims (1984) refers to the following causes in order of 
prevalence: Punishment by ancestral spirits, deities or personal protective spirits; witchcraft and 
sorcery; the unfolding of a person's destiny; personal carelessness. The central question in 
explanations of illness is: "Who made me ill? Why am I ill?" (Daynes & Msengi, 1979). 
A differentiation is made between disease and illness (the disease within its cultural 
context, including its cause) and both are treated. Most African healers have detailed 
knowledge of physical illnesses and employ a classification system to "diagnose" and point to a 
method of treatment. Physical and spiritual problems are differentiated but viewed holistically 
(Minkus, 1984 ). Both are seen as an imbalance or disequilibrium of a person within her total 
ecological and spiritual system (Brownell et al., 1987; Corin & Bibeau, 1980; Lambo, 1973). 
This view transcends the body/mind dichotomy which is characteristic of western views of 
illness (Cheetham & Griffiths, 1982; Cheetham & Rzadkowolski, 1980). 
The Process of Healing 
Healers use the force of nature and other secret knowledge including mediums, oracles, 
spirit possession, divination objects, common sense, intuitive knowledge, insight, and hypnotism 
(Mbiti, 1971 ). Herbalists use "medicine", whose healing properties are ascribed to their spirit 
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or inherent power. Charms may be used to secure protection or success. Charms and medicines 
derive their power from the spirit of their ingredients, their material form, and the ceremony and 
incantations used in their fabrication and use (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Minkus, 1984). Medicine 
and charms always have symbolic power (Corin & Bibeau, 1980) and may be combined with 
other physical treatments such as purges, immersion in water, or blood-letting (Lowery-Palmer, 
1980). Their use is integrated into a process that involves the total person within a total 
community (Sogolo, 1993). 
Researchers have difficulty in describing the process of divination, due to its intuitive 
nature. Attempts have been made from the viewpoint of Jungian psychology (Buhrmann, 1981, 
1984; Bilhrmann & Gqomfa, 1981), systemic psychotherapy (Shuda, 1986) person-centred 
therapy (Holdstock, 1981a), and psychoanalysis (Lambo, 1972). These studies find similarities 
and differences between African and other therapeutic systems. All diviners follow certain set 
routines to obtain information to bear upon a problem. 
Some type of device is usually employed, from a simple sliding object to the myriad 
symbolic items shaken in diviners' baskets. Sometimes the diviner's body becomes the 
vehicle of communication through spirit possession.... The final diagnosis and plan for 
action are rendered collectively by the diviner and the client(s). (Peek, 1991, p. 2) 
Divination combines an apparent contradiction: It is a mystical process producing 
concrete, practical results. The diviner is presented with a practical problem, brings forth new, 
previously unobtainable, exclusive knowledge, usually from a randomising source (which has 
been likened to a projective technique), orders this knowledge, and, in consultation with the 
client( s ), integrates it with existing knowledge to shape a solution and outline a plan of action. 
The solution is part of a mutually arrived at narrative of a client's life and a history of the event 
in question and considers the client's total life situation (Awanbor, 1982; Peek, 1991 ). 
Healing is always a holistic process (Awanbor, 1982; Corin & Bibeau, 1980; S. D. 
Edwards, 1990; Sogolo, 1993). Bilhrmann (1981) and Buhrmann and Gqomfa (1981) describe 
how healing rituals serve to integrate the affiicted individual with the community, while serving 
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at the same time to re-establish the integration of the community as a whole. The ritual may 
involve singing, the telling of myths, sacrifices, dancing, confession, and the analysis of dreams 
(Biihrmann, 1984; Lambo, 1973). Awanbor (1982) and Lambo (1973) describe all African 
healing processes as community approaches. Healing occurs through but also for the 
community. 
Cults of Affliction 
The practice of specialised healers from inside the community, is complemented and 
supplemented by a tradition of healing cults of affliction existing at the margins of the 
established social order (Corin & Bibeau, 1980; Devisch, 1993). Such a cult consists of a group 
made up of healers, who are all former patients, and provide treatment and training. Symptoms 
brought for treatment include psychological disturbances associated with the class of spirits that 
the cult specialises in, as well as problems that have resisted treatment by other healers. Most 
cult practices involve trance and possession states. These cults principally serve persons who 
are socially marginal or disempowered within traditional structures, such as women in 
patriarchal societies, and thereby offer a counterbalance to the dominant powers. 
African Knowledge and Power 
All power ultimately derives from the life-force. Everything possesses innate force or 
power. Knowledge is essential in activating the latent power inherent in humans and things 
(Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
l\1ystical Power 
The life force may manifest itself in magic, divination, witchcraft, sorcery, and other 
mysterious phenomena (Mbiti, 1971 ). The distinction between these phenomena is not clear 
(MacGaffey, 1980; Mbiti, 1971). Researchers tend to impose western conceptions of witchcraft 
and magic on African societies, which do not necessarily coincide (Hallen & Sodipo, 1986). 
However, there is agreement that some people have special powers, for instance a "second sight" 
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or telepathic power, which may be described as an ability to use magic (MacGaffey, 1980; 
Hallen & Sodipo, 1986). This power may be used by witches or sorcerers to harm others; 
diviners use the same power to heal (Corin & Bibeau, 1980; Hallen & Sodipo, 1986; 
Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
In addition to the official experts, some people are endowed with mystical power 
because of unusual attributes, such as twins or the physically disabled. Attitudes towards these 
exceptional humans vary from fear, resulting in their being killed, to veneration (Mbiti, 1971). 
In most African societies, elders are endowed with special powers and heroes may achieve 
mythical or divine status. Heroes are traditionally distinguished by their magical powers, not by 
physical prowess (Bird & Kendall, 1980). 
Power and Secrecy 
All specialists have a veil of secrecy surrounding their knowledge (Makinde, 1988; 
Mbiti, 1971) and secrecy is included in the code of conduct used by professional associations of 
healers (Ngubane, 1977). Similarly, witchcraft is characterised by secrecy, the hero in 
traditional myths cloaks himself and the instruments of his power in secrecy (Bird & Kendall, 
1980), and elders maintain their control over lower ranks, especially youths, by virtue of secret 
knowledge (Murphy, 1980). 
One explanation for the secrecy surrounding special powers, is that society fears those 
who are powerful and may easily accuse the powerful of witchcraft, leading to severe 
punishment and even death. Thus even diviners are careful not to expose their powers, and 
attribute these to spiritual beings (Hallen & Sodipo, 1986). If the diviner were to claim personal 
responsibility for her success, she would risk being identified by society as dangerous. This 
emphasises the limitations that were placed on claiming personal or individual 
power/knowledge (Hallen & Sodipo, 1986) by a tightly-knit community, and the power 
exercised by the "powerless" over the "powerful". Secrecy serves to reinforce the power of 
specialists but also, paradoxically, to protect these specialists from the power of ordinary 
society. 
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Objects as Power 
Objects such as charms or amulets may be endowed with power by powerful humans, 
spirits, or gods, and may be used either as magical protection against evil forces or as harmful 
agents (Makinde, 1988; Mbiti, 1971; Minlrns, 1984). Their power is derived from the spirit 
inherent in their ingredients, as well as the ritual circumstances and incantations of their use 
(Corin & Bibeau, 1980; Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Makinde, 1988). Possessions are extensions of a 
person's personal power and may carry the intentions of the owner (Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
Language and Thought as Power 
Language and thought are powerful causal agents that may cause harm or offer 
protection to others (Lambo, 1972; Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Makinde, 1988; Minkus, 1984). Both 
thought and language have the power to bring about the state which they symbolise. No object 
has power without incantations (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Makinde, 1988; Minkus, 1984). "The 
power of words, meaning, and bearing on human happiness, misery, sanity, and insanity is 
enormous" (Makinde, 1988, p. 97). 
Speech is powerful: "The word, the spoken word, is the expression par excellence of the 
life-force, of being in its fullness" (Senghor, 1965, p. 84). The words of senior members of 
society carry power, especially when spoken during moments of crisis. Formal curses and 
blessings, especially those invoking deities, are extremely powerful (Makinde, 1988; Mbiti, 
1971; Minkus, 1984). A curse may become an automatic force, continuing to destroy until 
removed by specific ritual procedures. According to Senghor (in Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981), the 
word is "not only an expression of knowledge, but knowledge itself, ready for action, already 
action" (p. 113). 
African names have power, as they have a descriptive meaning bearing upon the person's 
life and conferring a specific identity on the person (Mbiti, 1971; Minkus, 1984; Ruch & 
Anyanwu, 1981). To know a person's name is to have power over him (Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
Names are "proverbial" or "definite descriptions" (Kaphagawani, 1990). They may determine 
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the nature of a person if given at birth, but they may also be changed by society to provide a 
better description of the person in later life (Kaphagawani, 1990). In the words of Pongweni (in 
Kaphagawani, 1990, p. 199), names are "long experiences summarised in a cryptic expression. 
[They] have a function similar to that of proverbs; they are learned, pithy expressions of the 
knowledge and wisdom of the elders". 
The Circulation of Power/knowledge 
Ruch and Anyanwu (1981) explain the functioning of the life force with a metaphor of a 
power system, where the current that passes through the network is more important than the 
individual power points: 
Nature is a kind of power-grid, connected to a distant power-station. No light-fitting, no 
transformer, no switch and no motor within the grid is entirely independent of the others. 
The network of beings-with-force is a network of booster generators each of which 
contributes its share to the overall power which is both generated and consumed. The 
various points in this network, however, do not play an equal part, nor do they share 
equally in the overall force available. There is a clearly defined hierarchy of forces. (p. 
151) 
This hierarchy corresponds to the ontological hierarchy (Lowery-Palmer, 1980; Makinde, 1988) 
and the distribution of knowledge within this hierarchy coincides with that of power. The power 
hierarchy, as essentially a descending analysis of power, tends to dominate the literature and 
conceals the collaborative nature of power relations and the circulation of power throughout 
society. An ascending analysis (Foucault, 1980b) reveals a process of mutual control between 
those lower and those higher in the hierarchy. The stereotype of the diviner imposing his or her 
power on ordinary humans is easily eroded. "Ordinary" (very powerless according to Mbiti, 
[1971]) humans do not only accept but also display scepticism towards divination. They 
carefully select diviners, seek multiple sessions, and may consciously deceive them in order to 
test their knowledge (Peek, 1991 ). Their active collaboration is an essential ingredient in the 
divination process. Society as a whole exercises control over those considered powerful. 
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Healers who are considered ineffective will not be consulted or may even be punished severely 
in some societies and heroes can only achieve heroic status by receiving praise from the 
community. 
In all societies, there is a dominating power/knowledge system (Foucault, 1980b) 
circulating through society. The dominant power/knowledge is rooted in and confirmed by 
interactions between members of society. In African society, this dominant power/knowledge 
manifests itself in the ontological power/knowledge hierarchy. However, Foucault stresses that 
all knowledge systems are continually threatened and renewed from within, by pockets of 
alternative, resistant, or deviant knowledges. The dominating power hierarchy is cross-cut by 
some persons of lower status achieving power, for instance women becoming witches or healers 
in patriarchal societies (Abraham, 1962; Hallen & Sodipo, 1986; Lowery-Palmer, 1980). 
All those individuals considered powerful in traditional society may be viewed as 
potential threats to stability. By virtue of their special power/knowledge, they continually run 
the risk of being regarded as Other and punished. However, society also functions to integrate 
these "deviants" by sanctioning their power/knowledge. Once thus sanctioned, their alternative 
knowledge serves as a source of renewal and creativity within society. This contrasts with the 
treatment of the Other in the modem era (see chapter 5), which implied, in the first place, their 
separation and alienation from society (Foucault, 1967, 1977). 
Power and knowledge were inseparable in pre-colonial African thought. Both, however, 
had a metaphysical and communal emphasis that differs essentially from modem individualising 
power/knowledge. Pre-colonial African power/knowledge is similar to pre-modem forms of 
power/knowledge in Europe regarding its metaphysical aspect, when 
man coincided with his own consciousness of a power to contemplate or to produce the 
ideas of all beings, among which man defined himself as living, speaking, and 
tool-making; this power was experienced as deficient or defective in the eyes of an 
infinite power that was thought to base [sic] the phenomenon of human power and its 
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concession or delegation of some part of that same infinite power. (Canguilhem, 1994, 
p. 86) 
A second difference between pre-colonial African and modern power/knowledge is to be 
found in the personal sanctioning of formal power relations. Although power/knowledge is 
asymmetrically, that is, hierarchically organised in African societies, "the asymmetrical exercise 
of power owing to differences in lineage, gender, and/or generation is still interwoven in 
communicative relations between groups and individuals situated horizontally with respect to 
one another" (Ingram, 1994, p. 241 ). The personal, communal sanctioning of power relations 
contrasts with modern bureaucratic power which depends on impersonal, individualising, legal 
sanction, and modern scientific power/knowledge, which depends on metanarratives for 
legitimation. These differences are further explored in chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
African knowledge, as it exists in recent discourse, emerges from an assumed dichotomy 
between African and western worldviews. African knowledge is identified as either different 
from or similar to western knowledge. Its relation to western knowledge is located in its 
otherness, though efforts are made to bring the Other closer by searching for similarities. 
Descriptions of the indigenous equivalent of psychological knowledge are located within this 
discourse around similarities and differences between two worldviews (Kottler, 1990). 
Some of the distinctions that shape this discourse are holism/dualism; 
integration/analysis; spirituality/materialism; life force/material forces; 
anthropocentrism/scientism; communalism/individualism; circular time/linear time; 
conservation/progress; closed/open; intuition/rationalism; oral/written; supernatural/natural; 
magic/science. Similarities are located within these same distinctions, for instance by 
demonstrating the rational, empirical, theoretical, or scientific nature of African knowledge. 
African indigenous knowledge has a partly invisible companion, a shadow that never 
leaves its side: So-called "western" knowledge. The companion is assumed to be scientific, 
42 
rational, empirical, objective, and analytic. It originates from the land of the Enlightenment, 
where modernism promises a superior power/knowledge. The hegemony of this land is now 
being questioned and the shadow has been described as the "rotting corpse of a particular 
complex, multifaceted, projected self-image, that of the Greco-Roman/European 'rational man', 
a self-image raised to the level of paradigm" (Outlaw, 1990, p. 226). If Outlaw is correct and 
the shadow is already dead, will its spirit be immortal, trailing African knowledge to infinity, or 
will it gradually recede to be replaced by a successor? 
The following chapter deals with an earlier companion of African knowledge: Islam. 
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CHAPTERJ 
ISLAM IN AFRICA 
Religion, far from being a recalcitrant hallucination 
of continuity, signals an inevitable resilience and 
openness of the present - a series of possible futures 
all potentially applicable and livable to a particular 
people. (Simone, 1994, p. 12) 
Although indigenous African religions feature prominently in the relevance discourse in 
psychology, few references are made to Islam. Boussat and Dupuy (1975), Desfarges (1982), 
and Vassaf (1987) view differences between Islamic and psychological knowledge as 
contributing to the irrelevance of psychological knowledge. This irrelevance is further 
illustrated in descriptions of the destructive interaction between Eurocentric psychology and 
Islamic traditions within the colonial context by Dequeker, Fanon, Lacaton, Micucci, and Rame 
(1955), Fanon (1967d), Fanon and Azoulay (1954), Fanon and Geronimi (1956), and Fanon and 
Sanchez ( 1956). 
Since its inception, Islam has co-existed with indigenous African religions, has taken 
root in a wide variety of forms in different parts of the continent, and is still growing in 
influence (Farah, 1987; Fernandez, 1978; Mbiti, 1971), so that the Muslim populace recently 
exceeded 40% of the African populace south of the Sahara (Farah, 1987). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the circulation of 
power/knowledge in African Islam, rather than the origins and doctrines of this religion. The 
chapter begins with a consideration of the relation between religion, knowledge, and power, 
which is central to the field of religious studies in Africa. 
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Religion, Knowledge, and Power 
Information on African religions is filtered through the discourses of the anthropology of 
religion, oriental studies, missiology, colonial doctrine, and African political ideology, 
philosophy, and theology. These discourses employ the categories and assumptions of western 
social science, which sets religion apart from and contrasts it with politics, economics, and other 
institutions. Since many African societies often do not separate these institutions, the adherents 
of evolutionary theory have declared them to be lagging behind in a process of increased 
differentiation, that is, conformity to a western secular model. "The derogatory assessment of 
religion and belief implicit in the evolutionary assumption in modem thought originates with 
Francis Bacon. It is a function of scientism or the myth of the scientific method" (MacGaffey, 
1981, p. 229). 
The relative neglect of the role of religious knowledge in the relevance discourse in 
psychology may be attributed to this habit of secularism, viewing religious knowledge or beliefs 
as separate from "real" knowledge. A secondary status is ascribed to religious knowledge in 
terms of an assumed hierarchy of knowledge dominated by scientism (MacGaffey, 1981 ). 
"Religion has become an affliction that other people have, a bizarre form of discourse ... for 
which only bizarre explanations come to hand" (MacGaffey, 1981, p.230). The rational 
discourse of the Enlightenment (Fernandez, 1978) is supposed to ultimately displace the 
confused discourses of religion or at least relegate them to a separate existence neatly 
demarcated by the borders of church or mosque. 
In contrast, Geertz (in MacGaffey, 1981) defines religion as 
a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods 
and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic. (p. 231) 
This definition stresses the role of religion in creating consensually validated realities and truths 
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within an accepted cosmology and thus it applies equally to ideology, belief, and social science. 
All knowledge requires a metaphysical point of departure, since it is selective, and all 
knowledge tends to replicate itself through conversion processes. Religious as well as scientific 
knowledge are especially powerful proselytisers as they make absolute truth claims. 
In Africa, religion functions not only as a political, economic, and social but also as a 
psychological force. Religious knowledge forms part of the epistemes (Foucault, 1970), 
ideologies (MacGaffey, 1981), and indigenous psychologies (Heelas & Lock, 1981) of Africa 
and competes with psychology for followers. Islam currently has a unique function in creating 
alternative, local knowledges challenging dominant western secular power/knowledge systems. 
The literature on Islam in Africa varies along a continuum according to the interpretation 
of the power of this religion. One pole represents a view that emphasises the universal 
hegemony and imposition of Islam on Africa. From this position, indigenous African 
knowledge has been disqualified and subjugated by Islam. The opposite pole represents a view 
that emphasises the resilience of indigenous beliefs, the integration of universal Islam into these 
beliefs, and the revitalising function of local variants thereof The rest of this chapter will 
reflect both positions, following the principle of double description (Bateson, 1979) in order to 
arrive at both a descending and ascending analysis of power/knowledge. 
Historical Background 
Within a century after the death of the prophet Mohammed in A.D. 632, Islamic religion 
and culture had swept across Northern and the Hom of Africa. Where it encountered early 
Christianity there was a prolonged battle, especially in Ethiopia and Egypt, where Coptic 
Christians remained. As early as the ninth century, Islam penetrated southwards via trade routes 
into west African societies. In the Sudan region, Islam moved from east to west through Arab 
traders and conquerors. It probably arrived on the east coast of Africa in the seventh century, 
where there were already well-established Arab trade settlements. Apart from in what is now 
Somalia, it only began to move inland in the late 18th and 19th centuries when Arab trade went 
into the interior (Mbiti, 1971). Its further spread into the continent coincided with the spread of 
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European colonialism, after which its adherents were doubled (Farah, 1987). 
Islam's early entry in Africa has ensured that it has a strong African identity, preceding 
the major spread of Christianity by centuries. It was spread by Africans to Africans, in contrast 
to Christianity which predominantly spread through European missionaries. Islam's history has 
ensured a wide spectrum of integration into African societies. Some North African societies 
have always formed a part of Islamic-Arab culture and have adopted Muslim political and legal 
structures. Some societies remain essentially traditional but have integrated certain elements of 
Islam into indigenous structures (Farah, 1987; Mbiti, 1971). Even these societies, however, 
have thereby gained entry into, and are being shaped by, the power of a universal community. 
The Universal Power of Islam 
The term Islam means "submission" (to God). Entry into the religion is gained by 
acknowledging Allah as the omnipotent and omniscient Creator, the only God, and Mohammed 
as his messenger/prophet. By submission to Allah, absolute power is granted to His will. Allah 
is the source of all knowledge and the only truth. The only direct access to this truth is through 
the Qur'an, as revealed to his prophet Mohammed. This global, unitary truth serves to specify 
the lives of Muslims. In addition to the Qur'an, Islamic knowledge has evolved a system oflaw 
(the Shari'a) governing every aspect of life through detailed prescriptions. It embodies a 
totalising, rule-governed, judicial power, rooted in a tradition of scholarship. Its body of 
knowledge reflects a view of a perfect society, ultimate justice and equality, the improvement of 
mankind, the attainment of social harmony, and personal salvation (Behishti & Bahonar, 1982). 
Participation in the universal power oflslam is, however, primarily attained through 
ritual, which forms part of a "carefully worked out social and ideological programme" (Ruthven, 
1984, p. 83). This programme was originally devised to unite the diverse Arab clans into a 
single social body. Islamic ritual enters into every aspect of daily life and thereby ensures 
uniformity across cultures. Ritual knowledge is emphasised in the five pillars of wisdom which 
represent Islam's most basic beliefs and practices (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994; Ruthven, 1984). These 
include the recital of the testament of belief in Arabic, prayer recital preceded by ritual 
47 
cleansing, fasting during Ramadan, obligatory almsgiving, and performance of the Hajj 
(pilgrimage) (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). The jihad (striving in the way of God) is regarded by some 
as a sixth pillar. Jihad is also associated with holy war (Trimingham, 1968). 
Global uniformity in ritual embodies an impersonal, totalising, disciplinary power 
(Foucault, 1977) which links the believer to the Umaa, the global community of believers, 
through visible tokens of belonging: 
On an average the Muslim invokes the name of Allah (God) no less than twenty times a 
day. No other known prophet of a monotheistic religion receives as much mention in 
prayer as the Prophet of Islam. More children bear Mohammed name than any other 
popular name known to mankind. No known body of sacred literature is as thoroughly 
and systematically committed to memory, or is recited as frequently, as the holy book of 
Islam. (Farah, 1987, p. 6) 
Individuals are recruited into an active role in their own subjugation (Islamisation) 
through practices which are detailed in the Shari'a and serve as disciplinary techniques of power. 
These include the organisation and arrangement of persons in space (as in facing towards Mecca 
in prayer) and time (the Muslim calendar), the exclusion and inclusion of groups (believers and 
unbelievers), and especially large scale disciplinary techniques, such as prayer: 
The physical movements of the Muslim prayer were, in addition to any spiritual 
dimension, a means of promoting group solidarity.... By subjecting itself at regular daily 
intervals to a series of identical and repeated physical actions, the Ummaa subsumed the 
particularisms of tribal or racial identity in a common physical discipline. In the original 
context of bedouin Arabia, and in parallel conditions elsewhere, the Muslim prayer had 
an effect similar to the discipline of the parade ground: The new recruits were welded 
into a single uniform body under Allah's generalship. The psychological impact of 
prayer was also effective at an individual level: By insisting on the interruption of 
ordinary mundane activities at least three times each day, it continuously reminded the 
believer of the superior claims of God and the community. (Ruthven, 1984, p. 83) 
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The Islamic regimes of prayer, recital, cleansing, and fasting recall Foucault's (1977) 
descriptions of "bio-power" and the creation of "docile bodies". "A body is docile that may be 
subjected, used, transformed, and improved" (Foucault, 1984, p. 180). Attention to detail, as in 
ritualistic movements and documentation of the minutiae of daily actions, may be described as 
"infinitesimal power over the active body" (p. 181 ). Disciplinary methods "made possible the 
meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its 
forces and imposed on them a relation of docility-utility" (p. 181 ). 
Disciplinary power techniques are concerned with meticulous detail. "For the 
disciplined man, as for the true believer, no detail is unimportant" (Foucault, 1984, p. 184). The 
requirements of ritual ablution preceding prayer provide an example of the degree of detail 
involved in the practical application of the Shari'a. "Muslim education is a drill which pays 
permanent attention to the functioning of vegetative life. Drinking, eating, urinating ... vomiting, 
bleeding, shaving, cutting one's nails ... all of them become the object of detailed prescriptions" 
(Ruthven, 1984, p. 163). 
Through the application of the Shari'a, the universalism of the Qur'an shades 
imperceptibly into the particularities of social life. Islam, as a technique of internal peace and 
order, implemented "the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, 
useful troop, of the regiment.... The dream of a perfect society was born but it was also a 
military dream to attain ... automatic docility" (Foucault, 1984, pp. 185-186). The dream of 
Islamic society attracted millions of Africans but thereby integrated them into a previously 
unknown regime of power which threatened the power of indigenous knowledge. 
Islam and African Cosmology 
Islam's monotheism is the central tenet of the faith. "Over ninety percent of Muslim 
theology is concerned with Allah as the one real God who is indivisible in nature" (Farah, 1987, 
p. 109). Islam's monotheism is familiar to indigenous African cosmology. Allah, like the 
African conception of God, is a supreme power, not a personal being, and man's relation to this 
God shows itself in ritual action (Adelowo, 1984). However, Islamic monotheism rules out 
49 
lesser deities and the intermediaries between man and God. Submission to local deities and 
communal knowledge is replaced by submission to a universal God and entry into a universal 
community of believers (Farah, 1987). 
Allah's role as the creator of all things is similar to the role of God in African religions. 
Angels, unknown in Africa, serve as His messengers and guardians of man. Satan, a fallen 
angel, is the manifestation of evil, and some angels guard the gates of hell (Farah, 1987). The 
division of forces into God/Satan, good/evil and heaven/hell contrasts with the universal life 
force and holism of African religion. 
A more familiar duality is that between body and immortal soul. However, in Islam the 
soul is judged in the hereafter. The concept of the afterlife, separated into heaven and hell, is 
unfamiliar to African religions, as is the emphasis on individual salvation. However, the Shari'a 
emphasises family and communal cohesion as well (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). This cohesion does 
not, however, apply to the extended genealogy of the clan, but to smaller family units. The 
community involved is the global community of believers. This implies a new division between 
believers and unbelievers. 
The middle eastern Islamic extended family further differs from the African one in that it 
embraces both genealogy and physical closeness (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). Its patriarchal 
organisation differs· from the partly matriarchal organisation of many African societies (Sow, 
1985). However, similarities exist in the sanctity accorded to marriage, the practice of 
polygamy, and an emphasis on kinship (Kyewalyanga, 1976). Islamic societies tend to replicate 
and extend kinship patterns in their general organisation and communal values are treasured 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). 
In Islamic cosmology, humans are separated from the angels by the jinn, who are similar 
to spirits and thereby familiar to Africa. However, the spiritual world of jinn is strictly social 
whereas African spirits are closely aligned to the natural world. "Islam, by emphasising the 
special relationship and duties of man toward God and his neighbour, denigrates man's sense of 
union or identity with nature" (Thayer, 1983, p.128). 
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Although the Islamic emphasis on ritual pervading daily life is similar to indigenous 
religions, global uniformity in ritual contrasts with the rituals of indigenous African religions 
which are localised and personally sanctioned. The blending and unity of religious, social, and 
moral life in Islam corresponds to that in African religions, but the scope of Islamic unity is far 
wider. 
The cyclical time of African religion is replaced by the Islamic calendar, based on lunar 
months. Whereas African life is marked by rituals corresponding to agricultural events, Islamic 
ritual events follow their own pattern of daily interruption of activities for prayer and a 
succession of annual religious events (Thayer, 1983; Trimingham, 1968). Time takes on a 
strong linear and future orientation, as it marches forward towards judgement and the afterlife 
(Fisher, 1985). The unity of space and time in African thought is disrupted by Islam. Where the 
natal village was central, Mecca becomes central. The boundaries of the familiar world are 
defined by Islam, rather than genealogy and the land. Holy places are sanctified by the holy men 
of Islam, not the ancestors. The microcosm of the village is replaced with the macrocosm of 
Islam (Fisher, 1985; Horton, 1971). 
Whereas oral knowledge dominates indigenous religions, written texts and literacy are 
central in Islam (Fisher, 1985). Formal, literate education becomes the vehicle of knowledge, 
whereas African education is integrated with daily life. 
Islamic Knowledge 
"Allah, as the Qur'an repeatedly and categorically declares, 'encompasses everything in 
knowledge"' (Ruthven, 1984, p. 116). Human knowledge can only be partial and is attained 
through God's revelation by means of signs or miracles. The signs fall into two categories: The 
miracle of the Qur'an and the evidence of the natural world which can be known directly 
through perception and reason. The Qur'an demands that this knowledge be actively pursued 
(Behishti & Bahonar, 1982). While Europe was enveloped in ignorance during its dark Middle 
Ages, Islamic centres of scholarly knowledge developed advanced scientific knowledge, which 
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later informed the Renaissance and formed the basis of rationalist and naturalist philosophy in 
the West. 
What one knows is, however, always signs and evidence of the unseen force of Allah. 
All reasoning should confirm the truth of the Qur'an (Behishti & Bahonar, 1982; Ruthven, 
1984 ). The unity between religion and knowledge is central. All knowledge is moral 
(Desfarges, 1982; Lambek, 1990). What is true is right and what is right is true. No "objective" 
knowledge or knowledge outside Islam is possible (Ruthven, 1984). The ultimate cause of 
every phenomenon is Allah, leading to a certain attitude of fatalism often ascribed to Islam 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). Spiritual causes are, however, also recognised, including evil and good 
spirits and the intervention of angels. Divinatory, ritual, mystical, spiritual, and symbolic 
knowledge is included in Islam, but textual knowledge is dominant. 
Textuality 
The Qu'ran is the central, sacred text and it is surrounded by secondary texts like 
commentaries and instruction manuals. 
Islam may be said to be hegemonic in the sense that the sacred quality of the central 
texts and the necessity or correctness of reciting them in critical contexts are 
unquestioned. Limited referential aspects of these texts ... provide the basis for ultimate 
reality. (Lambek, 1990, p. 24) 
The relationship between these texts, and the meaning or knowledge they convey, is a complex 
one, varying among texts, readers, and Islamic societies (Lambek, 1990). In principle, Islam's 
divinely ordained model is equally available to all literate persons and Muslims are not 
dependent on consecrated specialists to study the rules of the faith. In practice, however, some 
form of decoding is necessary to understand them, and those who are illiterate in Arabic are 
dependent on those who are not (Lambek, 1990; Sikander, 1991 ). The result is that Islamic 
power/knowledge is distributed according to relative access to the central texts. 
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The concept of the sacred text presupposes a particular notion of "reading" in Islamic 
societies. The act of recitation of the texts, rather than the insight gained, is paramount (Wagner 
& Lotfi, 1983). In societies with little knowledge of Arabic, such as many African ones, the 
texts have no or very little referential, locutionary meaning . "Meaning is always the power, 
certainty, truth, the reality oflslam itself'' (Lambek, 1990, p. 27), which is attested to by the~ 
of recitation, not the meaning of the words recited (Ruthven, 1984). Recital establishes moral 
states through the performative force of the texts (Lambek, 1990 ). Even when texts are 
interpreted or translated, these may take the form of further recitals. The paradox is that texts 
remain true, provide guidelines to action and certain knowledge of the world, but the meaning of 
these texts remains out of reach of many ordinary practitioners. 
Language plays a central role in Islamic power/knowledge. The sacred texts and prayers 
are all in Arabic. Although it is the language of North Africa, to other Africans it is a foreign 
tongue, "of which most people know nothing except the formulas of prayer" (Parrinder, 1969, p. 
217). However, there is widespread belief in the power of written and spoken language as such, 
resulting in practices such as the wearing of charms consisting of written passages from the 
Qur'an or even drinking the inky water of holy words rinsed off from a writing board 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). These practices play an important part in divination and no 
understanding of the words is necessary for the procedure to be effective. 
Specialists 
Islam has no official clergy, only an informal hierarchy of holy men, who represent all 
aspects of knowledge but vary widely in their proficiency (Brenner, 1993). 
Islamic states have fostered and utilised religious scholars to act as interpreters of the 
basic sources of the faith, the Qur'an and Sunna. These scholars, called the Ulumaa, have 
shaped the Shari'a and have held power by virtue of their association with the state. They 
formulate fatwa, the official view of the religion, and by extension of the state, on any subject 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1994) and act as filters between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds, approving 
or disapproving the integration of new knowledge into existing knowledge. "Islam encapsulates 
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or explicitly devalues other forms of thought and practice so that they need to be legitimated by 
reference to Islam" (Lambek, 1990, p. 24 ). 
The power of the senior religious scholars and the state does not, however, always 
extend to rural areas, where indigenous knowledge is more readily integrated and tolerated. 
Here mystical orders, Sufi brotherhoods, marabouts (holy men), and local Islamic teachers 
control knowledge and the mystical, spiritual, and curative rather than legal aspects of Islam are 
stressed (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). Local holy men provide an important link with the learned 
centre of Islamic power/authority and act as intermediaries between the local context and the 
centre (Ahmed & Hart, 1984). 
Knowledge and Authority 
The central relationship in Islam is that between God (the source of knowledge) and man 
(the seeker of knowledge). Study is in itself the quintessential act of piety and "awe of the 
divine ... is the prerequisite of knowledge" (Sikander, 1991, p. 88). Scholarship is the basis of 
authority, yet this authority does not reside in the scholar's control over his knowledge, but in the 
scholar's recognition of the control of the knowledge over himself "The situation may be 
described as inverse to that of the 'postmodern' discovery of the inscription of the author's 
authority in the text; in Islam it is the text's authority which is enacted in the course of the 
scholar's life" (Lambek, 1990, p. 27). The acts and way of life of the scholar are important 
criteria in the eyes of the community for conferring authority. "His personal behaviour must be 
seen to accord with the purity of knowledge he invokes" (Lambek, 1990, p. 30). 
While access to the sacred, though objectified, knowledge of Islam is necessary for 
wielding religious authority, it is far from sufficient. The informal hierarchy of 
power/knowledge created by Islamic education is mediated by social relations and power is 
limited by local public judgement, which depends not only on the acts of the knowledgeable, but 
also on their general status within society, recitation and teaching skills, age, lines of descent 
and "genealogical" lines of pedagogical relationships (Gellner, 1984; Lambek, 1990). 
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In Islamic discourse, principles are frequently invoked but seldom discussed. "The 'who' 
takes precedence over the 'what', since shared knowledge about the authority of the exegete 
provides a more substantial basis of communality than does the particular content area 
discussed" (Simone, 1994, p. 131). In part, this tendency reflects the legacy oflslamic 
education, where knowledge tends to be organised in terms of specific interpreters as opposed to 
content areas. 
The central, immutable knowledge of the Qur'an is thus mediated through metanarratives 
of legitimation (Lyotard, 1984 ), which may account for social conflict in Islamic societies. 
Different interpretations may be arrived at by different scholars, and the legitimation of these 
interpretations by the community may depend on a variety of criteria. One group may follow 
one scholar by virtue of his senior genealogical standing; another scholar will attract a following 
based on superior knowledge of the texts. "The transition from the unity and authenticity of the 
Word of God to the multiplicity and disputed quality of the words of men is perhaps the central 
dynamic problem of Muslim thought" (Lambek, 1990, p. 23). This problem has led, inter alia, 
to revival movements and wars within Islamic societies, but has also made it flexibly adaptable 
to local contexts. 
Education 
Islam has developed its own system of education which is essentially religious (Nduka, 
1974). The object of education is submission to and compliance with Islam, not knowledge for 
knowledge's sake. Although rational knowledge is valued highly, as is testified by a complex 
tradition oflslamic medical knowledge (Bourdillon, 1990), mystical and revelatory knowledge 
is included and emphasised in African Islam (Nduka, 1974 ). 
Islamic education traditionally involves verbatim oral mastery of the Qur'an, followed by 
literacy in Arabic (Parrinder, 1969; Wagner & Lotfi, 1983) in order to study the Qur'an, which is 
deemed essentially untranslatable (Ruthven, 1984). At post-elementary level pupils receive 
individualised instruction in a master-apprentice relationship (Wagner & Lotfi, 1983). The local 
teacher or fundi is part of an informal hierarchy of fundis who usually have some secondary 
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education and may be able to do some interpretation through acquaintance with secondary 
sources (Lambek, 1990; Ray, 1976). However, 
interpretations previously validated are usually unavailable to prolonged criticism and 
discussion about them constitutes another occasion in which deference must be shown. 
In religious education priority is placed on the length of study. Authority is established 
in terms of years of devotion accorded to a few works or specific areas ... rather than the 
salience of insight into the scrutiny. (Simone, 1994, p. 131) 
One requirement of Islam is dissemination of knowledge. The more one knows, the 
more you are required to teach. In addition to education, the Islamic teacher and holy man plays 
an important socio-economic, political, and psychological role in the community. His standing 
as a formally educated and literate individual traditionally gives him the power to act as notary, 
legal adviser, culture broker, mediator of disputes, source of medical knowledge, and spiritual 
healer (Wagner & Lotti, 1983). 
Knowledge and Healing 
Like indigenous religion, Islam has not renounced "a concern with the explanation, 
prediction, and control of space-time events" (Horton, 1971, p. 105), unlike Christianity, which 
has renounced these to the field of science. Divination is one of the functions of Islamic 
specialists. Diviners use sand (especially brought from Mecca), rosaries, recital or the Qur'an as 
oracles (Adelowo, 1984). Belief in witches, sorcery, and bad or good omens are accepted 
(Adelowo, 1984). Muslim holy men ward off evil forces through amulets consisting of Qur'anic 
passages (Awolalu, 1985). In addition to holy men, female dream interpreters, diviners, and 
cults of affliction are found in Islamic societies (Simone, 1994 ). 
Conversion to Islam 
The difference between Islam as an impersonal and abstract system with a body of 
doctrine and a rigid legal code embracing, not merely ritual, but every aspect of life, and 
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the diversified and complex African systems of life appears so profound that few points 
of contact seem apparent and the psychological shock of religious change to be as great 
as for an African converted to Western Christianity. This is not so in practice. 
(Trimingham, 1968, p. 41) 
Various theories exist to explain the conversion to Islam. Trimingham (1968) maintains 
that contact with Islam is characterised by a series of gradations which act as insulators passing 
on Islamic traditions gradually. Farah (1987, p. 283) refers to Islam's "non-demanding attitude 
toward the convert". For instance, Islam's emphasis on individuality was not stressed in Africa 
but its respect for community wholly embraced. The Islam that was brought to Africa was "a 
spoken and living Islam, and not a religion taught authoritatively" (Sow, 1985, p. 563). Islam 
"does no violent uprooting but offers immediate values without displacement of the old. It is 
not a question of either-or but of both-and" (Trimingham, 1968, p. 42). Islam and indigenous 
practices exist side by side without undue disruption of either (Arens, 1975). 
Horton (1971), Onyanwu (1975), Mbiti (1971), and Sow (1985) stress the superficial 
integration oflslamic elements into indigenous cosmology, which endures despite Islamisation. 
What is adopted from Islam will depend on local culture. Onyanwu ( 1975) maintains that 
African religion, as an experienced reality, remains unchanged underneath a veneer of Islam. 
Similarly, Arens (1975) summarises the arguments accounting for Islam's success in Africa as 
its ability to integrate existing indigenous patterns or tolerate them when syncretism is not 
possible, as well as structural correlates in the realm of practice or cosmology. "Islam is a 
religion open to interpretation at many cultural levels, especially in the area of world view" 
(Thayer, 1983, p. 118). However, Arens (1975) also points out that a sharp break with local 
traditions often occurs though this is not stressed in the literature. 
Fisher (1985) similarly stresses Islam's "internal dynamism" (p. 166) and power to 
gradually draw the convert into Islamic cosmology, and proposes a three-stage model of 
conversion. During the quarantine stage, the faith is limited to newcomers, such as traders and 
their accompanying clerics/diviners. Islam presents an attractive appearance to outsiders. Stage 
two, mixing, is often initiated by locals enlisting Islamic divination and healing practices: "To 
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the extent that the Muslim cleric is accessible, and is consulted, to that extent the seeds of 
religious change, of a new cosmology, have been sown" (Fisher, 1985, p. 158). During this 
stage, however, the convert still adheres to indigenous beliefs as well. During the third stage, 
reform, which often follows much later, converts renounce many indigenous beliefs and fully 
enter the macrocosmic world of Islam. Kasozi (1981) describes such a conversion process 
occurring in the Ganda culture during the early 19th century. 
Parallelism often manifests itself in a division of religion according to gender, men 
becoming Muslims and women remaining traditional (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). Men tend to 
become more deeply involved in Islam, as the participation of women in public ritual is limited 
in Islam. Non-Islamic cults are often maintained by women, who are dominant in semi-Islamic 
cults and saint-tomb rituals as well (Trimingham, 1968). 
Arens (1975) provides an example of conversion processes in a Tanzanian community 
founded in the 1920's. This community, like others in East Africa, had a Muslim character from 
its early days and new arrivals often accepted the faith soon after settling. Despite the fact that 
the community grew into a poly-ethnic, multi-religious centre, Islam remains associated with 
wealth, prestige, and integration into the community. Religious persuasion is a significant factor 
of identity. The manner in which an individual is seen to adhere to an idealised form of Islam is 
significant in affording him esteem in the community. The adoption of Islam has immediate 
practical advantages. Each new member of the faith is introduced to the Muslim community 
through a system of sponsorship. The sponsor assumes the role of father towards the convert 
and offers not only material but also social support, replicating a true father-son relationship. 
This system effectively incorporates the client into the kinship network of his sponsor. Islam 
thus serves as a visa into the social life, prestige, and power of the Islamic community. "Islam is 
a discursive shortcut. It doesn't require a great investment of energy or time to serve as a link 
among people" (Simone, 1994, p. 155). 
The early phase of conversion where the ruling class is Muslim often centres around 
prestige and concerns the superficial adoption of Muslim culture and practice of certain 
transitional rituals. In many parts of Africa, Islam was originally a class religion of rulers, 
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chiefs, and traders, who formed enclaves of Islam and attracted those aspiring to status. In East 
Africa Muslim coastal traders gradually absorbed African peoples, forming the regional Swahili 
culture which became a uniquely African Islamic culture (Trimingham, 1968). However, in 
most parts it only spread to the interior during colonisation, which opened up new routes of 
communication and disrupted the social cohesion of indigenous communities. Islam provided a 
new form of cohesion and solidarity. One attraction of Islam over Christianity was its 
propagation by non-westerners (Farah, 1987). Islam's system of intellectual culture and literacy 
became attractive as an alternative to European intellectual culture (Trimingham, 1968). 
The power of Islam's divining and magical practices attracted many converts 
(Trimingham, 1968). Islam also tolerated the parallel practice of indigenous diviners, who in 
tum incorporated Islamic practices (Kirby, 1992). This tolerance is related to the relation of 
Islam to the other. According to the concept of tawhid - the essential oneness in the social order 
of the universe ruled by God - there is no aspect of life hidden from Islam or outside God's will. 
"Since nothing exists outside oflslam, everyone is potentially a Muslim. It is the responsibility 
of the Muslim to address the other in such a way that brings the potential for Islamicity to the 
fore" (Simone, 1994, p. 142). Knowledge of the other is a religious imperative. "Otherness is 
not an irreconcilable philosophical or political chasm, a problem to be solved, or a sign of an 
essential plurality. Otherness is instead an opportunity for a broader human fulfilment for 
everyone" (Simone, 1994, p. 143). Everyone is an incomplete Muslim. Islam absorbs otherness, 
unlike Christianity which actively creates otherness. 
Although Islam tends to be regarded as militant, rigid, closed upon itself, and intolerant 
towards change, conversion processes reveal a tolerance towards differences, 
non-competitiveness, and ability to spread itself almost unobtrusively. It maintains unity while 
diversifying, in contrast to Christianity which continually splits off from itself. As Islam has no 
formal system of religious bureaucratic control and leadership depends on holy men, who in tum 
depend on support from local communities (Bourdillon, 1990), it tends to grow in an organic 
fashion, spreading patterns of belief similar to the repetitive patterns of Islamic design. 
However, Islamic designs, no matter how intricately detailed and diverse, always converge upon 
a central point, like Islam itself. 
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Islam as Local Power/knowledge 
Islam's descending power resides in the central authority of Allah and the Qur'an. An 
ascending view of its power finds a long tradition of Africans appropriating Islam to further 
their own ends. Early rulers of the empires of West Africa thereby strengthened their power. 
A king who protected Muslims or even converted to Islam became part of the 
international community, giving him considerable advantage over non-Muslim rivals. 
Literacy (in Arabic), the expansion of trade and even the opportunity to dispossess his 
non-Muslim neighbours by launching ajihad against them provided the inducements 
which made Islam an attractive "royal cult" for many West African princelings. 
(Ruthven, 1984,p.264) 
The king's power was, initially, not shared by the people, who remained rooted in indigenous 
ways until the advent of Sufism, which emphasised Islam's mystical forces. This emphasis 
made it adaptable to local needs and tolerant of indigenous practices (Awolalu, 1985; 
Bourdillon, 1990): 
In the voluminous Qur'anic store-house of angels, jinns, and devils, whose number is 
legion, many traditional powers found a hospitable home; and passages from the Qur'an 
are cited to justify their existence as real phenomena.... The supreme deities ... could be 
assimilated to Allah. Lesser local deities could be Islamicized or explained away as 
vernacular terms for God's attributes, or as the jinns and spirits of Qur'anic folklore. 
Ancestor cults could be accommodated to Islam by tagging local kinship groups on to 
Sufi silsilas or Arab lineages. By such methods the Somali cattle-herders ... acquired 
Quraishi ancestry. (Ruthven, 1984, p. 265) 
Many Africans never venture beyond an apparently superficial adoption of Islam and 
simply retain indigenous practices and beliefs alongside Islamic ones. Others successfully adapt 
Islam to local beliefs and vice versa. Mbiti (1971) refers to the example of the Wolof, who were 
converted during the 11th century. The Wolof observe the five pillars but make a pilgrimage to 
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the grave of a local holy man. Boys receive traditional Islamic teaching but divination, belief in 
witchcraft and the spirits persist, though the spirits have merged with the jinns. Protective 
amulets contain written passages from the Qur'an as well as traditional medicines. Rites such as 
marriage follow a mixture of both indigenous and Islamic procedures. Individuals carry both 
African and Islamic names. 
A similar integration of practices was witnessed by Simone ( 1994) in the Sudan. Most 
Sudanese are rural and emphasise the curative and charismatic elements of religion. Sufi 
brotherhoods and the use of spiritual intermediaries are widespread. Holy men such as the 
shaykhs use divination to attain revelatory knowledge through tools such as inhaling the burnt 
ash of the Qur'an, wrapping a piece of the Qur'an in leather or skin, and blowing breath during 
Qur'an recitation. Illness is construed as stemming from moral culpability necessitating the 
control of differing social and spiritual forces. "Religious practices are deeply engrained in a 
cosmology that affirms the omnipresence of various spirits, sorcery, and the practice of magic" 
(Simone, 1994, p. 182). Female healers are widely sought out by Muslims and Christians alike 
for their interpretation of dreams. 
Around a centre of core ritual practices, social and religious practices vary enormously 
in African Islam. Adelowo (1984), Awolalu (1985), Bone (1982), Kyewalyanga (1976), and 
Thayer (1983) provide further examples of societies where Islam and indigenous religion have 
fused. Although these societies are sometimes radically different from each other, their local 
knowledge and worldviews are all expressed and objectified in the universal symbols oflslam 
(Thayer, 1983). 
African Islamic Movements 
Some of the earliest African Islamic movements were derived from Sufism, which 
introduced into the rigid formalism of mainstream Islam aspirations towards personal spiritual 
growth and union with God through mystical ecstasy. In the 15th century, Sufi brotherhoods 
became popular in the Maghrib. They originally consisted of a master (marabout) and 
brotherhood of followers but later developed into cults of saints as mediators with the spiritual 
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world. It is believed that a sacred power emanates from these saints, their tombs, and 
descendants (Trimingham, 1968). Saints have come to replace the ancestors (Kyewalyanga, 
1976). The leaders of saintly families regulate the affairs of the local community and serve as 
the guardians of sacred knowledge (Ahmed & Hart, 1984; Ruthven, 1984). 
Fluehr-Lobban (1994) describes the ritual activities of a Sudanese Mawlawiyan Sufi 
order, who perform dhikr (remembrance) at the tomb of a local marabout: 
For about two hours before sunset on Friday afternoons the Dervishes form a circular 
procession to drum, dance, and sing the praises of God, and the Messenger, Muhammad. 
The Dervishes whirl in rapid bursts of energy, which in the heat of the afternoon sun can 
bring about an ecstatic trance-like state. The dancers are left alone to recover while the 
others continue the dhikr until sunset. (p. 39) 
This ritual contrasts with the disciplinary rituals of mainstream Islam and Sufi orders such as 
these tend to have an uneasy relationship to official Islam. However, the power of such orders 
are integrated into local history, traditions, and expressions of religion, while remaining linked 
to the Islamic centre. 
The Zar cult is a related though more marginal movement, which illustrates the fusion 
between Islam and ancient tradition. Zar (Sar, Saar or Bori) is a state of possession by a spirit 
also called Zar, whose malignant powers cause depression, illness, or misfortune in women 
(Lewis, 1984; Ray, 1976). Zar spirits are described as jinn and thereby integrated into Islamic 
cosmology. Zar can be expelled only by those who have acquired mastery over the spirits by 
themselves having been possessed and cured. It is thus a cult of affliction and is practised to 
this day by urban and rural women in Muslim North African countries and Sudan (Bourdillon, 
1990; Lewis, 1984; Simone, 1994). 
A female healer presides at the Zar ceremony. Animals may be slaughtered and 
drumming and dancing induce trance and spiritual possession of attendees as well as the 
afflicted. Often the possessed act as oracles (Lewis, 1984). Various recognisable spirits appear, 
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some deriving from early Cushite religions. Although the Zar dance is severely frowned upon 
by the Islamic centre (Lewis, 1984; Simone, 1994), it bears a close resemblance to the Sufi dhikr 
dance. There are many "similarities between the attainment of spirit possession (or the release 
from possession) and absorption in Allah which are the objects of the dance and dhikr 
respectively" (Lewis, 1984, p. 157). 
Zar is supposed to hate men and to be appeased by expensive gifts to its host 
(Bourdillon, 1990). The Zar spirits exhibit a wide range of social roles involving status, 
political power, and display in public life, all of which are usually denied to women (Ray, 
1976). Zar meetings are characterised by the display of behaviour such as smoking or crude 
language, which is otherwise unacceptable in Islamic society (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994). In some 
rituals, women satirise aspects of their lives and their relations with men, including the wedding 
(Bourdillon, 1990). Zar has been analysed as psychodrama and as spiritual feminism 
(Fluehr-Lobban, 1994) and clearly has an important function limiting male control. It serves as 
an area of secret power/knowledge for women in male-dominated societies. Although officially 
it is only marginally linked to the dominant religion, the Zar cult exists by virtue of Islam, as a 
form of subjugated, marginal knowledge. 
The Zar cult which clearly links with local pre-Islamic religion is so widely distributed 
throughout the Islamic world that its origins may be even further remote than is commonly 
assumed and its spread may be part of Islam's movement outwards from the centre (Fisher, 
1985). According to Lewis (in Fisher, 1985) even literate Islam contains an extensive-
written apparatus of magical and astrological Islamic lore which is regularly 
disseminated from urban centres of Islamic excellence. These not only provide an 
Islamic base and legitimisation for pre-Islamic mystical beliefs and rituals, but actually 
sometimes introduced these where such "magical" beliefs did not previously exist. It is 
not just oral, pre-Islamic culture which dilutes the unswerving eternal truth conserved in 
mainstream Islam, but also elements in literate mainstream Islam which introduce and 
perpetuate alternative renderings of the Prophet's message. (p. 168) 
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Thus, while Islam allows continual divergence from its centre of power, it also provides avenues 
for continual convergence, both from the centre outwards and from the periphery inwards. 
These movements are not always clearly discemable from each other. However, the African 
tendency to appropriate Islam's mystical power historically also opened the way for reformist 
movements to attain power. 
In the peripheral and marginal regions of the Muslim world, where the absence of a 
literate class of urban scholars left spiritual power, untempered by learning, in the hands 
of those who were free to exercise it in any manner ... conditions ... provided the perfect 
pretext for reformers who sought to purify Islam by bringing local practice more closely 
in line with Shari'a norms. (Ruthven, 1984, p. 266) 
Islamic Revivalism 
Islam is a religion of revolution, social justice, and resistance to oppression (Behishti & 
Bahonar, 1982). The joint path of spirituality, knowledge, Jihad, sacrifice, and martyrdom has 
always been associated with Islam (Bourdillon, 1990; Brenner, 1993; Simone, 1994). Islamic 
revival movements are as old as the religion itself. A 14th century Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun, 
developed a theory explaining the cyclical process of renewal through revival movements in 
North Africa which, according to Ruthven ( 1984) still holds. 
In the classic tradition ... the banner of militant Islam, purged of heretical accretions and 
restored to its pristine purity, would be the rallying point around which tribal forces 
would coalesce and, fired by religious zeal, descend upon the cities. Here they would 
find allies in the 'uluma, guardians of the legal and scholarly traditions, who would 
ensure the orthodoxy of the new-comers. (p. 99) 
After ruling for a few generations, a new tribal revival would replace them. Official Islam is 
thus a "two-edged sword, upholding the existing political order when this seemed to accord 
with the commands of God and his Prophet; undermining it, or sanctioning its replacement, 
when it appeared to deviate too much from the 'boundaries' set by God" (p. 100). 
64 
Much attention has been paid to the recent "encroachment" oflslam into politics. 
Eurocentric social theory tends to interpret recent intensifications of religious concerns and 
practices as "preoccupations with the past and impediments to modernization. Islam is 
especially viewed as an inflexible despotism that fosters terroristic single-mindedness or 
fatalistic passivity in its devotees" (Simone, 1994, p. 5). However, the revival oflslam can also 
be seen as 
an attempt to restore a developmental process interrupted by colonialism - an effort to 
reconstruct religion as an aspect of larger efforts.... As such, Islamic movements do not 
envision so much a return to a glorious mythical past as a determination to relink to their 
histories and substantiate a sense of identity that is self-sufficient and less influenced by 
the West. (Simone, 1994, p. 7) 
Reformers use traditional sources for the simultaneous pursuit of a modernist agenda and 
preservation of cultural integrity (Alwani, 1989). Islam plays an important role in attempts to 
reconceptualise local identity in terms of transnational concepts - "a means of establishing the 
psychological parameters through which the larger world can be engaged more actively and 
effectively" (Simone, 1994, p. 8). 
Islam has traditionally provided symbols against colonialism in Africa (Colonna, 1984) 
and has gradually become associated with a challenge to European domination (Ruthven, 1984 ). 
This challenge has recently been taken up in an international trend of Islamic revival 
movements to oppose western culture, which is criticised for its materialism and secularism 
(Sikander, 1991). Behishti and Bahonar (1982) describe the Islamic revolution oflran as "a 
rebellion against modem barbarism which has fettered the world with its materialistic and 
animal values" (p. 11). Western knowledge systems, especially the social sciences, are targeted 
for their role as mediators of oppressive power relations. European faith, including the faith in 
science, is criticised for its lack of submission to God and its belief that man is God (Sikander, 
1991 ). This international trend is also found in Africa, where a new generation of Muslim 
movements has risen (Brenner, 1993). 
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These recent revival movements also challenge the power/knowledge hegemony within 
Islam. There is a tension between the Uluma and new leadership oflslamic movements (Abaza, 
1993~ Brenner, 1993). The new leaders are self-taught, rely directly on the sources, and 
encourage independent collective religious study, undermining the monopoly on knowledge that 
the Uluma once held. There is a move towards the "democratization of access to and use of 
religious knowledge" (Fluehr-Lobban, 1994, p. 159). The young, western-educated as well as 
Islam-educated Africans are unified in their quest for a new synthesis of Islam and the secular 
world, but also show a concern for the Islamisation of all knowledge (Abaza, 1993). The 
themes of African unity and even black identity have become blurred with the Ummaa (Brenner, 
1993~ Simone, 1994). 
Conclusion 
A descending analysis of power in Islam reveals the imposition of a structural hegemony, 
a regime of truth (Foucault, 1980b ), "with the sacred texts providing the final authority and 
baseline reference for people's actions" (Lambek, 1990, p. 35). This authority is represented in 
the knowledge appropriated by learned scholars, who act as the texts' mouthpieces and 
formulate rules governing the conduct of believers. However, an ascending analysis of power 
reveals that this authority resides not only in its connection to the central texts but is always 
constrained and informed by local knowledge. A "subversive recodification of power relations" 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 64) continuously takes place at the local level, which informs the centre. 
African Islam's greatest threat has come from western secular knowledge. Although 
Islam's disciplinary power techniques are similar to that of the 19th century European 
Enlightenment, and its knowledge system stresses literacy and rational knowledge, its mysticism 
and adherence to revelational knowledge constitutes a unity between religion and knowledge 
that differs from western knowledge. Whereas Islamic power/knowledge emanates from and 
returns to a central, fixed, absolute truth, in a continuous cyclical fashion, western scientific 
knowledge tends to march forward towards such a truth, forming hierarchies of aspiration. 
Whether Islamic knowledge's process of cyclical inclusion is powerful enough to withstand the 
onslaught of western secular knowledge is still an open question. Psychology, as agent of 
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western power/knowledge, has remained largely outside the confines of Islam. Despite recent 
attempts to integrate the social sciences into Islam (Alwani, 1989; Langgulung, 1987; Sardar, 
1986), "more than perhaps any other discipline, the undertaking of psychology posits the 
greatest source of discordance with Islamic thought" (Simone, 1994, p. 152). According to 
Simone, however, the possibility exists that it may play an empowering role within the confines 
of recent, revivalist Islam. 
Islam has served as a "rubric under which African thought has attempted to alter and to 
preserve itself simultaneously" (Simone, 1994, p. 4) and may be seen as a vehicle for symbolic 
reconstruction. Christianity has become another such vehicle. 
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CHAPTER4 
CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA 
There are no relations of power without resistances~ 
the latter are all the more real and effective because 
they are formed right at the point where relations of 
power are exercised. (Foucault, 1980b, p. 142) 
Psychology's relevance discourse pays little attention to Christianity. Reference to 
Christianity by psychologists is mostly confined to brief mention of the prophet/healers of the 
African independent churches (Brownell et al., 1987~ Cheetham & Griffiths, 1982), reflecting 
the scientism of this discourse. At the time of its inception, Christianity was a powerful force in 
Africa. It was later to become a major conveyor of western knowledge systems during 
colonisation. It has become integrated with the epistemes (Foucault, 1970), ideologies 
(MacGaffey, 1981 ), and indigenous psychologies (Heelas & Lock, 1981) of Africa and competes 
with psychology for followers. Christian religious movements, like Islamic ones, have a unique 
function in creating alternative, local knowledges challenging dominant western secular 
power/knowledge systems. South Africa has the strongest following of African independent 
churches on the continent, so that 46% of South African blacks belonged to African initiated 
churches in 1991 and this figure is expected to grow to 50% by the turn of the century (Kro.ger, 
Thorpe & Anderson, 1993). These movements have proven to be more successful than 
psychology in proselytising. It is worth pondering the reasons for their success. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the circulation of 
power/knowledge in African Christianity. It will focus mainly on the Christianity that was 
brought to Africa by missionaries, and the way Africans appropriated this knowledge, rather 
than the universal features and dogmas of Christianity. 
As with Islam, the literature on Christianity in Africa varies along a continuum where 
one pole emphasises the imposition of Christianity and the subjugation of indigenous African 
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knowledge, and the opposite pole emphasises the resilience of indigenous beliefs and the 
revitalising function of African variants of Christianity. The chapter will again follow the 
principle of double description (Bateson, 1979) to provide both a descending and ascending 
analysis of power/knowledge. It starts with a brief consideration of history. 
Historical Background 
Long before the start of Islam in the seventh century, Christianity was well-established 
all over North Africa, Egypt, parts of the Sudan, and Ethiopia. However, Islam and political 
pressure drastically reduced this ancient church, so that it survived only in Ethiopia (where it is 
still the state religion) and in the closely related Coptic church in Egypt, Uganda, and the Sudan 
(Mbiti, 1971; Parrinder, 1969). 
In the 15th century Portuguese brought Roman Catholic missions to southern coastal 
areas. They were followed by other European churches, but these mainly served European 
traders and made little impact upon Africans. When Christian slaves began to return to West 
Africa towards the end of the 18th century, Christianity spontaneously spread in West Africa, 
but it was only during colonial expansion from the 19th century onwards that Africans were 
converted on a large scale (Mbiti, 1971; Parrinder, 1969). Christianity and European colonial 
rule came to be viewed as synonymous by most Africans and the missionary and colonial 
enterprises largely coincided in the European thought of the time (Mudimbe, 1994; Pieterse, 
1992; Sogolo, 1993). 
Christianity, African Cosmology, and Knowledge 
It is difficult to contrast Christianity with African religions, as it was translated into 
various versions which differ to various degrees from its central doctrines (Sogolo, 1993). 
However, most Christian conceptions of God places Him squarely in the realm of the 
supernatural. The universe is seen as inhabited by two distinct kinds of entities, some of which 
are governed by the laws of nature while others transcend such laws. God happens to be at the 
apex of the latter, and human life, though situated in the natural world, is viewed as a 
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preparation for another, metaphysical world. Such a bifurcation between the natural and 
supernatural worlds does not apply within indigenous African cosmology (Sogolo, 1993). 
However, Mbiti (1971) argues that the Christian concept of God that was imported to Africa was 
partly reconcilable with Africa's concept of God. On the other hand, the Trinity, a personal 
relationship with God, judgement in the hereafter, and its transcendence through Christ were all 
unfamiliar notions (Fisher, 1985; Sogolo, 1993). Lesser deities and veneration of the ancestors 
were ruled out. The role of intermediaries between man and God were unacceptable, but 
Catholic saints and Christ assumed roles that may have been similarly perceived. The emphasis 
on individual, personal faith and salvation differed from the communalism of African thought. 
Dualisms such as good/evil, body/soul, heaven/hell, believer/unbeliever, and 
religious/secular, differed from the holism of African cosmology, and were even more distinct 
than in Islam. Both/and thinking was replaced with either/or thinking. The African world of 
spirits, magic, and divination was recognised but viewed as a manifestation of evil and wholly 
rejected (Awolalu, 1985; Sogolo, 1993). Healing and education were not integrated into 
religion, but relegated to separate medical and educational establishments. Religion was 
divorced from the natural and physical world and God did not intervene in daily affairs. 
Cyclical time was replaced by linear time and the idea of progress in terms of salvation 
introduced (Fisher, 1985). Religious space was separated from daily life and centred in church 
(the community of believers) and individual consciousness (personal salvation). The local 
microcosm was replaced by the universal macrocosm of Christianity as well as the internal 
consciousness of the individual. 
As in Islam the existence of communal rites of worship and transition were familiar, but 
personal, individual worship and the central role of written, sacred texts were new (Fisher, 
1985). Individual salvation and the community of believers undermined kinship and communal 
ties. The community was divided into converts and unbelievers (Awolalu, 1985). In contrast to 
Islam, Christianity strongly opposed polygamy and centred on smaller families. Protestantism 
introduced middle-class culture, strict family morals and puritanism (Bastide, 1967). 
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The implicit epistemologies of Christian dogma largely coincided with those of the 
dominant epistemes of western thought, which will be discussed in chapter 5. During the 
Middle Ages, all knowledge was religious, as in Islam. The knowledge that was brought to 
Africa by missionaries was, however, a combination of the pre-modem and the modem, and 
religious knowledge was separated from secular knowledge. An important separation that was 
imported was that between religion and healing, which in both indigenous and Islamic 
knowledge were united. The church focused exclusively on "other-worldly" affairs and humans' 
relations with God, rather than on influencing this-worldly events (Horton, 1971 ). Knowledge 
of God was attained through the revelation of the Scriptures; knowledge of nature and the world 
through rational and scientific means (Sogolo, 1993). 
Whereas in Catholic and Orthodox churches there was an emphasis on ritual, symbolic, 
and iconic knowledge, which was similar to African religions, textual knowledge was central in 
Protestant ones (Fisher, 1985). Calvinism strongly emphasised reason, which should not be 
blinded by superstition or sin (Bastide, 1967). Mission Christianity was dominated by a rational 
theology. Knowledge had to be systematic, objective, and logical (Onyanwu, 1975). 
Paradoxically, the church demanded both rationality and faith, which is essentially a-rational. 
Faith was an individual, internal subjection to revelatory knowledge and was centred in the 
individual's relation to God. 
In contrast to Islam, the church embodied a distinct power/knowledge hierarchy in 
bureaucratic structures and was divided into different denominations, so that many contrasting 
and confusing images of Christianity and knowledge thereof were imported, each stressing its 
own claims to absolute truth, each transmitting particular aspects of European culture and 
knowledge, and each displaying severe antagonism to dissent from its norms (Awolalu, 1985; 
Crane, 1964; Sogolo, 1993). Whereas Islam was tolerant towards indigenous practices, the 
mission church almost wholly rejected the African worldview (Crane, 1964). According to 
Sogolo (1993), a central characteristic of missionary Christianity in Africa was its 
authoritarianism. Humans were required to surrender all, including all African deities, to a 
supreme God. Christian morality was viewed as the only morality. Whereas Islam unified and 
included, Christianity divided and excluded. 
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The Missionary Enterprise 
The Christianity that was imported to Africa was the Christianity of European 
domination. Its introduction coincided with massive social upheavals brought about by 
European imperialism, commerce, industrialisation, modernisation, science, administration, and 
political systems. Missionaries carried not only the Bible, but all the signs and symbols of 
European knowledge. Christian life was part and parcel of the "universal civilisation" of 
Europe, as reflected in the words of Pope Alexander VI (in Mudimbe, 1994) in as early as 1493: 
Among other works well pleasing to the divine majesty and cherished of our heart, this 
assuredly ranks highest, that in our times especially the Catholic faith and the Christian 
religion be exalted and everywhere increased and spread, that the health of souls be 
cared for and that barbarous nations be overthrown and brought to the faith itself. (p. 
30) 
The implicit opposition in the passage between civilisation and Christianity, on the one hand, 
and the barbarity/paganism of Africa which awaits forceful conversion, on the other hand, has 
its roots in earlier western conceptions of Africa and Africans. It is necessary to briefly 
archaeologise these conceptions, as they form part of the episteme informing missionary 
discourse. The missionaries were armed with an implicit body of knowledge concerning a 
mythical Africa created by the West over previous centuries, which often proved more 
influential in their contact with Africans than knowledge of the Bible itself. 
Early European Ima~es of Africans 
In Ancient Greece, Africa already had a composite image: The known North Africa, 
which formed part of the multicultural world of antiquity, and the wild, unknown Africa. In the 
Christian period, the colour black began to acquire negative connotations, as the colour of sin 
and darkness. Although originally it was not linked to skin colour, it gradually acquired that 
connotation, mainly during the Middle Ages, when Europe lost direct contact with Africa and 
the symbolism of the "black demon" was transferred to both the Muslim and the African. In the 
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late Middle Ages, a turnaround occurred: The Ethiopian churches aligned themselves with 
Europe against Islam, and a positive image of the black saint and madonna entered western 
iconography. The African became "the highly honoured representative of a remote 
Christendom" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 29). However, the 18th and 19th centuries were dominated by 
extremely negative images of Africans. They had become savages, barbarians, and heathens. 
Savages and Barbarians 
"The prehistory of the savage belongs to Europe itself The underlying idea seems to 
refer to the distinction between ... cultivated and uncultivated land or 'nature"' (Pieterse, 1992, p. 
30). To nature belonged the forests and the wilderness where, during the 9th century, Europeans 
lived in small feudal villages, separated by natural vegetation. These regions, dominated by the 
.forces of nature, were mysterious and numinous, "the domain of beings on the border-line 
between human and animal, myth and reality" (Peterse, 1992, p. 30). The European was the first 
savage, and in the eyes of the Greeks, became the first barbarian. 
The Greeks differentiated between barbarians, originally non-Greek speakers, but later 
referring to "base" and "rude" strangers, and civilitas, Greeks, who were cultivated and lived 
under law. For the Romans, as for the Greeks, barbarians and savages were those outside the 
empire. Europe's barbarity was eventually tamed "through a process of subjugation ... , in which 
missions and Christianization, pacification and exploitation formed a colonial scenario similar 
to that of the fater imperialism overseas. To put it differently, the nation-states were the first 
empires" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 31 ). By the 16th century, few savages were left in Europe. They 
had been civilised. 
During the Renaissance, the European notion of savagery was exported and transferred 
to non-Europeans. By the 19th century it had become routine in descriptions of Africa and the 
New World, which had become the philosophical and political counterpoint to Europe. Africa 
became a domain of alterity to where the unattractive aspects of Europe's present and recent past 
were banished. Africans became "savages" and Muslims, by virtue of a slightly higher status, 
"barbarians". 
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Europe's introduction to Africans and anthropoid apes via travellers' tales coincided 
historically. Increasingly, savages were likened to animals. In the sciences of the time, they 
became the missing link between apes and humans in the great Chain of Being. Their assumed 
biological and racial inferiority served as partial justification of the slave trade (Pieterse, 1992). 
The scientific classifications of race produced in the 18th century were often, however, 
metaphoric reproductions of earlier Biblical categories and metaphors. "Faith and reason 
ultimately achieved the same answer, a verdict regarding the status of Africans perfectly 
convenient to Europeans, Christian or otherwise" (Peterse, 1992, p. 44). 
Slaveor and the Children of Ham 
Christianity offered an additional and popular justification of slavery in the tale of the 
descendants of Ham. Ham's descendants were cursed by Canaan to be servants. Medieval tales 
depicted Africa as the continent of Ham's descendants. During the time when European slave 
trade had achieved considerable proportions, the children of Ham became increasingly 
associated with blackness. The scene was set for the master/slave relationship to be further 
specified as the white European I black African relationship. 
Terra Nullius and Tabula Rasa 
In 1830, Hegel depicted the African as "man in all his wild and untamed nature ... you 
must abstract all elements of respect and morality ... - there is nothing remotely humanized in the 
Negro's character .... Nothing confirms this judgement more than the reports of the missionaries" 
(Pieterse, 1992, p. 34 ). The superior condescension dominating European views of Africans 
manifested itself in a discourse of negative comparison. The 19th century savage was 
determined by "absences: the absence, or scarcity, of clothing, possessions, attributes of 
civilization" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 35). The savage became a tabula rasa, waiting to be inscribed 
with European faith, history and civilisation. He was waiting amidst the wilderness, an 
undefined, mythical space, uncultivated and undomesticated. His land became vacant space, 
terra nullius, waiting for appropriation and cultivation through colonialism. 
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The concept of terra nullius was decreed by the Pope, in the name of God, in Romanus 
Pontifex, a papal edict of 1454. The Pope considered the total planet the franchise of the 
Church. He granted Christian kings the right to invade and conquer lands, expel non-Christians 
from it, and, when necessary, to fight and subjugate them "in perpetual servitude" (Mudimbe, 
1994, p. 33). This edict provided the basis for both colonisation and slavery. Non-Christians 
had no right to an autonomous political existence or ownership of land. Although the 
Reformation later challenged the Pope's power to grant lands to European monarchs, religious 
conversion was still concomitant with colonial appropriation of land. 
Tales of Exploration 
The missionary's precursors and contemporaries in Africa from the 15th to the end of the 
19th century were the soldier and the explorer. The soldier was more visible than the explorer. 
He built castles and forts, managed trading posts, participated in the slave trade, and later 
implemented colonial power (Mudimbe, 1988). He visually embodied the power of European 
technology and force. 
The explorer compiled information on the continent, which confirmed and set the tone 
for Europe's and the missionaries' views on Africa as the Dark Continent. Whereas travellers in 
the 16th and 17th centuries had commented on Africa's rich courts and extensive, well laid-out 
cities, 19th century tales of exploration became blind to agricultural cultivation, social 
organisation, existing trade routes, and even the African himself, who was absorbed into the 
background of the overwhelming natural landscape. Nature dominated narratives of exploration 
and served as a backdrop to the heroic efforts of the explorer. The mythical meeting between 
Livingstone and Stanley, embodied in the famous phrase "Dr Livingstone I presume?", typifies 
the exploration myth. The two Europeans are pictured alone in a world of untamed nature~ their 
huge entourage of African and Arab bearers, guides, intermediaries, and interpreters, in sum, 
local experts, are mentioned only in passing, if at all, as passive bystanders, spectators, stage 
props, or obstacles to progress (Pieterse, 1992). 
The journeys of exploration, which coincided with early missionary work, were 
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documented as a '"pushing forth of the frontiers of ignorance' and as 'adding to the store of 
knowledge in the world"' (Pieterse, 1992, p. 64 ), assuming no knowledge existing outside the 
boundaries of Europe. Africa was a "dark recess, much akin to a bodily interior" (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991, p. 90), waiting to be laid bare by the probing gaze of the European observer. 
The language of empiricism that was born from clinical pathology at this time (Foucault, 1973), 
was transposed to geography. "To know was to raise to the light of scrutiny the dark secrets of 
life lurking in the body's interior" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 90). 
The explorers were not only representatives of empirical knowledge. They came, in the 
words of explorer/missionary Livingstone in 1867, 
as members of a superior race and servants of a Government that desires to elevate the 
more degraded portions of the human family. We are adherents of a benign holy religion 
and may ... become the harbingers of peace to a hitherto distracted and down-trodden 
race. (Pieterse, 1992, p. 65) 
The image of the savage and the heathen had merged with a Christian vision of "fallen 
creatures" waiting to be rescued from ignorance, pagan ways and, since the rise of abolitionism, 
from slavery. 
The Noble Sava~ and Abolitionism 
During the exploration of the New World, the savage, who was assumed to live in a state 
of nature, gradually became attractive, and attained the status of the "noble savage". As 
Europeans became more aware of the vices of European civilisation, embodied at the time in the 
court of Versailles, the savage came to represent life in a lost paradise, a unity with nature, 
unimpeded by reason; a nostalgic longing for Europe's own past. The innocent savage was born 
in the romanticism of the 18th century as a reaction against bourgeois society. It went hand in 
hand with infantilisation. The natural Other, nature personified, was less than fully human, like 
a child (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991). Admiration for the noble savage was always 
ambivalently coupled with the need to "correct" their "errors", in the same way that children 
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needed correction. The noble savage, the suffering innocent, still contained the threat of 
degeneracy and the Fall (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991), which had to be contained. The image 
of the noble, innocent savage was extended to Africa, which became a continent despoiled by 
slavery and ignorance. 
The noble savage fitted neatly into the discourse around the abolition of slavery. The 
advent of the industrial revolution had made slavery redundant because it was less productive 
than new forms of individualising power. However, the church actively fought for abolition. 
All humans were viewed as potentially equal within the confines of the faith. The freed slave 
became the potential convert. Abolition had humanised the African. This was, however, a far 
cry from emancipation. 
The central icon of abolitionism, the figure of the black kneeling, hands folded and eyes 
cast upward, carried a clear message. It made emancipation conditional - on condition 
of conversion, on condition of docility and meekness, on condition of being on one's 
knees. (Pieterse, 1992, p. 60) 
Missionary Discourse 
"One might consider that missionary speech is always predetermined, preregulated, let us 
say colonized. It depends upon a normative discourse already fixed" (Mudimbe, 1988). 
Missionary speech evolved within the framework of what Mudimbe calls the "authority of the 
truth" (p. 47) or God's assumed desire for the conversion of the world. "This means, at least, 
that the missionary does not enter into dialogue with pagans and 'savages' but must impose the 
law of God that he incarnates" (p. 47). The native, living under Satan's rule, has to be 
transformed to conform to the norm set by God's truth, embodied in the missionary. 
From the perspective of the Christianity of empire, the traditional African way of life 
was construed as paganism, unfaith, ignorance, misconception, and evil. Paganism is not a 
passive state, but a state of guilt, of rebellion against God, and of fall beneath the threshold of 
humanity (Eboussi Boulaga, 1984 ). It is the error of fetishism and animism, accompanied by 
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aberration and imperfection. To Christianise is to tame a degraded being, to rear it to a normal 
state through education. In missionary discourse, the pagan is in distress. "The most striking 
thing about Africa is its misery, moral as well as physical. Slavery, ignorance, superstition, 
immorality rage about in the most unbridled fashion" (p. 20). Africans are viewed as morally 
immature. Their animality and instinctualism have to be bridled 
by constraint and discipline .... This constraint is imposed upon them as it is imposed 
upon children or the infirm: for their own good. Indeed it is themselves they must be 
shielded from, for they have in effect forfeited their rights and become incapable of their 
responsibilities. They are morally incompetent.... Hence the authority exercised over 
them is twofold: natural and religious, in indissolubility. It is the authority at once of 
reason and revelation, of civilization and of faith, the former being both condition and 
product of the latter in each pair. For what is original and unique with Christianity is 
that these tandems are unified and circular. Here we have the reason why evangelization 
and colonialism are inseparable. (Eboussi Boulaga, 1984, pp. 20-21) 
Eboussi Boulaga ( 19 84) proceeds with a further analysis of missionary discourse. It is 
heir to both Greek reason and Judaic revelation. By virtue of this double qualification "it is the 
critic of the unreason of the other religions and the denunciation of their mythological nature. 
Its own proper element is language and history - not the obscure regions of the cosmos or the 
imagination" (p. 30). It addresses the pagan in the language of derision. "The gods die of 
ridicule ... the spirits vanish like the dreams of night" (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1984, p. 30) in the face 
of the only correct image of God. Where derision appeals to a sense of shame, the language of 
refutation is addressed to reason. It convinces through lines of causality, origin, and finality. It 
unmasks the "swindlers": Witch-doctors, secret societies, and elders. Its formal logic and 
ontology is invoked to demonstrate the incoherencies of indigenous beliefs. It is ironic that it 
attacks these beliefs from a position of materialistic reductionism: The knowledge of traditional 
religion is viewed as "a technique of impotence, which supplies, for lack of objective knowledge 
by beliefs, that 'knowledge' of weak minds who 'think' only by association of images, as children 
do" (Eboussi-Boulaga, 1984, p. 50). Christianity had itself previously been subjected to the 
same description, but had since assumed the status of rationality. It had outgrown its 
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mythological past, which had become objective fact in history. 
The arguments of refutation are clarified in the language of demonstration: The 
exposition of the faith "in all its order, coherence, and transforming power" (Eboussi-Boulaga, 
1984, p. 33). The themes of demonstration are the worship of God, sexual and family morality 
(including monogamy), private property, and the work ethic. The truths to be believed include a 
view of the person as divided into body and soul. Rote learning and abandonment to the 
knowledge of the church ensure salvation of the soul. The hospital looks after the body. 
Demonstration of the truth aims at demonstrating the reasonableness of the faith, which can be 
understood only by education to reason itself. 
Mudimbe ( 1988) identifies an evolutionary thesis underlying this discourse. The native 
is supposed to undergo a radical transformation, from primitiveness to civilisation; from illness 
to health; from disorder (madness, satanic illusions, and corruption) to order; from darkness to 
the light of God. Similar reasoning underlied newly invented treatment methods applied to the 
mentally ill and the delinquent in European institutions. Whereas, previously, these Others were 
punished or alienated by society, they were now viewed as lesser developed, morally and 
rationally, and thus in need of programmes of improvement. The site of improvement was 
within the individual; the measure thereof, the norm set by the regime of truth; the methods, 
discipline, domestication, reasoning, demonstration, and refutation (Foucault, 1973, 1977). 
Missionary discourse centres around a middle-class Christian truth. Faith becomes a 
personal struggle; it is interiorised and "psychologized" (Eboussi Boulaga, 1984, p. 62). The key 
to both knowledge and salvation is to be found inside the individual person (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991). Christianity entails a unique form of power, which Foucault (1982) terms 
pastoral power (p. 214). Its aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world. It is a form 
of power "that is prepared to sacrifice itself for the life and salvation of the flock" (Foucault, 
1982, p. 214) and serves each individual, in particular, during his or her entire life. The 
knowledge of Christianity carries the power to individualise and foreshadows the development 
of secular knowledges of the individual. These knowledges have become more important since 
the industrial revolution. 
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Comaroff and Comaroff (1991) point to the importance of the industrial revolution in 
British missionary discourse. The industrial revolution had replaced agrarian societies in 
Europe and its negative effects came to be felt. The lower classes had turned increasingly to 
religion, which, like capitalism, preached an ethos of self-improvement and upward mobility. 
English missionaries sought to evangelise and civilise by personal example (itself an expression 
of bourgeois values), and the pathway along which they were to lead the heathen ran through 
their own society as they would have wished to see it: 
A neat fusion of three idealized worlds: the scientific, capitalist age in its most 
ideologically roseate form, wherein individuals were free to better themselves and to 
aspire to ever greater heights; an idyllic countryside in which ... hardworking peasants ... 
produce gainfully for the market; and a sovereign Empire of God. (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991, p. 59) 
In a world where secularism was threatening the church and it was forced to offer a 
message of hope to those oppressed by industrialisation, it turned hopefully towards Africa to 
create a new society. 
Conversion to Christianity 
Missionaries varied along a spectrum of relations with the state. At one end were those 
who were closely aligned with colonial powers; at the other end, those who actively fought 
against it. They provided converts with a liberal education that opened a space for resistance to 
colonial power. As liberation movements got under way in the early 20th century, many 
churches lent them their support (Bourdillon, 1990). However, at least initially, the mission was 
viewed as an extension of colonial rule. Its paternalism and condemnation of local practices 
could not have been welcome. Why did it attract converts? 
Though missionaries were often marginal to their own culture, they conveyed its 
symbols, technology, political power, and opportunities for wealth (Bourdillon, 1990; Ray, 
1976). Christianity's strong ties with western education and health services made it the religion 
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of the educated and westernised (Bourdillon, 1990; Mbiti, 1971; Oduyoye, 1986). Its attraction 
was not in and for itself but by association with the power/knowledge of the West (Horton 
1971). Converts were attracted to education as an avenue to white-collar work as well as 
vocational and industrial training offered by some churches (Middleton, 1983 ). Many missions 
offered economic assistance in the purchase of new agricultural and domestic technologies 
(Bourdillon, 1990). Often access to these services was incumbent on membership. 
Conversion went with an expansion of scale from the narrow local viewpoints of small 
communities to wider horizons brought along by the opening of the continent to global 
concerns. Local deities whose power was gradually assumed to extend only to local affairs, 
became increasingly less important, while the universal God, whose power extends over a larger 
field, became more important (Horton, 1971). 
As with Islam, Christianity's acceptance was highly conditional and selective (Fernandez, 
1972; Horton, 1971 ), but Christianity was more intolerant of syncretism and parallelism. It was 
not prepared to learn from Africa and conversion was a one-way process (Oduyoye, 1986). 
Where Islam adopted a both/and approach, Christianity adopted an either/or position. Converts 
frequently had to live in missionary villages, divorced from their context (Gray, 1978; Oduyoye, 
1986), and though this practice of social isolation was later withdrawn (Middleton, 1983 ), 
conversion demanded the rejection of indigenous culture and the adoption of western culture. 
The first converts were ex-slaves, widows, other women, orphans, those carrying taboos 
and runaways - disempowered persons of ambiguous social status (Gray, 1978; Middleton, 
1983). Family ties converted the second generation. Lesser royals who were sent to the church 
to be educated became the first black pastors and evangelists. 
However, it is doubtful whether the term "conversion" applies to the interaction which 
took place between Africans and missionaries. The concept of conversion is itself a creation of 
missionary discourse (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991). It implies a rational, voluntary choice by 
an individual between different, discrete faiths, which are in tum, separate from the rest of life. 
The process whereby elements of Christianity were absorbed into the lives of Africans is of a 
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different order. It was a total and complex response to the imposition of a new social and 
epistemological realm. This will be illustrated in the following two sections, which offer 
descriptions of the process whereby missionary power/knowledge infiltrated two societies 
converted by different denominations, one Catholic, one Protestant. 
The Missionary Domestication of the Congo 
In 1876, Leopold II, King of Belgium, decreed that the central African area later called 
the Congo become a part of his kingdom. The Vatican, having lost power in Europe, proposed 
the simultaneous evangelisation of the area. Church and state were united in Belgium and they 
descended as a unity upon the Congo (Gray, 1978). The Belgian Catholic missionaries brought 
with them an elaborate ecclesiastical administration based on a hierarchical bureaucracy. By 
1911, there were ten ecclesiastical regions, each with its own tradition. The geography of the 
Congo had been turned into "a kind of spiritual checkerboard on which each unit or square was 
occupied by a definite religious style" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 110). All geographical features of 
the land (like all converts) were given European names (Bujo, 1992). Local regions of authority 
and community boundaries were disregarded and superseded by these "dividing practices" 
(Foucault, 1977). Church affiliation would be the new common identity. 
Each ecclesiastic region consisted of various missions, re-enacting a medieval pattern: 
"A religious centre is called to transform an area" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 113). Converts were 
relocated to missionary villages, and each centre's church, residences, schools, and hospitals 
projected a vision: The values and knowledge of Europe. Power entered through the 
reorganisation of space. It was a visible, monarchic, juridical power (Foucault, 1980b ). 
After the space, which they reorganized according to a new memory exemplified in the 
Church, the missionaries rapidly command time and its categories. There will be a 
religious economy of days, weeks, months, years, espousing a liturgical calendar, and 
also specific daily ritual arrangements. As an entity, the village comes to life at dawn, 
morning prayers follow the mass, and immediately after comes "Christian instruction". 
Men, women, children, Christians, catechumens, each group has its program, its teacher 
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and its message. The afternoon is devoted to a different labor - agriculture or 
construction ... till 6:00 p.m. curfew, recreation. The missionaries have regulated 
everything. (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 11) 
The project of conversion was "a politics that disciplines beings, space, and time in the 
name of unspoken models" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 112). The mission embodied the imposition of 
a disciplinary, totalising power, born of 19th century European Enlightenment. It was the 
disciplinary power of prisons, hospitals, mental institutions, schools, and factories (Foucault, 
1977). It was exercised in the name of humanitarian concerns, in the interest of the social body, 
as exemplified in the abolition of slavery. 
An important function of the missions was to buy the freedom of slaves from Arab 
traders. The freed slaves became the first converts and provided labour for the building of the 
missions, which earned them a religious education, baptism, and citizenship in the mission-city. 
Mudimbe ( 1994) questions whether their lives had radically changed after being freed. They 
had entered the bottom level of the church hierarchy. This hierarchy is visually present in the 
mission church: The altar and its space is reserved for the clergy; the next space is reserved for 
whites; the greater nave, for black Christians; finally, the lower nave for catechumens, so that, in 
the words of one of the missionaries, "they can feel excluded from the celebration of the most 
sacred mystery and thus experience better their inferiority vis-a-vis the Christians" (Mudimbe, 
1994, p. 112). This inferiority was further reinforced by attacks on indigenous religion. Church 
and state united in a full-scale attack on all indigenous customs: Polygamy, ancestor-cults, 
offerings to spirits, dancing and hunting ceremonies, all transitional rites, and carvings 
representing spirits were outlawed (Bujo, 1992). 
From the end of the 19th century, when the first black priests were ordained, conversion 
was conceptualised as a collaboration between the white fathers and their pupils. Detailed 
policies were formulated to guide the education of these pupils. They were to be socially 
engineered into an orthodox unity; dependent upon the sponsorship of white superiors and a 
foreign centre of authority. Norms were formulated for their selection on the basis of 
intellectual, moral, and spiritual capabilities. They were to be observed, studied, and selected 
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very early. A detailed "psychology" of selection was formulated. 
"The chosen ones submitted to a new system of life, completely isolated from their 
ordinary milieu" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 120). They entered a monastic boarding school, and were 
thus physically isolated from society. It was designed to "adapt" to "the psychology of the 
African", which, in practice, meant that the buildings were from mud. Culturally, students were 
to be situated somewhere between blacks and whites on the social scale, to prevent them from 
becoming "pretentious, demanding, and marginalized" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 121) in the white 
world. Educationally, they were to be taught both secular and theological subjects in Latin. In 
short, they were to receive a replica of the training of Catholic priests in Europe, without the 
benefit of previous acquaintance with its cultural context. 
"Through a long period of acculturation, an average of fifteen years, the candidate learns, 
in the Foucauldian sense, how to become 'a docile body'. The seminary structures itself as a 
'panopticon' through three main factors: the space, which reproduces a monastic model, the 
repartition of time, and the constitution of transparent consciousnesses" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 
121). The individual consciousness of the seminarian was developed in three ways: 
Thrice-daily self-examinations, an elaborate system of spiritual auto-surveillance, and spiritual 
direction in the form of confession, under guidance of a spiritual master. Progress was carefully 
monitored and meticulously documented. Of the first two hundred Africans who were selected 
for the programme, ten succeeded. The bishop called it "a miracle of grace" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 
123). 
Foucault ( 1984) describes confession as one of the earliest techniques of self-discipline 
that made the bourgeois subject and his conscience into a locus of evaluation and surveillance. 
The pastoral power of Christianity "cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's 
minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It 
implies a knowledge of the conscience and the ability to direct it" (Foucault, 1982, p. 214 ). 
Individuals were not only created but recruited into an active role in their own subjugation 
through techniques detailed in a science of conversion. This science contained the rudiments of 
what was to become the role of the social sciences in the domestication of Africa: The creation 
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of docile bodies "to be subjected, used, transformed, and improved" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 180). 
Another dream of a perfect society brought "automatic docility" (p. 186) to its followers. 
The dream did succeed in that it produced a new generation of evolues, a 
western-educated middle class falling between the colonials and the masses. By 1947, the 
evolues had, however, started questioning the political and social dominance of the colonists in 
their publications. The relationship between the white Father and his protege had taken an 
unforeseen tum. Missionary discourse reformulated itself accordingly. Informed by 
anthropology, it started speaking of ethnic differences and cultural accommodation. A new 
policy was drawn up to contain the potential revolt: A more equal relationship between 
missionary and student; a joint commitment to a search for a new social order. Euphemisms 
entered the language; the terms "savages" and "heathens" were no longer heard in public 
(Mudimbe, 1994). 
The church had succeeded in its mission of enculturation, but had thereby, paradoxically, 
furnished a tool for dissent, which later grew into nationalism and eventual decolonisation. The 
evolues became the new leaders and intellectuals. Their dissent, however, was fought in the 
arena of the dominant knowledge. Through dissent, they had entered the hegemony of the 
missionary truth. 
It was from the Congo that one of the first intellectual voices reclaiming the value of 
indigenous thought, rang out. In 1945, Father Tempels, a Belgian Franciscan missionary, 
published Bantu Philosophy, which was to become the first in a series of similar 
ethnophilosophical studies. Though respectful of "the philosophy of the Bantu", the ultimate 
aim of the study was to furnish information to improve the effectiveness of missionary work. 
Missionary discourse had excavated a subjugated knowledge but thereby extended its 
hegemony. Indigenous knowledge had become the object of science. A seed had, however, 
been planted which later grew into African theology (Bujo, 1992) and African philosophy 
(Hountondji, 1983). 
The legacy of missionary discourse can still be read in the discourse of some African 
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leaders. The formal alliance between church and colonial government during colonisation has 
led to so much resentment among the evolues that, to this day, conflict between church and state 
is characteristic of Zairean politics (Gray, 1978). President Mobuto is actively opposed to the 
presence of western churches in Zaire (Mushete, 1978). However, the structure of missionary 
discourse is to be found behind the "apparent disorder, changing themes, contradictory 
ideological appropriations ... and structural madness" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 145) ofMobuto's 
discourse, which has been termed a political religion (Fernandez, 1979, p. 289). Mobuto speaks 
in Messianic and mythical tones of absolute norms of truth and of a history marching towards 
salvation from colonialism. He gives cultural and doctrinal lessons regulated by major 
principles. It is as a teacher and "guide-Messiah" (Mudimbe, 1994, p. 148) that he inaugurates 
projects of social transformation. His regime explicitly aims at a total displacement of the 
values of the previous regime. His statements are divorced from social reality and exist in a 
separate realm of unquestionable truths. Mobutoism is a language of reason closed upon itself; 
of derision, refutation, and demonstration; of evolutionary paradigms and revelation. 
Conversion and Conversation in Bechuanaland 
The Christianity that was imported to the people who were later to be designated by the 
ethnic category of "Southern Tswana" was that of British Nonconformist Protestant 
missionaries. In contrast to the Catholics in the Congo, they were critics of the more obvious 
colonial abuses by the state (Gray, 1978). In Britain, missionary societies were at the heart of 
the humanitarian movement. They came from the post-enlightment world of liberalism, where 
self-contained, right-bearing individuals had the innate capacity to construct and improve 
themselves through the powers of reason. Self-discipline, in the form of punctuality, cleanliness 
and preparedness for hard work, fed the factories and oiled the machine of industrialisation. 
The social values of bourgeois ideology were internalised in personal virtues embodied in 
self-control, self-denial, self-esteem, self-sacrifice, self-possession, and self-improvement 
( Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991 ). Despite its humanitarianism, this Protestantism was rooted in 
industrial capitalism, bourgeois culture, and religious individualism. Rational, methodical, 
self-willed duty provided the means to salvation. 
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Armed with such knowledge, the missionaries arrived among the Tswana in the early 
19th century. They already had competitors in an existing battle between the British 
government and the Afrikaners to gain control of black populations. The missionaries fought 
both the Afrikaner domination of blacks (which was rooted in a Christianity that later supported 
apartheid) and the greed of British imperialism. Caught in the middle, they tried to force the 
issue of "native" social and legal rights on both parties, gradually becoming their representatives 
in a white world. In Britain, they had been the representatives of the oppressed lower class; in 
Africa they assumed the same role (though more patemalistically) towards the "noble savage". 
However, from the point of view of the Tswana, they were representatives of the white world, 
and while pursuing their liberal traditions, they drew the Tswana into the web of their 
knowledge. 
Gifts of Knowledge 
Knowledge was, above all, attained through literacy and the Bible, which was the path of 
"self-improvement and salvation, revelation and refinement, civilization and, finally, 
conversion" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 64). Literacy and education not only led to 
material gain, but developed the mind and reason, and promoted the cultivation of an 
inner-directed, reflective self. The first contacts between missionaries and the Tswana 
embodied these values. Missionaries would display the Bible to an entourage of curious 
Tswana, and proceed to read and preach from it. Gifts would be presented to their ruler, as 
recounted by the Reverend Campbell in 1813: 
I said that I had brought a small present for him, as a token of friendship - while opening 
it he remained silent, not moving even his head, only his eyes towards the parcel. I then 
took from it a gilded copper comb and put it into his hair, and tied a silver spangled band 
and tassel round his head, and a chain about his neck, and last of all presented him with a 
looking glass. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 170) 
The material gains of European culture are represented in trinkets of no real value, and the 
looking glass opens the way to self-reflection. It is ironic that the chief would return the 
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compliment by presenting the missionary with a gift of cattle, the most highly valued material, 
cultural and symbolic asset to the Tswana. The looking glass, representing to the Tswana the 
mysterious powers of whites, later became an object of divination. It was used by witch-finders 
to identify those "whose offence was the assertion of unbridled self-interest in violation of the 
common good" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 189). 
While the missionary was focusing on his preaching, the Tswana were awed by the 
objects and technologies that accompanied him. These objects were viewed as extensions of his 
power. A church clock, with wooden hands moulded in the form of soldiers, became an object 
of alarm to the Tswana, who argued about the powers of the soldiers to attack them. By 
association, the missionary was accused of plotting to take them into bondage. The missionary 
cut down the wooden figures, in an effort to "rationally" demonstrate their harmlessness, but to 
no avail. The controversy was settled only when the clock became a gift to the chief. This 
incident contains the major elements of the struggle for power/knowledge between the two 
parties. In the world of the missionary, the clock represented order and objective time; time was 
money, to be spent or used, wasted or owned. To the Tswana, the clock contained "white 
power", the ability to breathe life into inanimate material. This power was extremely seductive, 
but it was also (realistically) perceived as part of an ominous order of domination. The only 
way to fight this power was to appropriate it, and thereby enter into it. 
Invisible liecemony 
The earliest conversations between the missionary and the Tswana centred around such 
symbols of power/knowledge. Both parties were struggling to gain control over the terms of the 
encounter. "The earliest objects of this struggle were the forms that the churchmen sought to 
impose on the conversation itself: among others, linguistic forms, spatial forms, the forms of 
rational argument and positive knowledge" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 199). The overt 
content of the conversations had to do with the substantive message of the mission conveyed "in 
sermons and services, lessons and didactic dialogues" (p. 199). The gospel, delivered thus, 
initially made little sense to the Tswana and was mostly ignored or rudely rejected. Other kinds 
of knowledge were, however, gradually absorbed, in struggles in the domains of material and 
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symbolic values and language and representation. 
Both parties tried to appropriate the space of the encounter. The missionary would aim 
at building the mission in the heart of the social order, beside the ruler, as church and state stood 
side by side in Britain. The chief would banish the mission to outside the social centre, but 
close enough to be the source of valued goods and skills. One missionary eventually gained 
access to the centre only after giving the chief his own gun - the most condensed source of 
European power. In the short run, the chiefs controlled space, integrated the missionary into the 
village and proudly displayed him to visitors as a symbol of their power. In the long run, as 
elsewhere in Africa (Mudimbe, 1994 ), two distinct spatial domains developed, separated by a 
no-man's land. 
The battle around material versus symbolic values was fought around the control of 
water, a scarce commodity. The control over water was a crucial aspect of the sovereign power 
of the ruler. The annual rains were a force bestowed by the ruler upon the land after the 
necessary rites performed by the rainmaker. The effectiveness of rites of rainmaking depended 
upon harmonious relations between the living and the dead. The missionary would dig 
irrigation trenches and wells, technically managing what the Tswana regarded as sacred, while 
propounding that only God had authority over rain. Long arguments would ensue, with 
missionaries logically explaining, in the name of both God and Science, the absurdities of 
rainmaking, and the Tswana patiently explaining that their social order would collapse without 
it. Rainmakers began to blame the mission when their efforts failed and the mission started 
holding special rain services, claiming success as proof of victory over Satan. 
These conversations represent a process whereby the Tswana, like Africans all over the 
continent (Fernandez, 1972) were gradually drawn into a position where they had to defend 
their practices on rational terms. They were forced to stand outside their own knowledge and 
describe it to themselves. They became self-conscious about their own way of life. 
Imperceptibly, they were drawn to the looking-glass of European knowledge. They entered 
European discourse by arguing about the effectiveness of rainmaking, which is not about 
effectiveness but about the cohesion of the cosmos. Increasingly, they came to share the 
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missionary's view of essential differences between two opposing cultural and ethnic worlds, 
where, traditionally, they would view cultural differences from a relativist position with equal 
sharing between parties. They internalised the terms upon which they were being challenged. 
They were "seduced into the modes of rational debate, positivist knowledge, and empirical 
reason" ( Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 213 ). The hegemony of a modem, invisible, dividing 
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980b) had entered their world. At the same time, they were 
confronted with the seductive power of the visible word. 
The Power of the Word 
Missionary knowledge was powerful in terms of the sanctity of the written word. Behind 
the missionary lay his sacred texts, the ultimate repositories of eternal, global truth. In Tswana 
culture where words had mystical power, literacy was, initially, understood less as a learned 
skill than as an innate mystical capacity. "Given the rhetoric of the evangelists and the awe with 
which they spoke of the divine truth, it is not surprising that [the Book] was perceived as a 
strong medicine, an infusion that bewitched all who imbibed it" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, 
p. 228). Treatment by covering bodies with script and newsprint later became a regular part of 
healing rites among illiterates. The Book was seen as an instrument of divination and its power 
was appropriated through a "systematic misrecognition of European signs and meanings on the 
part of people whose own cultures did not segregate the word from the world or the concept 
from the concrete" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 229). 
According to Fernandez (1972), Middleton (1983), and Turner (1979) such 
misrepresentations are common in societies who are presented with selective elements of 
western culture (be they Bibles, church clocks or irrigation ditches) which have been abstracted 
from the context in which they are understood and from which they have received their power. 
The real source of the powers are never fully seen in the recipient area. Since for most primal 
cultures the ultimate sources of knowledge and power are mystical and spiritual, they search for 
the real source of power in western religion, mostly in the Bible. The expectation is created that 
access to this knowledge will ensure entry into all the powers of the whites, including material 
benefit. When this expectation is not met, it is believed that there exists further secret 
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knowledge which has been withheld. Many religious movements are built around prophets who 
claim to have access to secret, revealed scriptures that supplement the Bible. 
The power of literacy attracted many Tswana to the church. The Bible was translated 
into Setswana by the missionaries, who thereby unwittingly extended their power by reinventing 
the language before handing it back to its owners in written form. Bold mistranslations as well 
as subtle acts of appropriation occurred. The word "demons" was translated to badimo 
("ancestors"); "Christian believer" became modumedi ("one who agrees") (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991, p. 218). 
Schools were built and a regime of instruction, veneration, and surveillance imposed on 
converts. Space and time were reorganised, the sacred separated from the secular, work from 
leisure, the inner from the outer, the soul from the body. The first converts were the marginal 
and the powerless: Outsiders; minor royalty; women. They were followed by a large group who 
became "nominal" Christians, retaining traditional religious practices while harnessing mission 
resources and undermining its order and discipline. From schools like these emerged the future 
intellectuals, leaders of the revolution, and black theologians. 
Many years later, a Tswana herbalist/faith healer and zealous member of and evangelist 
for the Methodist church described the legacy of the missionaries as follows: "The missionaries 
have not taught us anything new about God and his workings with man and the world.... All 
they have taught us ... is tlhabologo (civilization, meaning, in fact, material progress in the style 
of the West)" (Setiloane, 1978, p. 402). 
There were also those who took from Christianity what they needed and integrated it into 
existing knowledge. As early as 1837, an indignant missionary wrote of a former candidate for 
baptism who had "pretences to immediate communion with the divine Being" (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991, p. 248). She had attracted a large following by creating a divination rite, "a 
brilliant bricolage of Christian and indigenous words and objects; she chanted fragments of the 
Lord's Prayer, hymns, and scriptures while laying out an orderly arrangement of patches tom 
from the Baptismal gown" (p. 248). An African independent church was born out of a 
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subversive recodification of power/knowledge. Christianity had been become a local healing 
power. 
Christianity as Local Power/knowledge 
Africa has appropriated Christianity in a way that is similar to its appropriation oflslam 
in that commitment to it ranges from full to superficial (Horton, 1971). "Africa today is a field 
of multi-religious activity that induces tolerance of different ways and beliefs. In the same 
family in the tropics it is possible to find Christians, Muslims and pagans" (Parrinder, 1969, p. 
235) and the same person partakes in different religions because family loyalty is stronger than 
religious loyalty (Middleton, 1983). 
Africans are converting Christianity into their cultural world without abandoning 
indigenous religious experiences (Onyanwu, 1975). Parallel practices depend on personal need 
(Awolalu, 1985). Different religious specialists are visited according to the nature of a personal 
problem: Cults of affliction, indigenous diviners or Christian prayer may be invoked (Gray, 
1978; Middleton, 1983; Whisson & West, 1975). People may visit traditional shrines and · 
healers for personal concerns; for a sense of community and social status, they go to church. 
Bourdillon (1990) points out that in traditional society, people could choose among a variety of 
specialists and cults, all associated with different powers, to deal with problems in their lives. 
They "tap the power of Christianity" when and if they choose and tum to more traditional 
powers for personal and family problems. Consistency over time is not important. 
Africans do not only selectively partake in Christianity, but have appropriated 
Christianity from within, by establishing their own independent churches as well as 
transforming the theology of the mission churches. They are following the example of the early 
Ethiopian and Coptic churches. At the time of the inception of the Ethiopian church, it 
produced famous Christian scholars and theologians and formed part of the orthodox Christian 
world. Centuries of later isolation from the rest of Christiandom, however, ensured that it 
developed a uniquely African expression (Mbiti, 1971). There is currently a growing tendency 
to establish a closer link between ancient and new forms of African Christianity (MacGaffey, 
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1981). The old forms have become models for some African theologians. Similarly, the names 
of independent churches, often incorporating Zion or Ethiopia, reflect a desire for recognition as 
independently linked to the earliest roots of Christianity (Bourdillon, 1990). 
African Theology 
Christianity opened the way to opposition to western domination in Africa. Mission 
educated Africans appropriated the rationality and humanitarianism of the mission churches in 
their struggle for liberation (July, 1968). The new nationalists associated foreign religions with 
colonialism and many wanted to see them abolished in Africa and traditional religion 
re-instituted (Awolalu, 1985). At the same time, African clergy were moving towards 
indigenisation and beginning to practise their own theology. 
Liberation (or Black) theology in South Africa, was inspired by its North American 
counterpart (Tutu, 1979). It was concerned with both indigenisation and liberation from 
oppression. "Our concern is not merely to liberate people; it is also to liberate the Gospel" 
(Boesak, 1979). The growth ofliberation theology was closely related to the rise of black 
nationalism (Mphahlele, 1977; Mudimbe, 1983) and the Black Consciousness movement, which 
originated in the schools of theology of black apartheid universities (Tutu, 1979). According to 
a report of the Commission on Black Theology of the South African Student Organisation of 
1971 (in Kotze, 1974) Black theology "means taking resolute and decisive steps to free Black 
people not only from estrangement from God but also from slave mentality, inferiority complex, 
distrust of themselves and continued dependence on others culminating in self-hate" ( p. 52). 
Black theologians unanimously rejected white churches, especially the Dutch Reformed Church, 
which was believed to have been designed to oppress blacks and support apartheid. 
The complex and contradictory role of Christianity in the liberation struggle is illustrated 
in the South African national anthem, Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika, which was composed at Lovedale 
College, a mission institution, in the l 890's. This Christian hymn became a symbol of 
liberation, sung by multiethnic, sometimes secular, and often radical groups of people, 
beseeching the Holy Spirit to intervene on the side of the "Nation of Jesus", in the idiom of a 
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Victorian moral army (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991). 
Elsewhere in Africa, theologians struggled for the establishment of an organic and 
original connection between political independence, cultural autonomy, and Africanised 
churches (Mudimbe 1983). Mission Christianity was criticised on methodological, ideological 
and philosophical levels. The work of anthropologists and missionaries on indigenous religion 
was rejected and new studies appeared, searching for similarities between indigenous religions 
and Christianity (Mudimbe, 1983). Various attempts have been made to adopt African elements 
into Christian theology. The ancestor cult is connected to the cult of Saints, communal 
solidarity to the Mystical Body of the church and ancestors to Grace (Nyamiti, 1978). Similarly, 
Bujo (1992) proposes a theology where Christ becomes the proto-ancestor, and Crane (1964) 
proposes the unification of initiation and baptismal rites and a greater emphasis on the gifts of 
the Spirit such as healing, prayer, and exorcism. 
Catholic churches have shown earlier and stronger tendencies to indigenise through a 
policy of finding local cultural "stepping stones" that lend themselves to implantation. The 
ritual aspect of Catholicism is amenable to adaptation and its central objects tend to take on a 
meaning equivalent to that of indigenous charms (De Craemer, Vansina & Fox, 1976). 
Protestants, more concerned with inner states than outward forms, were more reticent to adapt, 
but recently there has been a move to include the ancestors in the celebration of All Saints day 
in the Anglican church and Protestants have proposed strong arguments that Christianity is a 
continuation and perfection of traditional religion (Mudimbe, 1983). 
Most, if not all, African churches now integrate traditional devotional practices such as 
drumming, clapping, and dancing (Awolalu, 1985; Kyewalyanga, 1976). However, one area 
where the established church differs from Islam, indigenous religion, and the independent 
churches, is its hesitancy to become involved in healing divination. An awareness of this fact 
has led some leaders in established churches to start healing ministries, but these still meet with 
strong opposition (Bourdillon, 1990). One missionary, Kirby (1992), who decided to undergo 
training in divination, reports as follows on the reaction of a Ghanaian community after his 
initiation as a diviner: "Most villagers ... seemed quite at home with the idea.... I recall the 
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impression that it left on one old man who said: 'Father, I didn't know you were interested in 
religion!"' (p. 337). 
MacGaffey ( 1981) concludes that indigenisation is difficult to attain as the demands of 
theological universalism oppose those of cultural relativism and African clergy are still heavily 
dependent on external financial assistance. However, Mudimbe (1983) is of the opinion that 
since 1960, the church has largely been Africanised. Theologians are now focusing more on the 
universal essence of Christianity which transcends cultural differences. Recent work reflects a 
serious reciprocal dialogue between Christianity and the African heritage which is transforming 
both (MacGaffey, 1981 ). African clergy have demanded and earned for themselves "the right to 
think Christianity" (Mushete, 1994, p. 16). Whereas westernisation and Christianisation went 
hand in hand in the missionary era, these are separated in current African theology. Christianity 
is viewed less as a unitary universal knowledge and more in its multiple and various local 
manifestations, implying that it can speak in many different cultural languages. The knowledge 
of Christianity is not seen as a fixed, given truth, to be accepted or rejected, but as a process of 
growth in communion (Oduyoye, 1986). Evangelisation has acquired a new meaning: The 
evangeliser gives as well as receives not only cultural knowledge but understandings of the 
Gospel and the faith itself There has been an inversion of the missionary idea that Africa needs 
Europe; it is now Europe that needs to be informed by African theology, in order to overcome its 
own impasse of rationalism and for the sacred to be restored to the faith (Agossou, 1977). 
These African initiatives are not concerned with the propagation, expansion, and 
explanation of an alien religion in Africa but form part of a global trend in Christianity to 
transcend a purely western, parochial understanding of Christianity (Gray, 1978). What used to 
be the margins of Christianity have become central to the faith and its development. Whereas 
Christianity is declining in the West, the "meteoric rise of the church in Black Africa" (Barrett, 
1970) has become a growing edge. "We no longer speak of Christian 'adaptation to' black 
Africa, but rather of'incarnation within' black Africa" (Fisher, 1985, p. 169). 
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The Independent Churches 
The originality of African Christian knowledge is most apparent in the popular religious 
movements which have been termed separatist, messianic, nativistic, syncretic, and independent. 
"None of these labels is much good because each implies a particular, limited way oflooking at 
phenomena so many-sided as to defy such characterisation" (MacGaffey, 1981, p. 243). The 
term "independent churches" is used here to differentiate between these movements and the 
more orthodox African churches which developed out of the mission churches, though it is 
recognised that this distinction is by no means clear-cut. It does allow, however, for 
comparisons to be made between the two, showing that, in South Africa, independent churches 
are growing (especially in urban areas) at the expense of the older mission churches (Kruger et 
al., 1993). 
There is a tendency in studies of independent churches to reduce them to traditional 
religious rites covered with a veneer of Christianity to appear respectable (the assumption of the 
unchangeable nature of the African, who lacks history), or as impure, immature versions of 
proper churches, implying that they will grow up to become respectable (the evolutionary and 
infantilising assumption), all traceable to missionary discourse. In the same way that the term 
conversion is inadequate in the African context, theological terminologies such as "church" or 
"syncretism", do not convey the complex reality that underlies these religious movements. 
Theological descriptions tend to focus on the practice of spirit possession and neglect its context 
of healing. Similarly, the terminology of psychiatry and psychology tends to reduce these 
churches to indigenised faith healing institutes or religious hospitals and their prophet/healers to 
traditional healers in religious disguise. The independent Christian movements or churches are 
total, contemporary responses to complex social, political and epistemic contexts. 
Origins 
Missionary paternalism and over-domination were instrumental in the formation of 
independent African churches (Ray, 1976). Africans were relegated to the bottom of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy of power of the clergy. They rebelled against the contradiction between 
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this hierarchy and the proclaimed equality of men before God (Awolalu, 1985). Liberty, 
equality, and fraternity was preached in the name of Christ, but not in culture and politics 
(Oduyoye, 1986). 
The way in which the healing and political functions of independent churches have come 
to be associated is illustrated in the origin of the Kimbanguist church in Zaire, one of the most 
influential religious movements in Africa. When an influenza epidemic broke out in 1918, 
Simon Kimbangu, a Baptist missionary, was called by Christ to heal and convert. He left the 
mission and attracted a large following through healing ceremonies and sermons. He 
accomplished what centuries of missionary work could not: To convince people to abandon the 
charms of spirit cults. His work created such a sensation that the government took notice. 
Thousands of Congolese left their jobs to undertake pilgrimages to Kimbangu, hospitals fell 
vacant, and Catholic missions started to lose converts. Radical leaders urged people in 
Kimbangu's name not to pay taxes and to abandon their work. A nationalist movement was 
sparked. Kimbangu was sentenced to death by the King of Belgium and the movement was 
banned until national independence (Ray, 1976). 
Independent churches are, however, seldom directly involved in politics, and have been 
criticised for this. They have offered structures by which new social and political roles can be 
learnt (Fernandez, 1978), as well as an alternative social structure for those estranged from the 
mission churches. Mission Christianity did not satisfy their religiosity. It came to mean "simply 
a set of rules to be observed, promises to be expected in the next world, rhythmless hymns to be 
sung ... and a few other outward things" (Mbiti, 1971, p. 233). It failed to be integrated into the 
whole of life. When traditional structures of solidarity were shaken by modernisation, 
industrialisation, and urbanisation, independent churches offered alternative communities. 
According to Appiah-Kubi (1979) political, social, and other factors are less important in the 
emergence of independent churches than the spiritual hunger for healing, divining, prophesying 
and visioning. These churches fulfill what is most lacking in the missionary churches: A form 
of worship that satisfies spiritually as well as emotionally (Awolalu, 1985). 
Horton (1971) offers a similar explanation: Indigenous religion was a "this-worldly 
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affair", concerned with explanation, prediction, and control of space-time events, as well as 
communion in religion. Early Christianity functioned in a similar vein. However, by the end of 
the 19th century the mainstream of western Protestant Christianity had "dropped all pretence of 
providing a theory of how the world really worked, or a recipe for controlling the course of 
affairs; and theologians and pastors concentrated on the encounter with God as the supreme and 
archetypal social relationship" (Horton, 1971, p. 96). It had become an "other-worldly" religion 
offering, in this world, only communion between humans. It was the disappointment of 
converts with this other-worldliness, that led to the creation of independent churches. Horton's 
explanation has been criticised for its Eurocentrism (MacGaffey, 1981) but there is general 
agreement that most members enter these churches with problems to be solved (Bourdillon, 
1990). Although protest against domination was a prominent feature in the early independent 
churches, especially in South Africa, healing later became their central feature. 
Membership 
Independent churches appeal to the socially dislocated, the marginal, and the powerless. 
Women are far more strongly represented in leadership positions within these churches than in 
the orthodox churches (Fernandez, 1978). Although these churches have traditionally been 
associated with the uneducated lower classes, they attract a wide variety of people from illiterate 
to literate (Bourdillon, 1990). Jahoda (1971) describes the emergence of independent churches 
that cater for the educated, westernised elite, belying the common view that scientific education 
has a shattering effect on indigenous beliefs in spirits and witchcraft. In fact, Jahoda's research 
demonstrates that belief in witchcraft and modernity varies independently. The new 
independent churches offer the best of two worlds: "Some of the valued Christian forms 
together with an up-dated version of traditional elements, including both protection from harm 
and help for success in life; and all this in the setting of lively and emotionally satisfying 
services" (pp. 30-31 ). 
Structure 
Patterns of authority vary in the independent churches but the roles of prophet, elder and 
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pastor occur frequently. The prophet has divinely inspired dreams and visions, diagnoses 
problems through prayer, and is the spiritual expert. His or her authority is granted by 
revelation. The elder deals more with social relationships among members. The pastor is 
concerned with church administration, the conduct of services, the interpretation of the Bible, 
and church doctrines. Authority is granted by training and efficiency. A combination of offices 
may be held by one person (Fernandez, 1978). 
The role of the prophet varies from those that resemble Old Testament models of 
religious individualism to those who resemble African heroes and African charismatic 
traditions. The prophets' personality and charisma play an important role in many movements 
but all speak of themselves in humble vein - as media of revelation. Their career paths are 
similar: They receive a calling through disease or a crisis of affiiction. This is followed by 
messages or directions received from supernaturals, recovery, and a confirmation of powers of 
healing. This career path is similar to that of indigenous priest/healers and not to be confused 
with the western idea of seeing into the future (Fernandez, 1978). Many prophet/healers are 
converted traditional healers (Bakker, 1989; Whisson & West, 1975). 
Independent church movements function similarly to cults of affiiction. Members are 
related by affiiction and the group provides an incorporating structure where other resources 
were unavailable or have failed. In fact, according to De Craemer et al. ( 1976) African religious 
movements fall on a continuum between indigenous cults of affiiction and formal Christian 
churches. These authors assert, as does Fernandez (1972) and MacGaffey (1972), that the core 
elements of Central African pre-colonial culture have remained remarkably intact. One part of 
this core culture that evolved and spread was religious movements, some of which became 
decidedly Christian. Their symbols and rituals include those of the church which have 
familiarity in terms of traditional religion: Candles (fire), baptism (water), the temple (shrines 
and places of initiation), and hymns (music) (De Craemer et al., 1976). 
Healing and Community 
Healing is the central activity in independent churches (F. S. Edwards, 1983; Fernandez, 
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1978). Their healing knowledge, which is similar to that found in indigenous cults of affliction 
(Devisch, 1993), has been described as 
the wisdom of taking illness and disease and turning it into social order: It is the same 
wisdom to be noted in the prophet's own career: the transformation of the sufferer into 
the healer, of encountering the solution in the problem, of making community out of 
suffering isolation. (Fernandez, 1978, p. 210) 
Conversion is always the result of actual treatment of sickness or misfortune (Horton, 
1971). Converts acquire new identities and shed previous selves to enter the fraternal 
community (Devisch, 1993). In the breakdown of kinship and relations, churches act as 
purveyors of new forms of moral accountability. They treat spiritual, personal, and physical 
problems, as well as new "diseases of money" (the frustrations of capitalism and the vices of 
possessive individualism), and "diseases of the city", which are problems related to the 
experience of the contradictory social realities of urbanisation and capitalism (Devisch, 1993). 
Revelation and healing occur through the Holy Spirit, via dreams, visions, divination or 
possession (Bourdillon, 1990), which are induced by ecstatic singing, drumming, clapping of 
hands or dancing (Awolalu, 1985). Treatment methods include prayer, fasting, the ritual use of 
holy water, candles, sacred oils (Awolalu, 1985), and many others (Bakker, 1989). Healing 
combines indigenous and western rites, is done individually and communally, and forms part of 
all devotional services. 
The psychology practised by the independent churches is simultaneously an individual, 
family, and community psychology. The churches offer alternative communities to the 
dislocated, as well as serving a function similar to community mental health centres, 
supplementing western medical and mental health services (Bakker, 1989; F. S. Edwards, 1983). 
They provide the equivalent of psychotherapeutic services, integrated with the spiritual and 
religious worlds. In addition, some of these churches offer the equivalent of economic 
development and community projects (Bourdillon, 1990). "There are obvious attractions in 
joining a community which provides meaning in the face of ambiguity, power in a situation of 
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powerlessness, and healing in an environment which undermines social harmony, and 
psychological and physical health" (F. S. Edwards, 1983, p. 178). 
Wholeness 
The independent Christian movements are ultimately about the restoration of wholeness. 
Fernandez (1986) describes African religious movements as revitalising because they provide 
access to the experience of states of relatedness, whereas modem secular life is characterised by 
atomisation and individualisation. The experience of wholeness has become a subjugated 
knowledge. In western thought, it belongs to the realms of the past or of "lesser developed" 
cultures. However, it is central to independent Christian movements, who provide members 
with "a kind of conviviality in experience" (Fernandez, 1986, p. 162). 
Fernandez (1986) argues that the conviction of wholeness is essentially an 
extra-linguistic experience, a product of certain kinds of imaginative - that is visualising or 
pictorialising - activity. One of the largest problems facing scholars studying religious 
movements is the difficulty of conveying their functioning linguistically. It is not possible to 
discuss theology with Kimbanguists, as was discovered by Martin (in Fernandez, 1978) who had 
to establish whether Kimbanguists qualify for admission to the World Council of Churches. 
Kimbanguist theology is lived, sung, and acted in unformulated images. Similarly, Devisch 
( 1993) abandoned a narrative account in favour of bodily and cultural images in studying a 
healing cult. 
The knowledge of wholes is a knowledge of form, images, patterns, relationships, and 
flashes of illumination. Its organising images are embodied in ritual performances, relating 
microcosm to macrocosm, inner things to outer things, centres to peripheries, upper to lower, 
past to present. The experience of wholeness in these religious movements can best be 
conveyed by images, such as in the following rite practised in Togo and Dahomey: 
Picture a wide beach of white sand under a brilliant sun, next to a dark blue sea. Here, 
under a cluster of palm trees, is a group of Celestial Christians in their resplendent white 
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and gold uniforms, kneeling around a deep hole dug in the sand, at the bottom of which a 
small trace of ocean water has seeped up. Close by are bottles of holy water and fruit to 
be poured and placed in the hole as an offering, after which the Bible will be read and 
prayers will be said. Then the hole will be filled in with the whitest sand and the group 
members, covering themselves with the whitest sheets, will lie on their backs and go to 
sleep around the hole. The divine force of the heavens, which they worship, and the sea 
and earth, which they have just propitiated, will now ebb and flow through them without 
disturbance and with purificatory and healing power. (Fernandez, 1986, p. 166) 
The Celestial Christians see themselves as channels between earth, sea, and sky. They are 
healed/made whole when they become pure conduits who do not impede the flow of these forces 
in their endless circulation. The images embedded in this and other descriptions of independent 
churches (Bakker, 1989; F. S. Edwards, 1983; Mbokazi, 1990) contrast sharply with the 
military, regulatory, disciplinary images of mission Christianity quoted earlier in this chapter. 
The healing images are elementary and primordial. They reflect the reclamation of a kind of 
knowledge that has been subjugated by rational Christianity. This knowledge is concerned with 
healing, wholeness, and holiness. Its power is spiritual, sacred, communal, and mystical. It 
continually reinterprets the relation between the seen and the unseen in new and invigorating 
ways that are drawn from what is culturally familiar but include the power of the Spirit of a 
universal God (F. S. Edwards, 1983, p. 192). 
Conclusion 
The power of mission Christianity had many different faces: Feudal, classical, and 
visible in some cases; modem, internal, invisible, and individualising in others. It was 
repressive and prohibitive; it reduced voices to silence (Foucault, 1980b ). However, it was also 
extremely seductive, productive, and durable. "What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse" 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 119). 
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The missionary narrative of difference viewed indigenous practices as manifestations of 
evil powers from which Africans had to be saved. Yet "what the missionaries identified was not 
only a space of salvation but a domain of forces and powers that they believed operated 
autonomously from Christianity .... What was being identified was a space where European 
impositions could be fought" (Simone, 1993, p. 99). In this space of otherness, Africans 
maintained the integrity of their worlds by creating new knowledges from a collage of 
resurrected and dominant knowledge. 
The narrative of colonisation contained the seeds of its own disempowerment. 
Christianity, as one aspect of an ideology of universality, was able to convert many Africans to 
its point of view. However, "the indigenous set their own terms for connection to this 
universality, interpreted its dogmas in their own way, and thus undermined the attempt to 
re-engineer cultural practices - which was at the heart of the Christian mission" (Simone, 1993, 
p. 98). An instrument of colonial power had became a voice of liberation, transformation, and 
revitalisation. 
It may be premature to consider at this point, still close to the echoes of missionary 
discourse, the calling of the psychologist, who properly belongs to the next chapter, the 
Enlightenment. For psychology has long ago outgrown its religious origins; has discarded the 
soul and adopted the psyche. We will leave religion to theology and Africa to anthropology, as 
is proper in the religion called Science, and rather conclude with a consideration of the calling 
of the anthropologist -
It is a calling that is ever ready to abandon centredness and look for what is revealed in 
peripheries. It is a calling with a tolerance of ambiguity amidst its striving for method. 
For those who have lived the complex interaction of religious cultures there are ... many 
varieties of ambiguity. (Fernandez, 1978, p. 230) 
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CHAPTERS 
AFRICA ENLIGHTENED 
With the death of God, proclaimed by Nietzsche at 
the tum of the century, man came to be the measure 
of all things, and psychology became the 
secularized religion of modernity. In modernity the 
loss of belief in an absolute God had been 
succeeded by the modernist declaration of faith: "I 
believe in one objective reality". Religion as a 
truth guarantee was replaced by the new sciences, 
the priests as truth mediators were substituted by 
the scientists. (Kvale, 1992b, p. 54) 
This chapter describes the manifestations of post-enlightenment western secular 
knowledge in Africa, including the social sciences and psychology. The relevance debate 
attaches particular importance to the complicity of psychology in oppressive power relations in 
Africa, due to its colonial origins. This chapter attempts to archaeologise such a view of 
psychology, by explicating the conditions of possibility of psychological knowledge and 
specifically its complicity in modem forms of power. 
All hegemonic power/knowledge systems contain resistances which feed back into the 
dominant knowledge (Foucault, 1980b). In Africa, certain aspects of western knowledge 
insinuated themselves "into the warp and weft of an emerging hegemony" (Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 1991, p. 12), while others gave rise to novel forms ofresistant knowledges. This 
circular process of imposition and resistance will be artificially separated between chapters 5 
and 6, for purposes of a double description in terms of power. This chapter deals with the 
imposition of western knowledge on Africa and emphasises its hegemony and the complicity of 
psychology therein. Chapter 6 describes resistant knowledges emerging from Africa and the 
resistant role of psychological knowledge. 
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The first section of this chapter archaeologises the prevailing epistemes in western 
thought during its historical interaction with Africa, describes the nature of knowledge produced 
after the Enlightenment and situates psychology within modernism. The second section focuses 
on the forms of power which produced both colonialism and psychology, and highlights 
psychology's role as technology of power. The third section locates modem power/knowledge in 
Africa and extracts psychology's early career as technology of power in the African context. 
Knowledges of Enlightenment 
Before the Enlightenment in Europe, all assumptions about the nature of reality were 
essentially theistic and it was assumed that the dynamics of the physical cosmos exceeded 
human comprehension (Young, 1992). The early Enlightenment scientists and philosophers 
questioned this assumption and assumed that the human mind was equal to comprehending the 
laws of the physical cosmos. Theism was dissolved into deism and rational knowledge was 
legitimised in opposition to the dictates of kings and priests (Lather, 1992). 
The central ideas of the Enlightenment were the primacy of rational thought, the 
liberation of humans, and the idea of historical progress. Emancipation and progress were to be 
obtained by accumulating knowledge through scientific research. This Enlightenment code of 
values is still predominant in western intellectual projects of the late 20th century (Lather, 
1992). 
The Enlightenment union between rationalism and humanism has historically assumed 
many different forms. Each form imposes a definition of what is human, on all men and 
women, and each is per definition normative (Bemauer & Mahon, 1994). In western society, 
the norm has usually assumed a white, male, rational, heterosexual, bourgeois form, 
marginalising other races, women, other knowledges, other sexual orientations, and other 
classes and thereby creating a domain of otherness which includes Africa. 
The era of Enlightenment confronts us with several contradictions. It is on record as the 
"age ofreason", when scientific thinking advanced- but this also meant the 
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rationalization of old prejudices. It was the time when the debate on slavery was taken 
up and human rights were first mentioned - but the science of race took shape in this 
period as well.... Enlightenment thinking was also interwoven with European expansion 
and as such imbued with cultural arrogance and coloured by political and economic 
interests. The Enlightenment was in reality a far more heterogeneous period than the 
image of "enlightenment" allows for. (Pieterse, 1992, p. 45) 
Epistemes of Enlightenment 
The Renaissance Episteme 
Foucault ( 1970 ) describes the knowledges of the Renaissance in terms of a "prose of the 
world" (p. 17); a unity of words and things in a network of correspondences and resemblances. 
Knowledge in 16th century Europe was a knowledge of the connections between things. Four 
kinds of resemblances connected everything in the universe: The first is the resemblance 
between things connected in space or resemblances born of proximity. Thus, "in the vast syntax 
of the world the different beings adjust themselves to one another; the plant communicates with 
the animal, the earth with the sea, man with everything around him" (Foucault, 1970, p. 18). 
The second refers to resemblances based on simulation, and includes analogy. The third is 
sympathy, a sort of free association. The fourth is antipathy, which confers identity on separate 
things. Words and things were joined together and linked to a divine order. Magic and 
divination, intending to control things by manipulating the signs that identify them, were not 
regarded as marginal knowledge. There are certain similarities between this description and 
that of indigenous African knowledge, as well as African Islamic and some local Christian 
knowledges, which do not separate the word from the world and unite words and things in 
divine orders. The contrast between the Renaissance episteme and the Classical and Modem to 
follow, reflects the contrast with which Africa was faced during its contact with Europe. 
During the Classical age, a radical epistemic break occurred. Words and things 
separated and resemblances no longer served as a mediating agent. "Words became signifiers 
and things were signified, but no direct connections between them existed" (Major-Poetzl, 1982, 
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p. 171). This change, Foucault (1970) concludes, 
involved an immense reorganization of culture, a reorganization of which the Classical 
age was the first and perhaps the most important stage, since it was responsible for the 
new arrangement in which we are still caught - since it is the Classical age that separates 
us from a culture in which ... signs ... in their primitive being shone in an endless 
dispersion. There is nothing now, either in our knowledge or in our reflection, that still 
recalls the memory of that being. Nothing except perhaps literature. ( p. 43) 
In Europe, the knowledge of resemblances was relegated to a mythical, primitive past, 
and superseded by the new knowledge of the Classical age. When a knowledge of resemblances 
was discerned in Africa, it, too, was relegated to a mythical, primitive space. 
The Classical Episteme 
In Foucault's terminology, the Classical age refers to the transitional era between the 
Renaissance and bourgeois capitalism, from about 1650 to 1800 (Cooper, 1981; Gutting, 1994), 
when the knowledge of resemblances was relegated to a world of primitives, madmen and poets 
and a new knowledge of"identities and differences" (Foucault, 1970, p. 54) became dominant. 
The disappearance of what is now called superstition and magic and the entry of nature into the 
scientific order were made possible by a retreat of language in respect to the world. Language 
became an instrument for manipulating, mobilising, juxtaposing, and comparing things 
(Canguilhem, 1994). A science of measurement and order, which represented objects in tables 
and grids, was created. Analysis became a universal procedure (Cooper, 1981). 
The major transitions that occurred from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme 
according to Foucault are summarised by Major-Poetzl (1982, p. 173) as "the substitution of 
analysis for analogy, finite differences for infinite resemblances, certain knowledge for probable 
relationships, discrimination of differences for synthesis of similarities, and those that divorced 
history (what was heard and recounted) from science (what was seen and observed)". Order was 
established by an analysis of differences and similarities. During the 17th and 18th centuries, 
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change was understood in spatial, not temporal, terms. Changes in the natural order were 
regarded as displacements in spatial positions on a table. Knowledge of Africa and Africans 
was ordered into grids of classification. 
The Modem Episteme 
The rupture that divided the Classical from the Modem episteme occurred at the tum of 
the 18th century, after the French revolution. It was marked by the sudden dominance of 
temporal concepts replacing spatial ones in the discourses on life, labour, and language. This 
made possible the emergence of history as a mode of being and evolutionary theories of change 
(Major-Poetzl, 1982). The static order of the Classical tables of knowledge shifted to a concern 
with knowledge of hidden life processes. At the end of the 18th century, "seeing meant leaving 
the density and opacity of things closed upon themselves and allowing the slow and deliberate 
passage of the gaze to fix individual things objectively so as to organize rational language 
around them" (Cooper, 1981, p. 34). The darkness of Africa was fixed in a gaze of "objective" 
science. 
In language, there was a shift from presentation to self-presentation. Words interpreted 
the meanings of things, and thought emerged from and turned back on man (Foucault, 1970). 
Man now became a being which existed both as subject of knowledge and the object of 
historical processes. This made the emergence of sociology and psychology possible. The 
human sciences were further made possible by the emerging sciences of biology, economics, 
and philology, constituting man as a being who lives, works,, and speaks. These views of man 
are reflected in the human sciences, with shifts in their relative importance. The biological 
model was dominant during the early part of the 19th century, the economic model dominated at 
mid-century (as reflected in Marx's thought), and the linguistic model achieved pre-eminence 
from the end of the century, as reflected in Freud's work. A further shift occurred from a 
concern with function (processes, conflicts) to structure (norms, rules, and systems). Similar 
shifts occurred in scientific discourse on Africa. 
According to Foucault (in Cooper, 1981) the new knowledges of man, freed from the 
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presence of God, put man in charge of his own salvation. 
Man could become freed of his alienations, freed of all determinations of which he was 
not the author; thanks to this knowledge that he had of himself, he could ... become for the 
first time, master and possessor of himself In other words, man was made an object of 
knowledge so that man could become the subject of his own freedom and his own 
existence. ( p. 5) 
An important offshoot of the modem creation of man as subject/object was the 
simultaneous creation of the Other, man's double, the unthought, and the collective unconscious 
(Foucault, 1970). This made it possible to distinguish between the normal and the abnormal; to 
confer on the Other the properties rejected by the self, and to create normalising scientific 
knowledge which treated the Other as object. The ordering of the Same during the Classical 
age, was further refined by the ordering and objective study of the Other during the Modem. 
Africa, as domain of the Other, became the object of normalising science. 
A new perception of the past in terms of" origin", made the concept of regression 
possible. "Although the origin of things such as species, products, or words, now receded 
indefinitely into the past, it could still break through to the present (a notion that is called the 
return of the repressed in Freudian thought)" (Major-Poetzl, 1982, p. 190). A search for origins 
made it possible to develop a hermeneutics of suspicion, where undetected meanings lie hidden 
behind surface meanings, waiting to be detected by the gaze of knowledge. It also made it 
possible to speak of "primitive mentalities" and "societies left behind by history". 
Scientific versus Narrative Knowledge 
Scientific knowledge, rooted in positivism and empiricism, became dominant during the 
Modem era. Reflecting a binary either/or logic of hermetic subjects and objects and a linear, 
teleological rationality, such knowledge is assumed to be value-free (Lather 1992). It represents 
"the one true reality" subjectively copied in our heads by perception or objectively represented 
in scientific models (K vale, 1992b ). 
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Narrative knowledge, "the quintessential form of customary knowledge" (Lyotard, 1984, 
p. 19) became subjugated to the abstract logic of positivism. 
One of the features that characterizes more "scientific" periods of history, and most 
notably capitalism itself, is the relative retreat of the claims of narrative or storytelling 
knowledge in the face of those of the abstract, denotative, or logical and cognitive 
procedures generally associated with science or positivism. (p. xi) 
Although science set itself up in opposition to narrative knowledge, it produced a 
discourse of legitimation with respect to its own status (as embodied in philosophy) which is 
essentially narrative. Lyotard ( 1984) uses the term modem science "to designate any science 
that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse ... making an explicit appeal to some 
grand narrative, such as ... the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of 
wealth" (p. xxii). Paradoxically, scientific knowledge "cannot know and make known that it is 
the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its 
point of view is no knowledge at all" (p. 29). 
One important difference between narrative and scientific knowledge is that scientific 
knowledge entails "an alienation from its user" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 7) because it is legitimised by 
outside claims of experts (grand narratives) whereas narrative knowledge is legitimised through 
social consensus and practices at the local level, as in African indigenous knowledge, and to 
some extent in African Islam and African Christianity. One implication of the difference 
between narrative and scientific knowledge is that the one cannot be judged by the criteria of 
legitimation of the other. The relationship between the two is unequal. Narrative knowledge 
"does not give priority to the question of its own legitimation and ... certifies itself in the 
pragmatics of its own transmission without having recourse to argumentation and proof' 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. 27). It approaches the problems of scientific discourse with an 
incomprehension but also with a certain tolerance: "It approaches such discourse primarily as a 
variant in the family of narrative cultures" (p. 27). We have seen an example of this in the 
attitude of the Tswana towards missionary knowledge in the previous chapter. In contrast, the 
scientist (missionary), does question the validity of narrative statements (the narratives of 
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rainmaking) and, because they do not stand up to argumentation or proof, 
classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, 
backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, 
ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and children. At 
best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light into this obscurantism, to civilize, 
educate, develop. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 27) 
The unequal relationship between scientific and narrative knowledge had enormous 
pragmatic effects in Africa, where indigenous and religious knowledges were devalued and 
subjugated. 
We all know its symptoms. It is the entire history of cultural imperialism from the dawn 
of Western civilization. It is important to recognize its special tenor, which sets it apart 
from all other forms of imperialism: it is governed by the demand for legitimation. 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. 27) 
Metanarratives of Legitimation 
The modem narratives that serve as legitimation of scientific knowledge are cultural 
products. They provide norms defining not only what is true but also what is just. Science, for 
instance, is legitimised through appeal to grand narratives of Utopias such as the emancipation 
of the rational or working subject and the creation of wealth (Kvale, 1992b, p. 33). The hero of 
the Enlightenment narrative is 
the people, the sign of legitimacy is the people's consensus, and their mode of creating 
norms is deliberation. The notion of progress is a natural outgrowth of this. It represents 
nothing other than the movement by which knowledge is presumed to accumulate ... 
extended to the new sociopolitical subject. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 30) 
What is meant by "the people" in Enlightenment narratives of legitimation is different from 
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what is implied by traditional narrative knowledge, which 
requires to instituting deliberation, no cumulative progression, no pretension to 
universality.... It is therefore not at all surprising that the representatives of the new 
process of legitimation by "the people" should be at the same time actively involved in 
destroying the traditional knowledge of peoples, perceived from that point forward as 
minorities or movements ... destined only to spread obscurantism. (Lyotard, 1984, p. 30) 
Although the subject of modern narratives is humanity as the hero ofliberty, the definition of 
humanity is constrained by cultural norms. The dominant view of humanity of western 
narratives of legitimation was constructed out of a rational self-image by philosophers such as 
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and others. It is formed around 
a generally unspoken, but nonetheless very much operative, key aspect of identity: ~ 
rational male, of Greek (and subsequently European) descent!. .. It is here, in the 
invention of homo rationalis as distinctive human type (found only among persons of the 
appropriate gender and racial/ethnic pedigree) ... that we find the birth of the "man" 
whose rotting corpse has caused such a choking scent over Africa .... For the ideal of the 
"rational man" ... has been, in fact, the carrier of key elements of a particular cultural 
agenda. (Outlaw, 1990, p. 227) 
The Grand Narrative of Pro~ess 
The grand narrative of the modernist programme assumed a logical and ordered universe 
whose laws could be uncovered by science. As the knowledge of these laws 
accumulated, it could be used to benefit humankind and eventually lead to the 
emancipation of humanity from poverty, sickness, and class and political servitude. 
(Polkinghorne, 1992, p. 147) 
Within this narrative of progress, the modernist researcher is 
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a soldier in an army where the battles are fraught with difficulty, dedication is valorous, 
but victory is guaranteed. Each individual scientist makes his/her contribution - great or 
small - to the annihilation of ignorance and the establishment of truth (often equated 
with liberty andjustice) for all. (K. J. Gergen, 1992, p. 25) 
The long struggle of the hero to ultimate victory is an ancient western narrative. The modem 
idea of progress and development includes both the progress of mankind and the individual 
pilgrim's progress towards salvation of his or her soul, later to be turned into the health of the 
psyche (Kvale, 1992b). Both views are reflected in psychology and both were exported to 
Africa. 
Psychology and Modernism 
"The story of academic psychology is a subplot within the history of modernism. 
Psychology originated as a purposeful effort to apply the epistemological principles of the 
Enlightenment science to the study of human beings" (Polkinghome, 1992, p. 146). 
Modernism's romance with positivist science gave rise to the following overarching assumptions 
in psychology: That it has a basic, knowable subject matter, that this subject matter has 
universal properties, that it may be uncovered through the empirical method, that results are 
objective and devoid of ideology and values, and that research is a progressive enterprise that 
moves towards truth (K. J. Gergen, 1992). Gergen calls these assumptions "presumptions" as 
they ignore that psychology takes place within the narrative conventions of western culture, 
which robs subjects of their voices by scientific procedures, which are saturated by western 
cultural values. Simply to write as an isolated subject independently observing the actions of 
others is already to carry a western worldview into the field (K. J. Gergen, 1992). 
In the modem narrative of science, "methodology was the means to truth and light, and 
thus to salvation" (Kvale, 1992a, p. 24). Methodology, as applied in psychology, casts the 
individual into the role of mechanical automaton, denying the possibilities of agency and 
personal responsibility. Methodology "engenders an artificial separation between the 
scientist-knower and the subject, suggesting that superior knowledge is gained through alienated 
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relationships" (Kvale, 1992a, pp. 24-25). Such relationships become even more alienating when 
the subject is African and the context colonial. 
Empiricism and Romanticism 
Although empiricism became a dominant narrative of legitimation of knowledge in the 
Modem era, a dissenting tradition appeared in the form of 19th century romanticism (Kvale, 
1992b). Nietzsche's philosophy, the surrealist tradition in art, and new forms of literature, 
offered romanticism and irrationality as alternatives to empiricism and rationality. This 
manifested itself in 19th century humanitarianism which became less rational and more 
concerned with the goodness of man, as reflected in the rise of emancipatory discourse. As the 
world became characterised by mechanisation and industrialisation, romantic ideas of the 
person proliferated. 
Both empiricism and romanticism are reflected in psychology. The empiricist tradition 
is best exemplified in behaviourism and the romantic tradition in humanistic subjectivism. 
These two extremes are, however, both sides of the same modem coin as both focus on the 
inside of a psychic container (K vale, l 992b ), both assume a unified, reified, and essentialist 
subject (Lather, 1992), and both are interpretative knowledges (Foucault, 1970). Both extremes 
are caught in a quest for external legitimation in metanarratives: Behaviourism legitimises itself 
via empiricism and positivism; humanistic psychology via existentialism, hermeneutics, and 
phenomenology. The apparent contradictions within psychology, such as the dichotomy of the 
universal versus the individual, the opposition between technical rationality and romanticist 
emotionalism, and the issue of quantitative commensurability versus qualitative uniqueness, are 
all essentially modem issues. Both commensurability and "the retreat to the cult of the 
individual self' (Kvale, 1992b, p. 44) ignore the contextual rootedness of human activity in 
language, culture, and history, that is, in narrative knowledge. 
The Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
"A heady and optimistic romance with foundations and essence lies somewhere towards 
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the center of the modernist perspective" (K. J. Gergen, 1992, p. 19). The interpretative function 
of modem knowledge (Foucault, 1970) led to the idea that everyday practices hide hidden truths, 
called the hermeneutics of suspicion by Paul Ricoeur (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). It assumes 
that no action is what it appears to be but becomes an expression of another, deeper, more real 
reality. Psychology is characterised by a continuing hunt for underlying plans and rationales, 
hidden plots or curricula, to explain disorder and impose on it an underlying order, constructing 
a deeper rationality where none is visible (Kvale, 1992b, p. 38). 
The hermeneutics of suspicion was carried to its extreme in marxist and psychoanalytical 
thought, where the underlying disguised truth is the class struggle and the libido (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982). "The psychoanalyst came to be a positivist Sherlock Holmes, intelligently 
finding the concealed and buried meaning, awaiting discovery" (K vale, 1992b, p. 45). Not only 
the psychoanalyst, but also the patient and the public, were taught by western psychology to be 
suspicious of their own narratives and defer to psychological experts to unravel the "real" 
meaning of behaviour. 
Views of the Person 
The dominant views of the person inherent in psychology are "an isolated, thinking 
subject set over and against an objective world, facing an essentially theoretical task, and a view 
of him as a mechanism, operating according to laws" (Shotter, 1975, p. 30). The dominant 
metaphors representing humans in psychology are biological and mechanical, the dominant 
metaphors of modernism, evolutionary science, and the industrial revolution. 
The implication is that psychologists do not treat the objects of study as agents 
themselves able to do things or create knowledges. Psychologists take the stand of "external, 
detached and disinterested (disembodied) observers ... rather than, as in everyday life, being 
involved in exchanges with other people, appreciating the meaning of what they are doing" 
(Shotter, 1975, pp. 67-68). Shotter's comparison of psychology to "everyday life" is similar to 
Lyotard's comparison of science to narrative knowledge. Instead of being co-creators of 
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narratives with other people, modem psychologists create knowledges of people which are 
legitimised by grand narratives of truth. 
Psychology, by focusing on the inner life of the individual, also served modernism by 
internalising the grand narratives. Freud drew upon many of the grand narratives to help people 
make sense of their own stories and Jung further encouraged the individual to become 
autonomous and self-orientated in a quest for personal freedom. However, paradoxically, 
through encouraging the internalisation of European myths, psychology also created individuals 
who became less and less sure of their own knowledge, and more and more dependent on 
experts for interpretation of their own narratives (T. A Parry, 1993). 
Individualism 
In contrast to indigenous African views of the person as constituted by the community, 
psychology's view of the person reflects a strong individualism. The notion of the unique, 
isolated individual is a cultural- and historical-specific way of conceiving man, which arose in 
Europe around the 16th century (K vale, 1992b) and came to fruition in the Modem age. 
Western individuality is a combination of liberation and loneliness, as exemplified in its 
prototype: Don Quixote, a solitary figure on a strange journey, "terribly free and terribly lonely" 
(Berger, 1985, p. 323); the explorer in space or in the mind, the "conquistador of unknown 
lands" (p. 332); the entrepreneur, "conquistador of the marketplace" (p. 332); the citizen, 
embodiment of freedom as the bearer of rights and maker of revolution; the bourgeois 
gentilhom.me; the artist-hero who defies bourgeois society in a search for freedom; the 
existential hero. All these individuals appear in and are constituted by psychological discourse, 
and the psychologist himself, as conquistador of knowledge, strides into unknown territories, 
such as Africa, following the example of the lonely missionary and explorer (Munro, 1978). 
Psychology's understanding of human welfare mirrors this cultural form of personhood. 
"We cherish persons who stand out from the group, who chart their own course, who are the 
masters of their own fate" (Sampson, 1990, p. 118). Psychology provides a set of internal 
personal qualities (attitudes, beliefs, values, personality) that are invested in such a view of the 
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person and actually helped constitute it. Humanistic psychology has supported the cult of the 
individual subject and its self-actualisation. The ideal self has freed itself from tradition and 
authority and dissociated itself from society. In humanistic ethics, virtue is responsibility 
towards oneself. The self-actualised person is self-contained, true to her own nature, ruled by 
the laws of her own character. Internal psychological processes are viewed as central; cultural 
content becomes accidental and local (K vale, 1992b ), and political contexts are ignored. 
Psychology's individualism contrasts with the communal ism of not only indigenous 
African knowledge, but of a much wider "common human pattern" of collectivism (Berger, 
1985). Through individualism, psychology was invested with, and served, a particular, modern 
form of power. 
Powers of Enlightenment 
From Pastoral to Individualising Power 
Christianity not only changed the ethics of the ancient world, it also spread new power 
relations, as was illustrated in the previous chapter. It produced pastoral power, which was 
salvation orientated, individualising, coextensive and continuous with life, and linked to the 
production of the truth of the individual (Foucault, 1982). Although the pastorate has almost 
disappeared in the West, "an important phenomenon took place around the eighteenth century-
it was a new distribution, a new organization of this kind of individualizing power" (Foucault, 
1982, p. 214). The state has become a modern matrix of individualisation, functioning in a way 
that is similar in certain respects to pastoral power. The new power was still concerned with 
salvation, but instead of in the next world, salvation was to be ensured in this world. Salvation 
was turned into health, material well-being, and security. The officials of pastoral power 
increased. Not only state apparatuses, but private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors, 
philanthropists, medicine, and the family became concerned with the well-being of individuals. 
In the 18th century one of the primary functions of the police was to assure hygiene, health, and 
standards ofliving (Foucault, 1982). 
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The most important officials of the new pastoral power became the human scientists, 
whose knowledge was focused around two functions: 
One, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, 
concerning the individual. And this implies that power of a pastoral type, which over 
centuries - for more than a millennium - had been linked to a defined religious 
institution, suddenly spread out into the whole social body; it found support in a 
multitude of institutions. And, instead of a pastoral power and a political power, more or 
less linked to each other, more or less rival, there was an individualizing "tactic" which 
characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education 
and employers. (Foucault, 1982, p. 215) 
This individualising tactic also characterises psychology, which contributes its share of 
globalising, quantitative, and analytical knowledge to this power. As the new form of power 
was dispersed throughout society, in a series of discontinuous networks, psychologists became 
one of many professionals called upon to exercise functions that earlier belonged to the police. 
From Sovereign to Disciplinary Power 
With the formation of the knowledges of man during the Classical age, the scale and 
continuity of the exercise of power changed. Whereas, before, power was characterised by 
massive but infrequent displays of destructive force (public executions, military occupations, the 
violent suppression of insurrections and, in Africa, slavery and military occupation), the new 
power was uninterrupted and imposed constraints through discipline, training, and the 
production of knowledge (Foucault, 1980b). 
It was a question not of treating the body, en mass, "wholesale", as if it were an 
indissociable unity, but of working it "'retail', individually; of exercising upon it a subtle 
coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself - movements, 
gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. (Foucault, 
1977, pp. 136-137) 
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Whereas, previously, sovereign/monarchic power was used to coerce or destroy its 
target, discipline and training can reconstruct its target to produce new actions, habits, and 
skills, and ultimately create new kinds of people (Rouse, 1994 ). 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it.... It defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that 
they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the 
techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces 
subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies. (Foucault, 1977, p. 138) 
Sovereign power needs violence and spectacle~ modem power operates quietly, from 
within. Where sovereign power confers individuality, visibility, and audibility on the sovereign, 
modem power confers it on the ruled through subtle practices of surveillance (Rouse, 1994). 
Where sovereign power demands the sacrifice of subjects to save the throne, and pastoral power 
demands sacrifice for personal salvation (Foucault, 1982), disciplinary power demands the 
sacrifice of the self. In the words of Foucault (in Rabinow, 1984): "Where religion once 
demanded the sacrifice of our bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves, 
calls us to the sacrifice of the object of knowledge" ( p. 7). 
Disciplinary power is exercised both on the dominators and dominated, because it 
involves self-formation and autocolonisation: 
Hierarchized, continuous, and functional surveillance ... was organized as a multiple, 
automatic, and anonymous power.... This enables the disciplinary power to be both 
absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere, and always alert, since by its very principle 
it leaves no zone of shade, and constantly supervises the very individuals who are 
entrusted with the task of supervising, and absolutely "discreet", for it functions 
permanently, and largely in silence. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 176-177) 
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The Panopticon 
Foucault uses the panopticon to illustrate the functioning of modem disciplinary 
technology, although he stresses that there are many other technologies of power. The 
panopticon model may be applied to different institutions, and society as a whole. 
The panopticon consists of a large courtyard with a tower in the centre, and a set of buildings, 
divided into levels, and cells, on the periphery. In each cell, there are two windows~ one brings 
in light, and the other faces the tower, where one-way windows allow surveillance of the cells. 
The cells are like "small theatres in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized, and 
constantly visible" (Foucault, 1977, p. 200). The inmate is cut off from any contact with those 
in adjoining cells, and is always visible to an invisible supervisor. The inmate is "the object of 
information, never a subject in communication" (Foucault, 1977, p.200), and effectively guards 
him- or herself Surveillance is constant, and total. It allows not only control, but also 
transformation of individuals. 
Experiments could be carried out in cells and results tabulated in the tower. In factories, 
schools, hospitals (or psychology laboratories), the surveillant can observe and encode a 
perfectly differentiated grid which lies before his gaze (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The 
guardians are themselves observed by other guardians, in the same system of individualised, 
invisible surveillance. While observing, they are also fixed, regulated, and subject to control. 
The system perpetuates itself. Its power is continuous and anonymous. It unites knowledge, 
power, the control of the body, and the control of space into an integrated technology. 
"Whenever the imperative is to set individuals or populations in a grid where they can be made 
productive and observable, the Panoptic technology can be used" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 
189). 
Practices of Exclusion 
The reorganisation of space, as exemplified in the panopticon, is an ancient European 
method of control. The dangerous, abnormal, and those who deviated from the norm were 
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traditionally excluded, either geographically or by institutionalisation. During colonisation, 
Africa became a space of exclusion. Europeans who could not be fitted into European society 
or any of its institutions of exclusion, were sent to the colonies, armed with racism. Those who 
were sent to the colonies were used as cadres and administrative functionaries; "as tools of 
surveillance and control over the colonised peoples. And it was certainly to avoid the forming 
of an alliance between these 'lesser whites' and the colonised peoples ... that a rigid racialist 
ideology was foisted on them" (Foucault, 1980b, p.17). 
Foucault's ( 1977) analysis of disciplinary mechanisms such as leper colonies and 
quarantined cities in 17th century Europe applies equally to the colonies: "It entailed the 
analysis of a geographical area; the supervision of its inhabitants; the control of individuals; a 
hierarchy of information, decision making, and movement down to the regulation of the smallest 
details of everyday life" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 190). The act of exiling lepers into 
separate communities where they were required to live and die was "a massive, binary division 
between one set of people and another" (Foucault, 1977, p. 198). No South African needs to be 
reminded of local manifestations of such dividing practices. 
With the demise of imperial forms of power and colonialism, modem power added the 
individualising scrutiny of a constant gaze to such exclusion (Foucault, 1980b ). 
Individualize the excluded, but use procedures of individualization to mark exclusion -
this is what was operated regularly by the disciplinary power from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century in the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary, the reformatory, the 
approved school, and to some extent, the hospital. (Foucault, 1977, p. 199) 
We may add the colonies and the "homelands". From the tum of the century, Africans became 
the object of the individualising gaze of the new sciences, anthropology and psychology. Like 
the inmates of the panopticon, their visibility was maximised. They were to be isolated, 
identified, classified, understood, and categorised along a normative scale. 
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The Swarming of Disciplinaiy Mechanisms 
The techniques of the panopticon were first applied in the humanitarianised institutions 
born of the Enlightenment: Prisons, mental asylums, and hospitals. They then invaded those 
sectors of society concerned with "the integration of production, utility, and control" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 193). In schools, factories, and the military, authorities saw workers, 
students, and soldiers as individuals who needed to be trained, studied, and disciplined, first 
where they worked and later in their homes and every aspect of their daily lives. As the 
knowledge produced by these institutions developed, its scope of application broadened and 
disciplinary mechanisms infiltrated society. Foucault (1977) calls this process the swarming of 
disciplinary mechanisms. "One can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society in this 
movement that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of'quarantine', to an indefinitely 
generalizable mechanism of'panopticism"' (p. 216). The mechanisms ofbio-power made an 
important contribution to this movement. 
Bio-power 
"Bio-power is the increasing ordering in all realms under the guise of improving the 
welfare of the individual and the population" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xxi). This order 
reveals itself as a strategy of power produced by the Victorian proliferation of discourse on 
bodies and their pleasures (Foucault, 1980a). The bourgeoisie first developed control over its 
own members through technologies of confession and an associated concern with life, sex, and 
health. By the end of the 19th century, these technologies were extended to the working class 
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982) and to anomalies in the social body. Ultimately, the entire body of 
society was required to be healthy. "Health is an imperative: the duty of each person and the 
general objective of society" (Cooper, 1981, p. 117). The concept of health was extended to 
include mental health. Medicine, social work, community mental health, and psychology, 
extended normalisation to within the individual and the family, which became the locus of a 
private ethic of good health, with benevolence organised around internal surveillance (Cooper, 
1981). 
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The centrality of the body and health in the exercise of power explains the importance 
that the concepts of both sexuality and race assumed in western thought since the 19th century. 
The age of repression was also the age of an intensification of a concern with and discourse on 
sexuality. The confession of the sins of the flesh was replaced by a science of sexuality, which 
was part of a new political anatomy. The 19th century redefined women and children's 
sexuality, specified norms of social bodies (populations), created the bourgeois family and, 
ultimately, specified abnormal bodies, degenerate individuals, and races. "What is new in the 
nineteenth century is the appearance of a racist biology, entirely centred around the concept of 
degeneracy. Racism wasn't initially a political ideology. It was a scientific ideology which 
manifested itself everywhere" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 223). In European discourse on Africa, 
racial and sexual distinctions were closely associated (Fanon, 1967a). 
It is in the name of the management of life, of bodies, and the race, that Europe 
conquered Africa and that modern wars are fought. The regulation of life and the race made 
genocide and apartheid possible. Bio-power controls the life functions of whole populations, as 
well as our relations with ourselves. Through a mode of self-formation, we act to monitor, test, 
improve, and transform ourselves (Foucault, 1980a). 
Power and the Human Sciences 
The human sciences originated in the age that produced the idea that the kind of power 
embodied in the panopticon was necessary and desirable. Psychology was born in prisons, 
mental asylums, and hospitals, flourished in factories, educational institutions, and the defence 
force, and soon swarmed into the most intimate areas of personal life. Although Foucault never 
assumes that each aspect of the human sciences has disciplining effects, he insists on a 
continuous, mutual, and prolonged interplay between these sciences and the extension of 
disciplinary power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). This interplay is most visible at the margins of 
society: In the creation and treatment of those defined as Other by the normalising powers. 
Among these Others were criminals, the mad, the sexually deviant, women, children, and 
members of different races. 
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The human sciences extended the power over the body to a power over the soul, by 
creating a modem corpus of knowledge around it. Foucault (1977) views the soul as "the 
present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body" (p. 29), which is produced 
on, around and within the body by a power that is exercised 
on those one supervises, trains, and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at 
school, the colonized .... This is the historical reality of this soul which, unlike the soul 
represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is 
born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.... It is the 
machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge .... 
On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of 
analyses carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have 
been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism .... 
The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the 
body. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 29-30) 
Where early missionaries operated on the soul of Africans, the psychologist later carved 
out domains of analysis on "the African personality" and "African intelligence". 
Normalisation and Rehabilitation 
A central question in the technologies of normalisation was knowledge of anomalies in 
the social system. Where the criminal used to be a legal and political issue, the sciences of man 
turned him into a delinquent: A subject/object that had to be understood, classified, and soon 
also rehabilitated. As the new sciences and bio-power advanced simultaneously, more 
categories of anomalies appeared and proliferated. The power/knowledge technologies that 
were designed to eliminate these anomalies were only partially successful, justifying further 
efforts at classification and rehabilitation. "Penitentiaries, and perhaps all normalising power, 
succeed when they are only partially successful" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 195). 
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Normalising power and the language of reform illustrate the complex relationship 
between politics and science. 
Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, 
removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language 
of science. Once this is accomplished, the problems have become technical ones for 
specialists to debate. In fact, the language of reform is, from the outset, an essential 
component of these political technologies. Bio-power spread under the banner of 
making people healthy and protecting them .... We are promised normalization and 
happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more 
of the same. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 196) 
The pairing of normalisation and rehabilitation was based on the right of reason to 
exercise power over unreason and of psychiatrists to "treat" madmen, which was transcribed in 
terms of "competence over ignorance, of commonsense and access to reality as a corrective to 
the errors of illusion, hallucination and fantasy, and of the need for normality to be imposed on 
disorder and deviation" (Cooper, 1981, p. 23). A similar transcription occurred in colonial 
discourse, where access to western knowledge of reality was viewed as a corrective to errors of 
primitivism and the disorder perceived in culturally different construals of reality. 
Psychology as Technology of Power 
Normal Science and Normalising Technologies 
One way to crystallise psychology's position as a technology of power is to contrast 
normal science (a Kuhnian concept) with normalising technologies. According to Kuhn, science 
becomes normal when the practitioners in a certain area all agree on the important problems in 
the field and demonstrate how some of these can be solved. The ideal of normal science is to 
show how all the phenomena that resist incorporation into the theory will eventually be shown 
to be compatible with it. "By determining what counts as a problem to be solved and what 
counts as a solution, they set up normal science and normal society as totalizing fields of activity 
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which continually extend their range of prediction and control" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 
198). The same may be said of normalising technology. However, this technology "works to 
set up and preserve an increasingly differentiated set of anomalies, which is the very way it 
extends its knowledge and power into wider and wider domains" (Dreyfus &Rabinow, 1982, p. 
198). Normalisation both presupposes equality and justifies differences and inequalities. 
Psychology spread itself by creating new kinds of objects for knowledge to be about, such as 
delinquency, hyperactivity, developmental structures, age-group levels of performance, and 
normal distributions of intelligence (Foucault, 1977) . 
This process illustrates the productive aspect of normalising psychological technologies. 
"Programmes/technologies of power have essentially to do with the formation of the social real" 
(Foucault, 1980b, p. 251 ). Psychology produces knowledge both to describe the object of power 
and devices to inscribe it (Rose, 1990). Psychology makes it possible to think of achieving 
desired social objectives such as contentment, productivity, sanity, and intellectual ability 
through a "systematic government of the psychological domain" (Rose, 1990, p. 106). The 
vocabulary produced by psychology was written on 
a surface of emergence upon which problems would take shape - racial degeneration, 
intellectual decline ... childhood maladjustment.... In and around these sites, psychology 
would find its subjects, scrutinise and study them, seek to reform or cure them, and, in 
the process, elaborate theories of mental pathology and norms of behaviour and thought. 
(Rose, 1990,p. 106) 
In liberal democracies, experts such as psychologists are accorded power to prescribe ways of 
acting in the light of "truth". Their power operates "not through coercion but through 
persuasion, not through the fear produced by threats but through the tensions generated in the 
discrepancy between how life is and how much better one thinks it could be" (Rose, 1990, p. 
108). 
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Examination and Documentation 
Normalising technologies spread themselves through the creation or extension of rituals 
of surveillance and practices of examination: Scholastic and psychological tests, examinations, 
case histories, employment interviews, and research data banks, make previously inconspicuous 
people audible and visible. The practice of confession, extended into the interview and the test 
protocol, has become a central feature of western society, and of psychological practice. 
According to Foucault (in Rouse, 1994), western society has become 
a singularly confessing society.... [The confession] plays a part in justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of 
everyday life, and in the most solemn rites: one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's 
thoughts and desires, one's illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the 
greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. (p. 92) 
What is seen and heard in confessional practices is then documented, as a resource for further 
intrusion, enquiry, disclosure, influence, and control. The normal distribution, a 19th century 
creation of European statistical bureaus to supervise the health of populations and backbone of 
psychometrics, makes it possible "to locate the individual within an epistemic field, without 
reducing the individual to the typical" (Rouse, 1994, p. 98). Normalising judgement produces 
a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social 
body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of 
rank. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes 
by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to 
render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. (Foucault, 1977, p. 184) 
Surveillance, confession, and documentation, while normalising, create individuals. The 
individual is constructed 
as a describable, analyzable object, not in order to reduce him to "specific" features, as 
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did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but in order to maintain him in his 
individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes and abilities, under 
the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge. (Foucault, 1977, p. 190) 
The gaze of the psychological examination, as part of this corpus of knowledge, 
originated in 19th century medical science. It "fixes things objectively to organize rational 
language around them" (Cooper, 1981, p. 34). Like the doctor and the missionary, the 
psychologist is authorised by society to impose, from a domain of esoteric knowledge, an 
ethicof self-discipline and self-regulation, serving a particular, western dream of a healthy 
society and supervising "a regime of supervised normalcy" (p. 37). Psychology, like medicine, 
reflected a new relationship between knowledge and curing: "Everything that appeared to the 
clinical gaze could be expressed~ that which was not on the scale of the gaze fell outside the 
domain of possible knowledge" (Cooper, 1981, p. 41). The new relationship between the doctor 
and patient was a "confrontation of a gaze and a face, or a glance and a silent body ... by which 
two living individuals are 'trapped' in a common, but non-reciprocal situation" (Foucault, 1973, 
p. xv). 
The gaze of psychology generates construals of the individual interior which, in western 
culture, have become constituents of the taken-for-granted-world. Each of these construals is 
embedded in forms of discourse that favour certain segments of the population or certain 
patterns of conduct, while disparaging others. With the objectification of this discourse, so 
occurs the ossification of social pattern (K. J. Gergen, 1992, pp. 26-27). Psychology's discourse 
has consistently centred around a Eurocentric norm, which is hidden behind a scientist regime of 
neutrality and objectivity. 
Humanistic Psychology and Normalisation 
According to Foucault (in Richer, 1992), "the success of power-knowledge mechanisms 
is proportional to their ability to hide themselves" (p. 112). Humanistic approaches to 
psychology are especially successful in hiding power. Their indirect interpretative approaches 
subject individuals "not through an alien gaze, but through a reflexive hermeneutics" (Rose, 
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1990, p. 113). The guilty, law-abiding subject is best manufactured in the offices of humanistic 
psychology with its insistence on the sovereignty of the subject: 
It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the 
word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own 
identity by a conscience of self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault, 1982, p. 212) 
The apparatuses of humanistic psychology function through technologies of the self 
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, 
so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection or immortality. (Foucault, cited in Rose, 1990, p. 114) 
This self-government is a matter of choice, and above all, of freedom, attained through a 
language of self-interpretation and a set of criteria for self-evaluation. 
We imagine that avoiding objectification and medicalization, the hermeneutic, 
psychodynamic and humanistic trends in psychology somehow transcend the job of 
social control that is explicit in other forms of psychology. Nothing could be farther 
from the truth. In the end, the prying interpretations of humanistic and psychodynamic 
approaches are far more efficient at normalizing than either the anti-psychotic drugs of 
the medical approach or the shaping techniques of behaviorism. Psychology - all of it -
is a branch of the police; psychodynamic and humanistic psychologies are the secret 
police. (Richer, 1992, p. 118) 
The policing function of psychology has to be understood not as a repressive, but as a productive 
function; the production of psychological well-being, as defined by the norms of western 
societies. Psychology produces knowledge and thereby the terms of self-understanding that 
allow people to police themselves and others. 
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Psychoanalysis and Bio-power 
The modem medical management of sexuality resides at the heart of the society of 
normalisation (Bemauer & Mahon, 1994). As sin was replaced by sickness, sexuality invaded 
science, and desire was turned into discourse. What is peculiar to modem societies, according 
to Foucault (in Cooper, 1981), "is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that 
they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret" (p. 
127). Sexuality, having been turned into the object of medical knowledge, had to be detected 
and described - "in the depths of the organism, in a smile, in the colour of one's skin, in the signs 
of the slightest behaviour" (Cooper, 1981, p. 128). 
It was during the emergence ofbio-power that psychoanalysis emerged as a confessional 
science. Man came to be defined by the "truth" of sex, in the same way that reason had defined 
man's essential nature in the 18th century (Major-Poetzl, 1982, p. 207). The truth of the self had 
to be uncovered through the relationship with the psychoanalyst, and extended to a process of 
self-surveillance. Rooted in confessional practices, psychoanalysis fortifies the notions of the 
subject and the self, in a project that links sexuality to self-identity as a source of truth. Through 
psychoanalysis, self-knowledge diverts a quest for freedom to the illusory liberation from 
repression (Bemauer & Mahon, 1994 ). By investing the self with dangerous drives and energies 
requiring constant surveillance, as well as the ability to attain freedom, normalising power 
insinuates itself into self-identity and overinvests the self with illusionary power, disregarding 
social and historical contexts and masking the circulation of power in these contexts. 
Psychoanalysis, like psychology in general, emerges from the individualising 
power/knowledge of the Enlightenment. Its effects of power are visible in western societies, but 
become even more so in Africa. 
The Enlightenment, Africa, and Psychology 
The Enlightenment idea of progress had no limits: Not only enlightened Europe but all 
mankind was deemed capable of perfection. Science, like Christianity, was deeply embroiled in 
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the manufacture and implementation of colonialism, by which "Europe set out to grasp and 
subdue the forces of savagery, otherness and unreason" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 11). In 
a quest for equality, freedom, material well-being, and morality, it brought an empire of 
inequality, alienation, poverty, coercion, and dispossession to Africa. 
Colonialism and Forms of Power/knowledge 
Historically, Europe conferred on Africa pastoral, sovereign and disciplinary power. The 
domestication of the Congo (chapter 4) may serve as an example of the interplay between these 
forms of power. Although pre-colonial Africa was familiar with the visible power of a monarch, 
who bestows life and death on to his subjects (Ray, 1991), at the local level, power was usually 
conferred through the personal sanctioning of communal relationships (chapter 2). Modem, 
impersonal, individualising forms of power were unfamiliar and wrought profound changes to 
African societies. Where Europe had centuries to gradually adapt to new forms of power, 
colonialism imposed these forms of power in a relatively brief period on Africa. 
The initial conquest of Africa was characterised by the brute, visible forces of sovereign 
power, as manifested in military conquests, slavery, and economic and social exploitation. This 
initial confrontation was "harsh, its spirit amoral; the interest limited to extracting a profit from 
trade, first in gold and other goods and then primarily in slaves" (July, 1968, p. 18). This phase 
was characterised by crude biological knowledge based on racism (Fanon, 1967e ). 
The second phase of colonialism reflected a transition to disciplinary power, mirroring 
the transition to this form of power in Europe. Due to increasing technological development 
and industrialisation and the imposition of a mechanised, regulated, and impersonal social 
system requiring a high degree of conformity, the expenses of sovereign power were overcome 
by instituting more subtle forms of power. In Africa, as in Europe, the processes of hierarchical 
observation, normalising judgement, and constant examination were introduced to control the 
colonised. As the human sciences were implemented in these processes of surveillance, more 
subtle forms of cultural oppression were developed. Ethnopsychological and anthropological 
knowledges, and later cross-cultural studies, replaced the earlier, biological theories justifying 
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colonialism. A pseudo-concern with African culture and the cooption of native collaborators 
into the new power/knowledge systems further strengthened colonialism (Fanon, 1967e). 
Both as objects of science and within the newly created western institutions, Africans 
were subjected to individualising examination, classification, regulation, and supervision. 
Psychological evaluation was one of the technologies employed in the conversion to modernity, 
which followed the same pattern as conversion to Christianity. Certain candidates were selected 
for integration into the upper class of its hierarchies. The evolue had to repress indigenous 
knowledge and assimilate the new knowledge (Mudimbe, 1994). As in Europe, all the major 
institutions reflected the effort to render individuals obedient and productive with a minimum of 
violence and expense. As in Europe, the twin processes of accumulation of men and 
accumulation of capital, cannot be separated. "Each makes the other possible and necessary; 
each provides a model for the other" (Major-Poetzl, 1982, p. 206). In Europe, citizens reaped 
some material benefit from these gains. In colonial Africa, the benefits were exported to 
Europe. Whether this situation has changed in postcolonial Africa is questionable (Bulhan, 
1993a). Both neocolonialism and autocolonialism employ disciplinary, individualising power, 
although monarchic power is still displayed in all its visible splendour in parts of Africa 
(Mazrui, 1986). 
Colonial Discourse 
In Africa, the "rational man" of the Enlightenment 
was heard to speak in the timbre of another facet of the self-image: the "man" of 
Western Europe now elevated to the position of paragon of human development and 
existence. This form of self-image was off-loaded to Africa from ... slave ships ... through 
rationalisations of greed and imperialism, under the camouflage of sacred texts and 
practices guided by the cross, the pseudo-science of the "other" (i.e. early anthropology) 
and the outright practices of near genocide and domination. The most frequent 
rationalization offered was that the European encroachment on Africa brought 
"progress", in the form of the spread of Christianity and "rational" civilization, which 
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would lead to the improvement of individual and social existence. (Outlaw, 1990, p. 
228) 
Colonialism, as such inscribed with the grand narrative of progress, was both a civilizing 
mission and a violent subjugating force. 
It is there, in the colonial margin, that the culture of the West reveals its difference, its 
limit-text, as its practice of authority displays an ambivalence that is one of the most 
significant discursive and psychical strategies of discriminatory power - whether racist or 
sexist. (Bhabha, 1990, p. 71) 
In philosophical discourse, such as that of Kant, Hegel (Neugebauer, 1990), and Marx 
(Manganyi, 1985), producing narratives of legitimation, African peoples were depicted as 
racially inferior and explicitly denied the status of rational, historical beings, as in the words of 
Hegel (in Outlaw, 1990): "What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, 
Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature" (p. 229). This orientation 
was shared by many of Africa's early European visitors, as well as colonialists and scientists, 
who saw their mission as 
methodically, to "make history" for people whom, they thought, lacked it; to induct those 
people into an order of activities and values; to impart form to an Africa that was seen as 
formless; to reduce the chaos of savage life to the rational structures and techniques that, 
for the Europeans, were both the vehicle and the proof of their own civilization. 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 14) 
A grid of difference and sameness, originating in the 18th century Classical ordering of 
the world, as well as a modem narrative of evolutionary progress, were imposed on Africa. 
During the Classical age, in the order of the "great chain of being", the African marked the point 
between animality and humanity. With the rise of the human sciences, black bodies were 
increasingly associated with dim minds. 
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The great chain of being, a vertical scale, had been set on its side, becoming also a linear 
history of human progress from the peripheral regions of the earth to its north European 
core. The hard facts of organic form, it seemed, could now explain and determine the 
place of men in the world. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 99) 
Africa bore the image of an earlier Europe, waiting to be liberated from ignorance, but 
with liberation entailing a subjection to modem scientific power/knowledge. This subjection 
was inscribed into colonial discourse: 
The essence of colonization inheres less in political overrule than in seizing and 
transforming "others" by the very act of conceptualizing, inscribing, and interacting with 
them on terms not of their own choosing; in making them into the pliant objects and 
silenced subjects of our scripts and scenarios; in assuming the capacity to "represent" 
them, the active verb itself conflating politics and poetics. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 
1991, p. 15) 
Similarly, Said (1986) describes Europe's Orientalist discourse as the confinement of Arabs and 
Muslims to "the fixed status of an object frozen once and for all in time by the gaze of western 
percipients" (p. 214 ), thereby imposing a muteness upon the Other as object. The colonised, 
though Other, is deemed entirely knowable and visible (Bhabha, 1990). Such discourse emerges 
not from an interaction but exist as "communities of interpretation", perpetuating themselves in 
further discourse. 
Here, of course, is perhaps the most familiar of Orientalism's themes - they cannot 
represent themselves, they must therefore be represented by others who know more 
about Islam than Islam knows about itself.... There is no question of an exchange 
between Islam's views and an outsider's: no dialogue, no discussion, no mutual 
recognition.... Now this, I submit, is neither science, knowledge or understanding: it is a 
statement of power and a claim for relatively absolute authority. (Said, 1986, p. 219) 
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Terms like the Orient, Islam, Arab, and Africa derive their meanings from a discourse 
created around European meanings assigned to an "imaginative geography" (Said, 1986, p. 211). 
Inherent in colonial discourse is a confusion between geographic and mythical space (Shetty, 
1989), so that even a critic of empire such as Joseph Conrad in Heart of darkness uses a colonial 
stereotype of Africa as mythical space of darkness, to expose the darkness inherent in Europe. 
So saturated with meanings, so overdetermined by history, religion and politics are labels 
like "Arab" or "Muslim" ... that no one today can use them without some attention to the 
formidable polemical mediations that screen the objects, if they exist at all, that the 
labels designate. (Said, 1986, p. 214) 
The following section depicts some of the meanings conferred by Europe on the labels 
"Africa" and "Africans". 
Africa as Other 
It comes as no surprise that the era of Enlightenment primarily associated Africa with 
darkness. Since the earliest use of the word "Africa" (a Latin term), its darkness was associated 
with absence, void, and nothingness, until the arrival of an outsider, usually in the form of a 
conqueror, first Muslim and then European (C. L. Miller, 1985). Africa only attained meaning 
by being described from an external point of reference, in terms of that external point. 
"Darkness can be known only by shedding light on it; that is, it cannot be 'known' as such" (C. L. 
Miller, 1985, p. 19). In this context, knowledge, as light, must destroy what it knows. Blank 
darkness opens a space of distance, difference, and absence, to be simultaneously inscribed and 
dominated. 
The inscription of the mythical space of the Other took on a variety of different, often 
ambiguous, ambivalent, and usually stereotypical forms, in European discourse on Africa 
(Bhabha, 1990). All these African Others reflect qualities that have, at some time, been 
assigned to Europeans, but were rejected; all reflect internal concerns of Europe, and all reflect 
Europe's changing relationship with Africa. "Images of otherness as the furthest boundary of 
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normality exert a disciplinary influence, as reverse reflections, warning signals. The savage is 
indispensable in establishing the place of civilization in the universe" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 233 ). 
Early inscriptions of Africans in European discourse cast them into images of the 
rejected European self: The savage; the barbarian; the noble savage (chapter 4 ). Colonialism 
created a series of new images. During the first, forceful stage of colonialism, the African 
"native", was represented as an enemy and a brutal warrior, in contrast to the noble self-image of 
the imperialist. This "ignoble savage" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 78) replaced the earlier "noble 
savage", who returned in a new guise during the second stage of colonialism, when savages had 
to be turned into political subjects and the "native" was depicted as impulsive and childlike. 
"Colonial paternalism engendered as its counterpart the infantilism of the colonized" (Pieterse, 
1992, p. 89). With the expansion of capitalism and modem forms of power, the stereotype of 
the lazy native, indolent and without ambition, was born, while the colonies were depicted as a 
place made productive through discipline and ingenuity. Late colonialism created the 
"westernised savage". 
In colonial discourse, stereotypes often conflict and contradict each other. 
The black is both savage (cannibal) and yet the most obedient and dignified of servants 
(the bearer of food); he is the embodiment of rampant sexuality and yet innocent as a 
child; he is mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the most worldly and 
accomplished liar. (Bhabha, 1990, p. 85) 
An attraction-rejection ambivalence towards the Other was reflected in the development 
of an association between exoticism and Africa during colonialism. While colonial science was 
turning the colonised into objects of knowledge, they were turned into spectacles by being 
regularly displayed at colonial exhibitions in Europe. Groups of Africans were imported to be 
exhibited amongst reconstructions of their own dwellings and cultural products in what was 
termed "anthropological-zoological exhibits" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 95). Preference was given to 
fierce-looking warriors in full regalia. 
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The peoples on display were the trophies of victory. After the battle was done with, the 
image of the native warrior ... became decorative.... Exoticism is a luxury of the victors 
and one of victory's psychological comforts. The Other is not merely to be exploited but 
also to be enjoyed, enjoyment being a finer form of exploitation. (Pieterse, 1992, p. 95) 
The contradictory nature of African otherness is further exemplified in depictions of 
Africa as representing an uninhibited, extroverted sexuality, which is both declared taboo and 
idealised, within a field of attraction and repulsion. 
An ambivalence towards one's own sexuality is experienced and projected on to the 
. outside world, which appears the more primitive and uninhibited the greater one's fears 
as to one's own sexuality .... A connection can arise between the control and repression 
of one's own sexuality and the control and repression of "Others". (Pieterse, 1992, p. 
172) 
These connections reached their zenith during the 19th century, when sex and the body were 
invaded by power/knowledge. Africa, both the unspoilt paradise and dark labyrinth, appears as 
a seductive, destructive woman, whose interior had to be penetrated by explorers. Similarly, 
colonial abuses were later cast in the allegory of rape - the rape of the continent; of the Congo 
(Pieterse, 1992). The portrayal of Africa as a woman was an extension of an emerging gender 
ideology in Europe, made possible by bio-power. As differences between men and women were 
"biologicalised" and ascribed to fixed, determined scientific laws, differences between races 
were similarly fixed. Biology merged with geography in stigmatising signs that came to imply 
one another: In late 18th century images of Africa, "the feminization of the black 'other' was a 
potent trope of devaluation. The non-European was to be made as peripheral to the global axes 
of reason and production as women had become at home" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 
105). 
The colonial scenarios of ambivalence reflect the intimate connection between power, 
desire, and knowledge. Colonial texts are characterised by "scenes of fear and desire" (Bhabha, 
1990, p. 78). In colonial discourse, Africa, like "the Orient", "vaccilates between the West's 
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contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in - or fear of - novelty" (Said, 1978, p. 
59). 
The Other and Unreason 
A parallel may be drawn between the images of otherness that were projected on to 
Africa and the treatment of Others in European society (Major-Poetzl, 1982). The relation 
between Same and Other revolved around complementary relations between reason-unreason, 
being-nonbeing, and inclusion-exclusion. These pairs emerge together and define each other. 
The history of madness would be the history of the Other - of that which, for a given 
culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to exorcise the 
interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its otherness); whereas the 
history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same. (Foucault, 
1970, p. xxiv) 
During the Renaissance, madness was viewed as different but not as pathological. There 
were no efforts to control it. The "dialogue between reason and unreason remained open" 
(Major-Poetzl, 1982, p. 113). During the Classical age, madness was viewed as a moral fault 
and violation of the orderly and rational laws of nature (Gutting, 1994), and both the mad and 
the African were associated with animals. As such they were believed to be confined to their 
inherent, fixed natures, and subject to public display and spectacle (Foucault, 1967). "They 
could be put on show, but there was nothing to be said to them, nor would one listen to them" 
(Cooper, 1981, p. 17). By the time that Africans were exhibited in Europe, the dialogue 
between reason and unreason was closed. Unreason was "deprived of its language; and although 
one continues to speak of it, it became impossible for it to speak of itself' (Major-Poetzl, 1982, 
p. 113). 
The Modem age transformed otherness to natural phenomena, governed by biological 
and psychological laws, though the moral condemnation of the Classical age was retained 
(Foucault, 1967). Unreason was rejected because it violated the morality of work. The idle 
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were a threat to the stability of a bourgeois society in which labour was the central value. Hence 
the association in discourse on Africa between unreason, biological and psychological 
determination, immorality, and laziness. However, this discourse also contained "a paradoxical 
unity of moral guilt and animal innocence" (Gutting, 1994, p. 59), as reflected in the noble 
savage romantic discourse. Africa, like Foucault's (in Gutting, 1994) view of madness, 
"gathered into a single point, the whole of unreason: the guilty day and the innocent night" (p. 
59). 
Between the Medieval and Modem periods, otherness was systematically divorced from 
the world, nature, and society, and increasingly located within the "personality" of the Other. 
This internalisation of otherness "paralleled the shift from the medieval belief in God to the 
Enlightenment concept of Nature and the later shift to nineteenth century notions of History and 
Man" (Major-Poetzl, 1982, p. 119). A similar shift occurred in notions of Africa, which 
increasingly came to be viewed as a different state of being located within Africans. This state 
of being, paradoxically, also came to possess no real content. As the Enlightenment "freed" men 
from being viewed as transgressions of nature, otherness came to indicate absence, nothingness 
and nonbeing and the African came to symbolise blank darkness in colonial discourse (C. L. 
Miller, 1985), as opposed to the light of knowledge: 
A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear of darkened spaces, of 
the pall of gloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths. It sought to 
break up the patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate the shadowy areas of 
society, demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, 
religious superstitions, tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of 
ignorance were fomented. (Foucault, 1980b, p. 153) 
The emerging sciences had recently discovered that it was possible to describe "what for 
centuries had remained below the threshold of the visible" (Foucault, 1973, p. xii). Both 
darkness and the light of the scientific gaze were manufactured in the early 19th century. "The 
residence of truth in the dark center of things is linked, paradoxically, to this sovereign power of 
the empirical gaze that turns their darkness into light" (Foucault, 1973, pp. xiii-xiiv). 
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Psychology's individualising gaze contributed to the opening up of the blank darkness of the 
Other and its inscription within scientific discourse. 
Psychology and the Other 
Psychology reflected the dominant episteme of the late 19th century, which elevated the 
norms of rational, male, bourgeois society to the status of normalcy and excluded and 
objectified those who departed from this norm. Its knowledge both informed European 
discourse on Africa and was informed by this discourse. 
Psychological theories sought explanations for otherness in regression to earlier, less 
rational modes of being. This evolutionary perspective made it possible to establish 
resemblances between the mad, the primitive, and the child. Foucault (in Major-Poetzl, 1982) 
comments as follows on these psychological theories: 
On the horizon of all these analyses there are, no doubt, explanatory themes that are 
themselves situated on the frontiers of myth: the myth, to begin with, of a certain 
psychological substance (Freud's "libido", Janet's "psychic force") ... the myth, too, of an 
identity between the mentally ill person, the primitive, and the child - a myth in which 
consciousness, shocked by the sight of mental illness, finds reassurance and is reinforced 
in the enveloping prejudice of its own culture. (p. 108) 
This myth was instrumental in the redefinition of savagery at the turn of the century: Savagery 
had become an inner disposition common to both civilised and primitive humanity so that 
primitive peoples appeared in the work of colonial anthropologists as Europe's "contemporary 
ancestors" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 37). According to H. White (in Pieterse, 1992), the idea of 
primitive man was progressively despatialised and "attended by a compensatory process of 
psychic interiorization" (p. 37). Savagery had acquired an image of the instinctive: A view at 
the heart of Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis. The unconscious is identified with the 
collective and unindividualised and the black person, in Jung's (in Pieterse, 1992) words, 
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"reminds us - in not so much our conscious but our unconscious mind - not only of childhood 
but of our pre-history" (p. 173). 
Freud freely linked metaphors of the Dark Continent and the voyage of discovery to the 
study of women and psychoanalysis. When discussing the ignorance of psychology regarding 
female sexuality, Freud refers to this lack of knowledge as the "dark continent" of psychology. 
According to Gilman (cited in Pieterse, 1992), 
in using this phrase in English, Freud ties the image of female sexuality to the image of 
the colonial black and to the perceived relationship between the female's ascribed 
sexuality and the Other's exoticism and pathology.... Freud continues a discourse which 
relates the images of male discovery to the images of the female as object of discovery. 
(p. 173) 
Freud (cited in Manganyi, 1985), links the group mind, primitiveness, and uncontrolled 
emotionality to the child and the neurotic (usually female), thereby reflecting and justifying the 
subjugation of non-rational knowledges: 
In our children, in adults who are neurotic, as well as primitive peoples, we meet with 
the mental phenomenon which we describe as a belief in the "omnipotence of thought". 
In our judgement this lies in an overestimation of the influence which our mental (in this 
case intellectual) acts can exercise in altering the external world. All the magic of 
words, too, has its place here, and the conviction of the power which is bound up with 
the knowledge and pronouncing a name (p. 153). 
This passage could only have been written from within the Modem episteme, and reflects its 
web of power/knowledge. The form of knowledge that it condemns had been relegated to the 
Other, who was linked, since Freud, to the unconscious (as both the embodiment of Europe's 
own past and the individual's infantile past). Despite the condemnation of this past in terms of 
its lack of rationality, it was necessary to continually uncover it, to speak of it, to fix it in 
discourse, in the same way that sexuality had to be exposed and fixed. Europe's quest for the 
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uncovery of the unconscious was, however, characterised by an ambivalence, reflected in 
attitudes towards the colonised. 
As Manganyi (1985) points out, Freud further contributed to a modem denigration of 
communal values, in the form of the archetype of the primal horde, whereby primitive man is 
defined by an absence of individuality, as part of a permanent, dangerous mob, endowed with 
sexuality and rebellion, and associated with patricide. "The black man is constituted 
individually as though he was part of a permanent mob. He is, since the connection is not a 
difficult one, a group man" (Manganyi, 1985, p. 154). 
These Freudian images combine into what Manganyi (1985) terms the paradox of 
innocence and treachery: "A single image: the tantrums of a child, the omnipotence of thought, 
a passionate intensity which knows no limits, as well as the cannibalistic savage in whom 
violence, murder and sexual transgressions are but the order of the day" (p. 153). This Other 
image remains evident in later ethnopsychological discourse, to be further substantiated through 
"objective scientific research" and bolstered by the emergence of scientific racism. 
Psychology and Racism 
Although racism has a long pre-history, the abolition of slavery marked its emergence in 
a modem form (Pieterse, 1992), when race science established hierarchies on the basis of not 
only race, but class, age, and gender. "Victorian anthropology saw racism, classism and sexism 
as ... expressions of the same logic.... It used concepts ofrace and notions about savages and 
primitive peoples as a basis for ideas about women, lower classes, criminals, mad people and 
deviants" (Pieterse, 1992, p. 219). According to Foucault (in Major-Poetzl, 1982), racism, one 
manifestation of otherness, was made possible by normalising technologies: "When one spoke 
of the life of groups and societies, of the life of the race, or even of'psychological life' one did 
not think first of the internal structure of the organized being but of the medical bi-polarity of 
the normal and the pathological" ( p. 139). 
At the tum of the century, bio-power and racism extended themselves through an 
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obsession with information on the body and a proliferation of scientific research on race. Skin 
colour measurement led to the manufacture of various devices to measure hair texture, hair 
colour and thickness of lips. Brass instruments were devised for measuring the cranium and 
skeleton. A six volume work on the nervous system by Gall and Spurzheim (in Guthrie, 1976) 
published in 1817, declared that the outward shape of the skull reflects the shape of the brain 
underneath, which in turn determines the level of intelligence, which differs between races. 
Such conclusions were made possible by the truth claims that the sciences had recently 
acquired, and, though we now consider them "unbelievable" (Guthrie, 1976, p. 33), these truths 
still reverberate in both knowledge and practice. In the words of Said ( 1978): 
The point to be emphasised is that this truth about the distinctive differences between 
races, civilizations, and languages was (or pretended to be) radical and ineradicable. It 
went to the bottom of things, it asserted that there was no escape from origins and the 
types these origins enabled; it set the real boundaries between human beings, on which 
races, nations, and civilizations were constructed; it forced vision away from common, 
as well as plural, human realities like joy, suffering, political organization. (p. 233) 
By the late 19th century, the human sciences were saturated with racism and social 
Darwinism. Contentions that "primitive races" (like women) could not abstract, inhibit impulses 
or make ethical choices were first solidified by Freudian theory and later empirically confirmed 
by "objective" psychological research (Guthrie, 1976). Psychology and anthropology joined in a 
search for racial differences in mental abilities and character traits. Ethnology, the subbranch of 
anthropology concerned with race, was a field of study so significant at the time that Wechsler 
(in Guthrie, 1976) saw fit to include the word in the Information subtest of his intelligence test 
in 1939. The link between ethnology and psychology was established only after race differences 
came to be viewed as nativistic. According to Guthrie the following events contributed to 
nativism in psychology: 
Darwin's theory of evolution led to psychology's obsession with the ordering of human 
behaviour on scales of relative success in adaptation through intelligence and strengths. 
It facilitated a view of the biological connectedness of man and animal, and psychology's 
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laboratory studies oflower animals, where "even the rat was white" (Guthrie, 1976, p. 
37). 
Galton's eugenics provided the link between scientific naturalism and psychology. 
Galton, an important contributor to the field of intelligence, was also an early explorer of 
Namibia in 1851-1852 and "to examine Galton's original ethnological impressions from 
Africa ... is to glimpse some of the roots of modem psychology" (Fancher, 1982, p. 713). 
His account of his exploration is notable for its racism. When later combined with 
Darwinian ideas on evolution, this view produced Galton's hereditary psychological 
theories and eugenics, which promoted the idea of racial improvement through selective 
mating and sterilisation of the racially "unfit". Gal ton's (in Guthrie, 1976) idea of a 
"perfectly efficient society" (p. 37) is an example ofbio-power taken to its extreme. 
German psychophysics: As every primary psychology textbook proclaims, psychology 
originated in Germany with the application of the experimental method. The psychology 
of the 19th century was a product of the union of philosophy and physiology. 
Mendelian genetics: Mendel's work on the genetic transmission of physical traits was 
transposed to psychological characteristics, which fuelled the hereditary-environmental 
debate in psychology. 
This debate was most pronounced in the field of intelligence, due to an early link between 
unreason, the Other, and race. 
The fixity of the representation of the Other (blackness) which race science placed 
before our eyes pronounces the genetic inferiority of blacks particularly with regard to 
intelligence.... This time the black man is not a child, he is not a beast. He is afflicted 
with a condition that cannot be alleviated. In short, since he cannot be helped by anyone, 
least of all himself, in changing his innate genetic endowment, he is cursed. (Manganyi, 
1985, p. 156) 
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Intelligence, the original concern and technical pinnacle of psychometrics, is in itself a 
Eurocentric cultural construct, reflecting bourgeois values in its emphasis on abstraction and 
verbalisation criteria (Guthrie, 1976). A culture obsessed with reason (and unreason) produced 
the concept of intelligence, developed a technology of normalisation around it and used this 
technology to define otherness nativistically in terms of a lack of intelligence. 
Psychology has made efforts to extricate itself from racism, inter alia by attempting to 
explain it. These explanations tend to locate racism within groups or individuals, as a kind of 
pathology, and ignores ideology, politics and class variables (Foster, 1993a). The study ofrace 
later shifted to a concern with ethnicity, and then with culture, recirculating the discourse of 
otherness in new forms. 
Ethnopsychology 
The concept of ethnicity was created by science and put into general circulation by 
missionaries and colonialists. As Comaroff and Comaroff ( 1991) illustrate, the European 
objectification of the Self and Other led to a process whereby European ways were constructed 
in opposition to African ways, "each with its own cosmology, 'customs', and conventions ... as 
distinct, objectified cultures" (p. 194 ). As the European world was objectified, Africans 
invented for themselves a similar self-conscious coherence and distinctness, often organised 
around an ethnic identity conferred upon them by colonial and apartheid administrations. 
The great divide that had opened up between Europeans and Africans was reflected in 
the sciences of the time. At the beginning of the 20th century, indigenous systems of thought 
became "primitive philosophy" or "philosophy of the savages" in ethnographic and 
anthropological texts. The field of "African philosophy" was staked out within a primitivist 
ideology which ascribed to the African a prelogism in thinking, paganism in belief, and 
primitiveness of worldview (Mudimbe, 1986). The work of Levy-Brohl in the 1920's on 
"primitive mentality", which had an enduring effect on later psychological research in Africa, 
described "African thinking" in terms of a "prelogical mentality", and "concreteness". The 
African was said to rely merely on memory and to lack the capacity for individuation. His 
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prelogical thinking was assumed to belong to an earlier phylogenetic stage. Despite opposition 
to these conclusions, much of later research was organised around them (Bulhan, 1981). 
After 1930, some trends in German and French anthropology began to develop more 
sophisticated taxonomies. A new type of discourse emerged, insisting on the originality of 
different cultures. Anthropology became the study of both a multitude of cultural peculiarities 
and the effort to discern a universal system, which would in turn account for all the 
particularities (Mudimbe, 1986). The discourse of colonialism had gradually shifted from a 
concern with race, to ethnicity and from there to culture, coinciding with changes in the kind of 
power employed. However, Foucault (1970) holds that the discipline of ethnology "can assume 
its proper dimensions only within the historical sovereignty - always restrained, but always 
present- of European thought and the relation that can bring it face to face with all other 
cultures as well as with itself' (p. 377). 
The term ethnical psychology was first defined by Haddon in 1910 as the study of "the 
minds of other races and peoples, of which, among the more backward races, glimpses can be 
obtained only by living among them and endeavouring to reach their point of view by means of 
observation and experiment" (Guthrie, 1976, p. 30). Increasingly, the method of "living among 
them" were appropriated by anthropologists and methods of "observation and experiment", were 
colonised by psychologists, who viewed themselves as experimental scientists reigning within a 
laboratory milieu. The ethnical psychologist invaded Africa, preoccupied with locating 
differences on scales of normalisation, especially on measures of intelligence. His knowledge 
was highly valued in South Africa, where ethnicity had become a cornerstone of apartheid 
ideology (Swartz & Foster, 1984) and became closely identified with "the South African version 
of colonial discourse called Apartheid" (Manganyi, 1985, p. 157). 
The extent to which colonial discourse is reflected in psychological discourse, is 
illustrated in the following comment by Manganyi (1985): 
Colonial discourse respects no boundaries; its geography is that of a limitless terrain, 
and I consider this characteristic so decisive that I will not bother to introduce 
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conceptual distinctions between the so-called "African psychology", "Ethnopsychiatry" 
and "race science".... Small wonder that I have and will continue to use these terms as 
signifiers in a single semantic field. (p. 157) 
Bulhan (1981), Fanon (1967a), and Manganyi (1985) analyse the discourse of 
ethnopsychologists and ethnopsychiatrists, which essentially reflect all the ambivalent 
stereotypes and assumptions of colonial discourse. Manganyi stresses the absence and silence of 
the coloniser in this discourse. The African or Muslim takes centre stage; his intelligence, 
personality, culture, and above all modifiability are made transparent and fixed. As 
psychological evaluation techniques are developed to measure these concepts, colonial 
discourse recirculates itself Results, such as that of De Ridder (1962) show how South African 
blacks are still children, but also prone to violence. "Immature, anxious, insecure and naively 
exhibitionistic: is he not an inadequate personality, or worse still, simply neurotic as has often 
been suggested?" (Manganyi, 1985, p. 162). Carothers (in Bulhan, 1981, p. 31) went even 
further: "The native African in his culture is remarkably like the lobotomised western European 
and in some ways like the traditional psychopath ". What is absent from the analysis is the 
coloniser and his political, economic and military power, as well as the effects of the circulation 
of this discourse: Separate education, residential segregation, exclusion from political power 
and the exploitation of labour. 
Even studies that did include the coloniser, such as Mannoni's (1964) psychological 
analysis of colonialism, sought explanations from an ahistorical and subjective perspective 
(Bulhan, 1981; Fanon, 1967a). Mannoni attributed to the African a dependency complex and a 
need for nurturant authority, and to the coloniser unconscious forces to adopt a paternal role. 
The coloniser-colonised relationship assumes a neurotic form. As elsewhere in colonial 
discourse, the inscription of the Other takes place within a medicalised, decontextualised space 
(Manganyi, 1985). 
Cross-cultural Psychology 
As culture came to replace ethnicity in psychological discourse, the ethnopsychologist or 
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"brass instrument Tarzan" (Guthrie, 1976, p. 31) turned into the cross-cultural psychologist, 
who, like the ethnopsychiatrist (Gaines, 1992), is still battling to extricate himself from a 
territory demarcated by boundaries of otherness and hierarchies of evolution (Segall, 1986; 
Serpell, 1984). 
Cross-cultural studies were initially focused exclusively on comparisons between 
westerners and Africans. The earliest studies were concerned with the morphology and 
physiology of "the African brain", which were linked directly to intelligence. Next followed 
comparative studies between "African" and "White" intelligence, and qualitative analyses of 
"African intelligence" (Cryns, 1962; Serpell, 1984). The nature-nurture debate was central in 
interpretation of these studies (Cryns, 1962). Although social and cultural variables, and the 
concept of cultural relativity were later introduced (and reified) in interpreting findings, the 
central concerns in the field are technical and the economic and political context of the research 
itself, ignored. 
The recent discourse of cross-cultural psychology is focused primarily on a concern with 
the well-being of cross-cultural psychology, whose centre of gravity resides firmly in Europe 
and America (Serpell, 1984). Evaluations of the field (Doob, 1980; Lonner, 1980; Segall, 1986) 
are done in terms of the narratives oflegitimation of science. Doob (1980) criticises the field 
only in terms of its lack of scientific purity: "It has not appreciably hastened a scientific 
millennium: No great theorist or theory has emerged; sloppy psychologizing, and 
anthropologizing persist... and neologisms and fancy phrases are flagrantly coined" (p. 59). 
Lonner (1980) is similarly concerned with the well-being of the field. The future and concerns 
of the peoples studied receive no mention. Lonner does lament the fact that cross-cultural 
psychology is done mostly by and for westerners, but only because it threatens validity. 
Questions raised by Bulhan (1993a), such as who is benefitting from the results, are absent. 
In its search for differences, cross-cultural psychology has gradually shifted from 
nativistic to environmental explanations. These explanations include an environmental 
deficiency model, paternalistic notions of the "noble savage", static concepts of tribal identities, 
and, more recently, cultural relativism (Bulhan, 1993a). The historical, economic, and social 
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underpinnings of the relationship between researcher and subject tend to be ignored. The social 
role of the psychological investigator is familiar and crystallised in western societies, to such an 
extent that it has acquired an almost ritual character. Its "constants" include a power 
differential, where the researcher is both voyeur and determines what is done and the subject has 
a complementary role to "confess" and expose himself in an unreciprocal relationship. When 
transposed to a colonial or postcolonial situation, these constants are easily translated into the 
relationship between coloniser and colonised. 
Safely cocooned in the modernist world of scientific progress, cross-cultural psychology 
today distances itself from the crude ethnology of its colonial past, but continues a long tradition 
of alienated relationships with its subjects, who by and large remain mute within the margins set 
by its discourse. Bulhan (1981) concludes: "African psychological research has thus far been 
geared to the development of Euro-America and the psycho-economic underdevelopment of 
Africa" (p. 38). 
Psychology in South Africa 
The history of psychology in South Africa contains and magnifies all the problematic 
issues in the history of the profession and the continent. Psychology's technologies of power 
have been employed in a state apparatus that normalised racism and systematically employed 
disciplinary power techniques in a panoptic society, where both the prisoners and guardians are 
submitted to dividing practices. South African psychologists have lived in a world of rulers, 
separated by government policy from the majority of the population and functioning within a 
decontextualised, mythical world of science, mystifying differential power relations while 
contributing to their construction. 
Psychological research on black South Africans grew out of the concerns of those 
institutions most concerned with disciplinary power such as industries, notably the mines, the 
defence force, and educational institutions. Sophisticated psychological tests were developed to 
obtain maximum perform!lnce from workers and students (Retief, 1988). These technologies of 
normalisation came to be extensively used throughout Africa (Bulhan, 1981 ). The discourse of 
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South African psychologists on "the African" reflects a long tradition of colonialism in the guise 
of scientism. The African is objectified as a different Other, to be made productive and 
compliant, in an a-historical, decontextualised world where a concern with methodology takes 
center stage and both internal psychological attributes and cultural variables are reified. 
Political and economic power differentials are studiously ignored (Dawes, 1985). Examples of 
this kind of discourse may be found in De Ridder (1962), Swanepoel (1980), Umlaw (1980), and 
most of the literature on the construction and standardisation of psychological tests in South 
Africa. 
Even the most sympathetic cross-cultural studies have served to mystify power 
differentials between researcher and subject, who, in South Africa, are usually members of 
dominating or dominated groups (Dawes, 1985; Roper, 1992; Swartz & Foster, 1984). In an 
analysis of the images of black culture and mental illness in South African psychiatric and 
psychological approaches, Swartz and Foster (1984) conclude that 
common to all of these is a view of "Black culture" as an organic, archaic essence which 
is contrasted with the fragmented alienated "Western culture". This view seems to 
dovetail neatly with dominant South African ideology and is apparently related to a 
Romantic conception of the primitive. Political issues are generally ignored. (p. 17) 
In South Africa, the great cultural divide of colonial discourse was extended to a 
classificatory system consisting of a multitude of ethnic identities1 that have been reified to such 
an extent that today mention of the concept culture has become identified with ethnocentrism 
and oppression. The concept of cultural relativism has been used to exclude and divide. "It is 
not possible in South Africa to claim that groups of people are different from each other without 
at some level recalling, consciously or unconsciously, a major basis for justification of 
oppressive practices" (Swartz, 1992, p. 231 ). Psychological research reinforced ethnical and 
cultural stereotypes, which usually were originally imposed on people from the outside, as a 
static identity (Swartz & Foster, 1984). Swartz and Foster (1984) emphasise, however, that it is 
not useful to locate the problem in "conspiracy theories", but rather to acknowledge the 
embeddedness of psychological practice in the encompassing discourse of otherness. This 
150 
discourse produces paradoxes where psychologists who are concerned with overcoming 
Eurocentrisrn attempt to cross the (historically created) divisions between cultures, but thereby 
stand accused of creating the very same divisions they are attempting to cross, while studying 
people who often constitute themselves in terms of distinct cultural identities. 
Psychology's individualism and subjectivism have served as a smokescreen for social 
injustices. Individual psychotherapy, especially the client-centred approach, by focusing on the 
individual's internal states, have ignored the political context's contribution to personal problems 
(Dawes, 1985, 1986; Whittaker, 1991). Following the western model of modernistic 
psychology, psychologists search for causes of misfortune within the person (Beit-Hallahrni, 
1974). The psychologist's role of priest, and the quest for individual salvation, has relegated 
social and political issues to the professional unconsciousness. "We start with the belief that the 
big machine is all right; we just have to keep it oiled and running.... Psychologists help people 
adjust to the reality of the big machine" (Beit-Hallahrni, 1974, p. 127). In South Africa, the big 
machine was particularly successful in implanting the psychologist with an identity of 
surveillance within a context of division and exclusion. 
Conclusion 
The point of departure of this chapter has been a distinction between the West and 
Africa. It draws from a discourse that separates western knowledge from African knowledge; 
light from darkness; Sarne from Other; coloniser from colonised. This discourse, emanating 
from the Enlightenment, did not only create and fix an African otherness, it also created and 
fixed a European sameness. As the African was inscribed with a fixed, limited identity of 
difference, the "rational man" of Europe (and the psychologist) was similarly inscribed with a 
fixed, limited identity. 
Such a binary division permeates not only colonial discourse, but also those discourses 
that attempt to deconstruct it. This Manichean world (Fanon, 1967a), a dividing field of 
power/knowledge, encompasses both the object and subject of knowledge. This study, in 
approaching the field of emergence of such a hegemony, is, paradoxically, also drawn into it. 
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The binary world, like the total web of modem power/knowledge, is hegemonic, in the sense 
that its dominance has made it a part of 
that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies -
drawn from a historically situated cultural field - that come to be taken-for-granted as the 
natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it. It consists ... of 
things that go without saying because, being axiomatic, they come without saying 
(Bourdieu, cited by Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 23 ). 
Not only the discourse on Africa, but knowledges and practices, like psychology, occupy 
and constitute hegemonies. Hegemonies establish themselves at the expense of what has gone 
before in the same way that continued surveillance becomes invisibly inscribed into the fabric of 
the mundane, so that later it is not seen as control at all. It is precisely the things that go without 
saying that make it possible for well-intentioned psychologists to constitute themselves as agents 
of social control. 
However, as pointed out by Comaroff and Comaroff ( 1991 ), hegemonies are actively 
made, and, by the same token may be unmade. The following chapter describes attempts at 
liberation from the subtle, and at times unsubtle, webs of power peculiar to processes of 
domination in Africa. In contrast to the present chapter, which muted voices of resistance, the 
following chapter is concerned with African voices contesting the muteness imposed on them. 
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CHAPTER6 
KNOWLEDGES OF RESISTANCE 
What is striking is that someone always comes 
along to disturb the order of "reason". (Lyotard, 
1984,p.61) 
This chapter turns towards the receiving end of the knowledges of Enlightenment that 
colonised Africa. It presents African perceptions of, resistance against, and appropriation of 
modem western secular knowledge and focuses on psychological perspectives on this process. 
African knowledges of resistance all contain implicit and explicit psychologies, as they are 
aware of colonial power/knowledge intruding upon and redefining the terms of 
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self-understanding of both the coloniser and the colonised (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991; Ho, 
1985; Nandy, 1982). Various retellings of African narratives ofresistance occur in the current 
debate on the relevance of psychology in Africa. 
The first section of the chapter is concerned with a general consideration of African 
reactions to western knowledge. This serves to contextualise the subsequent sections depicting 
two narratives of resistance that have implications for the field of psychology: The reclamation 
of Africanness and the psychology of oppression and liberation. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the nature of power/knowledge embedded in African knowledges of resistance. 
African Responses to Western Knowledge 
The knowledge of western modernity had, and continues to have, enormous power. 
There is no doubt that it has transformed Africa and that Africa has largely succumbed to its 
attractions. In the words of Senghor (in July, 1968): 
The Renaissance was a conqueror.... But it exported not only merchants and soldiers; 
with professors, physicians, engineers, administrators, and missionaries, it also exported 
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ideas and techniques. It not only destroyed, it built; it not only killed, it cured and 
educated; it gave birth to a new world, an entire world of our brothers, men of other 
races and continents. ( p. 18) 
In an effort to gain control of this world, many Africans have joined its forces, some 
have resisted, some, like Senghor ( 1965), have recast its intrusive forms in their own image, and 
most have done all of these things, at one time or another, during the struggles provoked by 
colonialism. Just as technologies of power may vary between overt control and implicit 
persuasion, modes of resistance extend over a wide spectrum. At one end is organised protest, 
explicit movements of dissent that are recognisable as "political" by western standards. At the 
other end are silent gestures of tacit refusal. "For the most part, however, the ripostes of the 
colonized hover in the space between the tacit and the articulate, the direct and the indirect" 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 31), a process that is more complex than simple equations of 
domination and resistance. African resistance speaks both in local and European terms and 
languages, while extending the boundaries of these terms and languages. 
Even as they are consumed by the European capitalist system - consumed, ironically, as 
they consume its goods and texts - these "natives" of other worlds often seek to seize its 
symbols, to question their authority and integrity, and to reconstruct them in their own 
image. Sometimes they do so in open defiance; sometimes through strikingly 
imaginative acts of cultural subversion and re-presentation; sometimes in silent, sullen 
resistance. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. xii) 
In so doing, they paradoxically escape the dominant order without leaving it. Sometimes their 
resistance further contributes to their own subordination, and often they fail to call into doubt 
the most essential entrapments of the colonising culture and the most fundamental assumptions 
of its knowledge (Nandy, 1982). Resistance may take the form of a '"reverse discourse': the 
terms of resistance are already given us, and our contestation is entrapped within the Western 
cultural conjuncture we affect to dispute", writes Appiah ( 1988, p. 161 ). Many narratives of 
resistance are incorporated into and neutralised by the dominant discourse, which is ever hungry 
for novelty and feeds on challenges (Ferguson, 1990): Said (in Ferguson, 1990) expressed the 
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result as follows: "We can read ourselves against another people's pattern, but since it is not 
ours ... we emerge as its effects, its errata, its counternarratives. Whenever we try to narrate 
ourselves, we appear as dislocations in their discourse" (p. 11 ). Despite such re-appropriation of 
African resistance by the dominant discourse, the subtle, ambivalent manoeuvres of resistant 
discourse also escape dominance (Bhabha, 1990; B. Parry, 1987): 
When re-articulated by the native, the colonialist desire for a reformed, recognizable, 
nearly-similar other, is enacted as parody, a dramatization.... For in the "hybrid moment" 
what the native re-writes is not a copy of the colonialist original, but a qualitatively 
different thing-in-itself, where mis-readings and incongruities expose the uncertainties 
and ambivalences of the colonialist text and deny it an authorizing presence. (B. Parry, 
1987, pp. 41-42) 
This process is discernible in both written and other responses to western knowledge. 
Remonses in Writin~ 
In 1787, the Sierra Leone colony was established for the repatriation of ex-slaves from 
London. Hereby was initiated a long period whereby western-educated and acculturated freed 
slaves were returned to West Africa (July, 1968), turning this region, cradle of many influential 
African intellectuals, into an ambiguous space where western knowledge was imported by 
Africans with close ties outside Africa. A new class of "assimilated" Africans and mulattos was 
born (Curtin, 1972), who tended to form closed communities, constituting what Said (in 
Serequeberhan, 1991, p. 8) has termed "a widely varied group of little Europes" planted on 
African soil. Members of these groups became Christian missionaries and emissaries of the 
Enlightenment, and viewed their fellow-countrymen in much the same terms as the European 
colonisers did. Their assimilation was relatively unambiguous: As prototypes of bourgeois 
respectability they had few reservations about European culture. In their writings, they proposed 
programmes of active rehabilitation to bring Africa out of her barbarism and ignorance, and 
envisaged a period of tutelage and transition under the agency of Europe (Curtin, 1972; July, 
1968.) 
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Examples of 19th century writers from these communities include the West-African 
physician Africanus Horton setting off on a civilising mission of his fellow country-men (July, 
1968); Samuel Crowther, European educated missionary and explorer, who described the 
"nakedness, paganism, and cannibalism" of his African brethren in his travelogues, which read 
like early European texts of the same genre (Mudimbe, 1988), and the missionary Edward 
Blyden who advocated the mass importation of westernised Africans from the diaspora to 
civilise Africa (Curtin, 1972; Mudimbe, 1988). By the fact of their entry into colonial discourse 
through the written word and their (mis)appropriation of the role of the coloniser, these authors 
paradoxically reversed its ethnocentric assumptions. In their writings, they gradually started 
chipping away at the edifice of primitivism: Horton by arguing against its racism; Blyden by 
recognising a unique positive value in both indigenous and Islamic knowledge (July, 1968; 
Mudimbe, 1988). 
An almost unquestioning acceptance of western ways during the Classical age was 
gradually displaced by an increasing attraction/repulsion ambivalence during the Modern, which 
in varying forms has characterised African thought to this day. This ambivalence originated 
during the growth of modern racism and the partitioning of Africa into colonies (Curtin, 1972; 
July, 1968), whereupon the educated African found himself suspended between two worlds: 
Trained to an uncritical acceptance of the West, he was now rejected as an equal by 
Europe, and his country and people were made to subserve European interests. Unable 
and unwilling to return to a traditional Africa he no longer respected, he rose to its 
defense in part through loyalty and in part as an expression of national sentiments learnt 
through the West. (July, 1968, p. 463) 
This defense took the form of a reclamation of the positive values of African culture and a 
struggle for liberation from western domination. These two modes of resistance are dealt with 
in more detail later in this chapter. 
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Other Responses 
It is easy to overlook the responses of ordinary men and women to western knowledge. 
It is also dangerous, as these responses may constitute a new form of subjugated knowledge 
outside the realms of the dominant voices of African resistance. Modernity and its modes of 
resistance were by no means the inevitable or likely consequences of colonialism for those 
outside the circles of the acculturated elite (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991; Curtin, 1972) and the 
dominant narratives ofresistance do not necessarily reflect their experience (Bruner, 1986). 
Anthropological studies that attempt to bridge the gap between the ideas of the elite and 
those of the mostly illiterate masses have found a similar sequence of reaction to the West: An 
early uncritical approval, followed by second thoughts, and finally some form of 
neo-traditionalism and/or active pursuit of modernisation (Curtin, 1972). Like the literate 
response, the illiterate response was profoundly ambivalent (Curtin, 1972; Fernandez, 1972). 
Searching for general themes may, however, prove as unfruitful as working with a generalised 
African/western distinction. Particular African individuals and groups encountered particular 
western individuals and groups - "not a monolithic and inseparable western culture. One 
common element, indeed, was the African discrimination between different westerners and the 
aspects of western culture that each seemed to represent" (Curtin, 1972, p. 231 ). Missionaries, 
merchants, administrators, and different social classes were distinguished and received different, 
increasingly compartmentalised, responses. 
What all westerners had in common, though, and what made them attractive, was their 
access to scientific and technological advances; in sum, modernity. Efforts to grasp this power, 
to seek it in some aspects of culture, without always being able to sort out the incidental from 
the essential, characterise early reactions to the West (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991; Curtin 
1972). Many sought its power in Christianity (chapter 4); some in literacy; many reinterpreted it 
in terms of indigenous knowledge. In the same way that Africans were inscribed into western 
narratives, westerners were inscribed into African narratives. 
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Fernandez (1972) shows how the Fang of Gabon, Guinea, and Cameroon, who have had 
a relatively short period of contact (approximately a century) with westerners, first in the form 
of missionaries and later administrators, became anxious to explain their submissive relations 
with the colonisers to themselves. Myths and legends were reworked to explain the differences 
between whites and blacks and a powerful religious cult (Bwiti), a complex syncretism between 
indigenous religion, Christianity, and secular knowledge, was created, whereby they tried 
consciously to harmonise the cultures in contact and to find an explanatory network for the 
anomalies produced by that contact. Other reactions included self-isolation, but in general, 
"increasing self-consciousness is the lot of the acculturated. This must be labelled as an 
intellectual reaction, for at least in western tradition knowledge of the self has been one of the 
hallmarks of the intellectual posture" (Fernandez, 1972, p. 44). 
The particular form that such self-knowledge takes varies according to the specific 
aspects of western knowledge imparted by particular westerners to particular African societies. 
Paradoxically, the Fang's contact with missionaries and administrators not only subjected them 
to contrary intellectual pressures, but also reinforced many aspects of their pre-colonial 
epistemology, which Fernandez (1972) calls a "pre-scientific supernatural empiricism" (p. 45). 
In an effort to effectively transmit the Gospel, the missionaries focused on enactive and iconic 
representations thereof, reinforcing the preferences of the Fang. The pre-modern aspects of 
Christianity were imparted and assimilated, rather than the modern. Similarly, administrators 
imparted the organisationalism of the West; not its positivism or spirit of enquiry. The Fang 
assimilated new models of the environment and of social interaction, but the core of their 
cosmology remained intact. Frustrated in their efforts to impose western time constraints on the 
Fang, administrators and missionaries strongly depreciated the Fang's sense of time. Reactions 
on the part of the Fang included the inclusion of numerous alarm clocks in the rituals of the 
Bwiti cult, "though they run on a very local time" (Fernandez, 1972, p. 6). Similarly, French 
administrators' obsession with order, structure, and bureaucratic paperwork was mirrored in the 
organisation of a Fang clan regroupment movement, that appeared to Fernandez as "the perfect 
mockery of European organizationalism if it hadn't been taken so seriously" (Fernandez, 1972, p. 
17). 
158 
Though the Fang became increasingly disillusioned and embittered towards the 
European and his knowledge, something of an aura of the supernatural persisted to surround 
him. In the Bwiti cult the European was often represented as a black who had died and paid for 
his sins, learned the secret of the unseen, and returned purified and whitened. A similar 
integration of the European into the supernatural realm of indigenous cosmology occurred in 
other groups (Oruka, 1990), including the BaKongo (MacGaffey, 1972, 1978). 
In contrast to the Fang and the rest of Central Africa, the BaK.ongo have had intensive 
contact with Europeans for over five centuries. "During the colonial period the effect of 
European educational and economic institutions was probably more intense in the Lower Congo 
than anywhere in the interior" (MacGaffey, 1972, p. 50). In 1972, nearly all BaKongo were 
professed Christians, and most were literate to some extent. However, in contrast to West 
Africa, the region has only recently begun to produce intellectuals, who are trained in the West 
and offer "a poor guide to local social realities" (MacGaffey, 1972, p. 51). 
MacGaffey (1972) studied the ideas that the BaKongo themselves express in everyday 
conversation and found that the popular reaction to the West presupposes a cosmology 
according to which the universe is divided into two parts or phases called "this world" and "the 
other world", embodying the contrast between perceived events (this world) and the unseen 
causes that give rise to them (the other world). This world is inhabited by black people, whose 
lives are affected by the powers inhabiting the other world. These are the ancestors and spirits, 
coloured red or white. There are two routes of communication between the worlds: Water and 
the grave. 
From within this cosmology, the arrival of white-skinned people displaying unknown 
powers from a country across the ocean was easily assimilated. Whenever their powers had 
been regarded as extraordinary, westerners were classed as agents of other-worldly powers and 
were assigned to four roles - chief, prophet, magician, or witch - according to whether their 
powers were destructive or constructive, and whether they were exercised in the public interest 
or not. "Europeans have been allocated to any of the four roles, most often to those of witch ... 
and magician" (MacGaffey, 1972, p. 57). The magician, a technician employing his skills in 
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order to maximise his own material rewards, in fact summarised the European view of 
civilisation by the Fang, who viewed the exercise of power in the interest of private individuals 
as promoting social anarchy. 
History and geography have provided further content to the paradigm. Myths tell of the 
home of white people as a single continent across the sea, where the dead go and have always 
gone. Both the slave trade and later trade in goods were viewed as forms of witchcraft which 
transported large numbers of Africans, or their souls contained in goods such as ivory tusks, 
prematurely to the land of the dead. Having crossed the water, the dead become white. 
Colonialism was viewed as a process of destruction of indigenous power/knowledges, especially 
of medicine and metalworking, by the power/knowledge of the Europeans for material gain, and 
independence was promoted as the restoration of indigenous technology and medicine 
(MacGaffey, 1978). This may account for the phenomenal rise ofKimbanguism, a healing cult, 
as principle movement of resistance against the colonial regime (chapter 4 ). Only superior 
forces of healing could purge the country of the witchcraft of colonialism. 
"The Congolese, in brief, do not see themselves as having benefitted from the 
introduction of a form of civilization vastly superior to their own, nor do they share the 
European habit of distinguishing civilization in racial terms" (MacGaffey, 1972, p. 59). 
Research by Gorog (in Curtin, 1972) show that many ordinary Africans do share this habit, as is 
attested by popular stories accounting for racial differences. These confuse race and culture and 
accept the "fact" of European superiority, symbolised most often by the art of writing and the 
acquisition of technology. Viewed against the history of the 19th century, when people all over 
the world were first confronted with modem technology and industrialisation, not only Africans 
but Chinese, Turks, and Latin Americans were confused by the fact that it arrived in western 
clothing, and attempted to explain its powers in cultural and racial terms (Curtin, 1972). 
Why did many Kongo persist in their view of the West as the land of the dead despite 
nearly all having been at least to European primary schools and having been exposed to 
continuous propaganda exalting the West and its ways at the expense of African culture? 
MacGaffey (1972) offers three considerations: 
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First, that Kongo cosmology provides an adequate framework for the intellectual 
evaluation of Kongo experience in the modern world, as it did in the past; secondly, that 
the institutional position of literacy has not been such as to develop a consciousness of 
history; and thirdly, that Congolese experience of western culture has never been 
sufficiently different from popular expectations to cause a radical questioning of 
indigenous conceptual categories. ( p. 62) 
As was the case with the Fang and the early Tswana (chapter 4 ), the BaKongo were introduced 
only to certain selective aspects of European knowledge. Primary school education emphasised 
rote learning of selective facts; analytical reasoning and the context of the facts were not 
imparted. Congolese were trained to operate but not to understand western technology. Most 
were, at least until 1972, not presented with knowledge that could profoundly challenge their 
cosmology (MacGaffey, 1972). 
A similar situation developed around medical knowledge. The BaKongo, like many 
Africans, are to varying degrees suspicious of and disappointed with western health services, 
and tend to use these as an adjunct to indigenous and religious healing systems (Devisch, 1993; 
Lowery-Palmer, 1980). The research of Awanbor (1985), Brownell et al. (1987), Corin and 
Bibeau (1980), Edgerton (1980), Lambo (1960, 1961), Lowery-Palmer (1980), and Otsyula 
(1973) illustrates how this situation has led to mutual misunderstandings. Medical personnel 
carry western expectations of the doctor/patient relationship and "patient compliance" into the 
field, while patients bring indigenous expectations of a holistic, spiritual healing context, that 
remain largely unmet. Such a situation translates easily into a meeting between psychotherapist 
and client, although this relationship is unknown to many Africans. 
Although indigenous healing systems have undergone many changes and new forms of 
malpractice have become common, their value is now recognised by the World Health 
Organisation and many African governments are attempting to integrate them into their health 
systems (Devisch, 1993; Green, 1980; MacGaffey, 1981). The question of integration has also 
received attention in South Africa (Holdstock, 1979; Kottler, 1988, 1990), attesting to a complex 
process whereby the dominant scientist knowledge attempts to integrate a subjugated narrative 
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knowledge. As was discussed in the previous chapter, these knowledges employ different and 
unequal strategies of validation, so that one cannot be judged by the criteria of validation of the 
other. Does integration in this context mean subjugation or confirmation? 
The Question of Identity 
Both written and other responses to the West involved a re-assessment of self-identity. 
The previous chapter has illustrated how early European knowledges of Africa had 
systematically denied Africa an identity in itself Ever since, Africans have had to justify and 
defend whatever identity they conferred upon Africa; to prove that African history did not begin 
when Europe first reached Africa, and, by extension, that they themselves did not become fully 
human only after becoming "civilised" (Irele, 1986). 
The question of an African identity is reflected in a struggle for personal identity which 
is deemed characteristic of African intellectuals and is a central theme in their work. This is 
partly the result of an identity conferred upon them by the West (the "westernised savage" 
script). Even in postcolonial Africa, the intelligentsia and those who become part of the African 
elite continue to be presented to the world as "marginal men, as men alienated from their people 
and uprooted from their traditional cultures. Whoever dares to get education in Africa becomes 
a 'westernized' elite" (Anise, 1973, p. 437). However, this view is not only a product of western 
condescension, but one propounded by and reflected upon by African scholars and writers 
themselves (Irele, 1986; Memmi, 1965; Moore, 1980; Mudimbe, 1994). African intellectuals 
found themselves straddling two worlds. From this uncomfortable position have, however, 
emerged new discourses of Africanness. 
Of Africans and Africa 
In its search for identity, Africa has turned into multiple Africas of multiple knowledges 
of resistance. Some of Africa's Africas were taken over from the West. One is a unitary view of 
Africa as a continent, whose identity is defined in opposition to the West. This has become the 
secular Africa of the Pan-Africanists, where a mutual commitment to the struggle for autonomy 
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from the West is supposed to dissolve differences in culture and religion (Anise, 1973; Mazrui, 
1986). 
A second Africa is Sub-Saharan Africa, a concept that was developed in order to confer a 
specific racial/religious identity on those cultures which are not oflslamic and Arab origin. 
Hereby the cultures of North Africa are viewed as belonging to either the Mediterranean or the 
Muslim world. They are not "African", despite the fact that almost half of Africans south of the 
Sahara are also Muslims. This view was long accepted by North Africans and "Africans" alike, 
and, despite efforts from both sides to cross the Saharan barrier, still casts an ambivalence on all 
African definitions of Africa (Anise, 1973) and produces discomfort at "African" conferences 
(Irele, 1992; Soyinka, 1985). Sub-Saharan Africa historically has a distinct cultural connotation: 
It is the Africa of traditional African culture, of Negritude, which is supposed to belong to all 
persons of African descent (Brenner, 1993). This Africa also has a distinct racial connotation: 
It is "black Africa, and black Africa belongs to the black Africans. This has given rise to the 
problem that no definition of African could be purified from its racial foundations" (Anise, 
1973, p. 441 ). This view is complicated by the presence of not only "Arabs" in North Africa but 
generations of whites in North and Southern Africa, who either demand to be viewed as 
Africans and/or insist on defining themselves as non-Africans. It is further complicated by the 
presence, since the first contact with Europe, of peoples of mixed blood who have chosen to 
culturally define themselves on their own terms, though politically they may include themselves 
under the rubric of black Africa. 
Despite Pan-African consciousness, the Black Ethos continues to dominate the collective 
identity of Africans. It is further complicated by the tendency of blacks of the diaspora, 
especially the United States, in their own search for an identity, to identify themselves with 
black Africa, often viewed nostalgically and romantically as mother Africa. Thus a further 
distinction grew out of "black Africa": That all black peoples are Africans and all white peoples 
are Europeans. While being an expression of a common identity of black peoples who act 
together to liberate themselves from white control, these notions have given rise to numerous 
problems. African Americans identify themselves with and search for an idealised African 
culture which is supposed to be found among rural African peasants, uncorrupted by the West, 
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while contemporary Africa is largely oriented towards the future and resents being prescribed to 
by Americans (Anise, 1973). 
There is also the Muslim version of Africa, which subsumes cultural and racial 
differences under the universal Ummaa and equates African unity with Islamic unity. This 
Africa is unified by the Arabic language, "the knowledge of which is inextricably linked with 
the knowledge oflslam. It is an Africa which has recaptured its political independence from the 
West and whose destiny is linked with the future oflslam" (Brenner, 1993, p. 14). 
Finally, there is an emerging Africa that owes its existence solely to the fact that there is 
a continent of this name. There is nothing unique or essentialist about this Africa; it is part of a 
larger humanity. Though marginalised and subjugated to the West, this Africa searches a future 
not in its own uniqueness, but in the acquisition of "universal" scientific and technological 
knowledge which is to be applied autonomously for the benefit of economic and social 
development (Brenner, 1993). This view springs largely from a Marxist heritage and its 
proponents are to be found in fields such as African philosophy (Hountondji, 1983), education 
(lrele, 1992), and psychology (McCulloch, 1982). It paradoxically wants to liberate itself from 
the West by entering fully into its knowledge, which is deemed neutral and universal. A similar 
trend is described by Said (1978) in the Muslim world at large, where 
the intelligentsia itself is auxiliary to what it considers to be the main trends stamped out 
in the West. Its role has been prescribed and set for it as a "modernizing" one, which 
means that it gives legitimacy and authority to ideas about modernization, progress, and 
culture that it receives from the United States for the most part. Impressive evidence for 
this is found in the social sciences and, surprisingly enough, among radical intellectuals 
whose Marxism is taken wholesale from Marx's own homogenizing view of the Third 
World. (p. 325) 
Brenner (1993) concludes as follows on the Africas of Africa: 
Discourse in Africa about Africa's own identity is complex and includes numerous 
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opposing and conflicting strands. And the discourse takes on a very different shape 
depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. For example, if we analyze it in 
terms of its Muslim versus secular components, then these two sub-discourses appear to 
be largely conflictual and mutually exclusive.... But viewed from other perspectives, the 
Muslim and secular discourses are quite similar, for example in their attitudes towards 
the West. All Africans share the aim ofliberating the continent from the political, 
economic and cultural domination of the West. (p. 19) 
African Philosophies 
The question of African identity and the ambivalent position of the African intellectual 
are nowhere better illustrated than in the discourse around African philosophy, which relates to 
many of the issues raised by the relevance debate in psychology. 
The topic began with the book Bantu Philosophy published in 1945 by the Belgian 
missionary Tempels, which suggested that there exists an African philosophy that deserved to be 
taken seriously. Tempels' equation between an African indigenous worldview (based mostly on 
anthropological studies) and "philosophy" not only serves to positively reframe and validate 
indigenous knowledge (previously denigrated to a primitive status), but has inspired efforts 
towards elevating this knowledge to the status of a metanarrative, competing with the 
metanarratives of western philosophers, and thereby challenging the boundaries drawn around 
mainstream western concepts of knowledge and philosophy (Outlaw, 1990). Tempels' project, 
which has become known as ethnophilosophy, was taken up by Africans such as Abraham 
(1962), Kagame (in Mudimbe, 1988), Kamalu (1990), Mbiti (1971), and Senghor (1965) and 
represents one pole of a continuum that reflects the positions of African philosophers 
(Mudimbe, 1988). At the ethnophilosophical extreme of this continuum would fall all those 
efforts at documenting the implicit collective philosophies of African peoples (chapter 2). At 
the opposite extreme would fall the work of those who insist that African philosophy is the work 
of Africans trained in the western tradition of philosophy, which has been termed the scientist 
position (Serequeberhan, 1991 ). 
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From the scientist position, the project of ethnophilosophy is a failure, firstly because it 
does not constitute "real" philosophy, which should be understood as "the critical self-reflection 
of a culture engaged in by specific individuals in that culture" (Serequeberhan, 1991, p. 18). 
This critical self-reflection is characterised by rationality and science, is viewed as universal and 
as having an essential unity (Hountondji, 1983). Ethnophilosophy fails secondly because it is an 
extension of European colonialist discourse aimed at subjugating the African (both Tempels and 
Mbiti aim at using their work to better convert Africans to Christianity and "civilisation") and 
thirdly, because the undertaking of ethnophilosophy edifies the existence of a static African 
culture predating colonialism, that has no direct practical engagement with current, concrete 
problems. 
The scientist approach, followed by Hountondji (1983), Towa (in Irele, 1986), and 
Wiredu (1980) faces the problem of putting the concepts of science at the disposal of African 
nations. Cultural givens are viewed as irrelevant to the class struggle and a search for power. 
Towa (in Irele, 1986) writes: 
Due to its close affinity with science and technology, European philosophy seems to be 
the source of European power; for that reason, it will help us bring about the revolution 
of consciousness that underlies the construction of our own power. (p. 144) 
Philosophy should incalculate the values of rigorous enquiry and precise measurement necessary 
to a modem, technological civilisation (Wiredu, 1980). These authors all view philosophy as 
the handmaid of science and a rather uncritical modernisation. It is not hard to discern the grand 
narrative of the Enlightenment in these views. 
Writers such as Irele (1986) and Okolo (in MacGaffey, 1981) criticise the scientists' 
position, especially of their limited view of philosophy. "There is no Platonic essence or 
'essential unity' of philosophy, certainly no single style of enquiry" (Outlaw, 1990, p. 241 ). 
Harris (1980) accuses the "scientists" of being in the grip of a romantic, naive positivism. 
"Philosophy does not descend from heaven in full panoply of rigor, it emerges from a social 
context.... Is the mystification of science, rigor, and texts any more than a European evolutionist 
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ideology in the service of a neo-colonial bourgeoisie?" asks MacGaffey (1981, p. 261). 
Similarly, Koffi and Abdou (in Mudimbe, 1988), accuse the "scientist elite" (p. 160) of 
neo-colonialism. The debate continues. 
There have also been efforts in the middle ground between ethnophilosophy and 
scientism. Oruka (1990) advocates "philosophical sagacity" (p. 4), an effort to extract and 
document the philosophical wisdom of African sages through dialogue with their educated 
colleagues. Similar though not identical work includes that of Sodipo ( 1973) and Hallen and 
Sodipo (1986). These positions have been criticised for assuming that an African philosophy 
can be uncovered without being in some way contaminated by the inquiries of the educated 
(Serequeberhan, 1991). Serequeberhan also refers to a "national-ideological philosophy" (p. 20) 
produced by the African liberation struggle. These include the writings of Nkrumah, Toure, 
Nyerere, Fanon, and Senghor, some of which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
MacGaffey (1981, p. 261) concludes: "Africans, while advocating Otherness, have not 
been able to avoid repeating the tedious alternations of European social thought. ... These belong 
to the ideological armature of modem institutions, including international conferences, 
universities, and publishing". However, Outlaw (1990) illustrates how African philosophy has 
effectively reconstructed the history of western philosophy and has offered a direct challenge to 
its dominant narratives. 
African Literature 
While African philosophers search for new, appropriate metanarratives of legitimation, 
African literature, often written in the languages and styles of Europe, presents us with a 
different narrative knowledge that has not yet received the attention it deserves from 
psychologists who are concerned with relevance, due to the imperialism of science. In the West, 
literature and narrative knowledge have a marginal existence, as a space where romanticism and 
dissent can play themselves out without unduly disturbing the grand narratives (Lyotard, 1984 ). 
However, it is not surprising that African leaders and thinkers turned to literature to express 
their dissent. It has a long tradition of creating alternative knowledges challenging the dominant 
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ones, and of narrative knowledge challenging scientific knowledge. In modem African 
literature, this tradition merges with Africa's own narrative tradition, where oral literature was 
woven into the fabric of culture, served as a catalyst for change, edified and puzzled, educated 
and cured (chapter 2). The world of soothsayers and sages, of tales and fables, of poetry (a close 
relative of dance) and fiction, of dreams and myths; a world of a unity of words and things in a 
network of correspondences and resemblances (Foucault, 1970 ), opened a space where African 
intellectuals could open a different conversation not only with Europe but with a growing 
African readership. 
This literature speaks primarily in a language of resistance, as in the words of Achebe (in 
Leshoai, 1985): 
I believe it is impossible to write anything in Africa without some kind of commitment, 
some kind of message, some kind of protest. Even those early novels that look like very 
gentle recreations of the past - what they are saying, in effect, was that we had a past. 
This was protest, because there were people who thought we didn't have a past. What we 
were doing was to say politely that we did - here it is. ( p. 118) 
Similarly, Appiah (1988) writes: "We see the formation of a counterhegemonic discourse ... as 
the decolonized subject people write themselves, now, as the subject of a literature of their own. 
The simple gesture of writing for and about oneself. .. has a profound political significance" (p. 
156). Writing turns the colonised cultural consumer into a creator (Cesaire, 1959). 
Resistance was firstly aimed at colonialism, a strong theme in African literature. Where 
European fiction fabricated a mythical traditional Africa, African writers reacted with realist 
representations of African existence, thinking, perceptions, and values. Where colonial fiction 
contrived apologies for colonialism, African novels answered with stories of social havoc and 
psychological damage, or satirised the colonial ritual and pantomime, as in the work ofBeti, 
Oyono and Achebe (Moore, 1980). The complexity and disillusionment of the colonial world 
are portrayed in the work of Kane and Achebe. Themes such as alienation, urban political 
realities, exile and return, speak of the lived realities of Africans (Cartey, 1969). The theme of 
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cultural ambiguity, of attempts to find a personal identity, is contextualised and localised in the 
work ofNgugi Wa Thiong'o and Okara (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). 
"Such fiction restores to the dislocated colonial the image of the collective subject, of the 
integrated self in vital interactions with an authentic cultural community" (B. Parry, 1987, pp. 
46-47). This cultural community is often nostalgically depicted as a lost paradise and attempts 
are made to retrieve its values and dignities that have been insulted by colonialism, as in the 
work of Laye, Diallo, and Senghor. There is also the nostalgia of a writer like Achebe (1987) 
who portrays a realistic, dynamic, particular, local past that can hardly be described as romantic. 
In Achebe's work, the movement from pre-colonial to colonial and postcolonial is a central 
theme, as in writing all over the continent (Moore, 1980). The African that emerges from this 
theme has been restored to humanity by writers such as Achebe, Beti, and La Guma, who write 
of the African "from the dignity and authority of self-acceptance" (Soyinka, 1963, p. 395). 
More recently, protest is increasingly being launched against the excesses of postcolonial 
regimes (Leshoai, 1985; Soyinka, 1967). A theme of disillusionment with contemporary affairs 
features strongly in later work, casting the writer in the role of moral critic and conscience, for 
which many have been prosecuted (Soyinka, 1967). Similarly the problem of corruption and 
deceit amongst both politicians and ordinary people permeates the work of Achebe, Soyinka, 
Armah, and Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (Leshoai, 1985). 
African literature deconstructs western notions of Africa by affirming multiple forms of 
African difference and sameness. Above all, as narrative knowledge, it contextualises - it is not 
possible to tell a story without rooting it in the particular and local. By voicing experiences that 
are not encompassed by the dominant narratives, it deconstructs monolithic generalisations and 
exposes the complexities and multiformity of existence in Africa. In Soyinka's (1963) words: 
Only when the political creature who persistently emerged from the common back cloth 
of an imposed identity - primitivism - began to display evidence of will, of individuality, 
of localized social and historical causation, only then did the European observer begin 
169 
seriously to accept the validity of a creative imagination for the African, outside folklore 
and ritual. (p. 3 87) 
The Reclamation of Africanness 
We now examine in more detail one of the dominant African narratives of resistance: 
The reclamation of Africanness. This narrative has found its most able spokesmen in the 
Negritude literary movement in French-speaking Africa. What started as a psychological and 
literary response to colonialism developed into an ideology expressing African and pan-African 
nationalist sentiments (lrele, 1965a; Steeves, 1973), an approach to history (lrele, 1986), a 
philosophy (Markovitz, 1968), an epistemology (Senghor, 1965), and a psychology of African 
personality (Tembo, 1985). It has influenced the Black Consciousness movement (Adam, 1973; 
Biko, 1978; Charney, 1986; Hirschmann, 1990; Ranuga, 1986) and Black Psychology in the 
United States (Houston, 1990; Jackson & Sears, 1992; Jones, 1980; Myers, 1984, 1986, 1993; 
Nobles, 1976; J. L. White, 1984), and is echoed in the movement towards the indigenisation of 
psychology in Africa (Abdi, 1985; Bodibe, 1992, 1993, 1994; Gobodo, 1990; Holdstock, 1981b; 
Laubscher & Mcneil, 1995; Moghaddam, 1987; Okonji, 1975) as part of the relevance debate. 
The Context 
Negritude was the product of the acquaintance of three students of literature in 1928 in 
Paris. They were Leopold Senghor from Senegal, Aime Cesaire from Martinique, and Leon 
Damas from French Guiana. Both Senghor and Cesaire were later to become leaders of their 
countries (Eshleman & Smith, 1983; Markovitz, 1968; Moore, 1980). All three men hailed from 
highly assimilated French colonial cultures, found themselves alienated from French culture in 
Paris, and set out to rediscover and reconstitute an African identity (Spieth, 1985). The 
intellectual climate in Paris at the time reflected a re-assessment of European values which 
included a rising concern with Marxism, the rise of existentialism and Nietzsche's philosophy, 
the rise of surrealism, and a "discovery" of "primitive art", which became a source of inspiration 
to modern artists (Eshleman & Smith, 1983; Reed & Wake, 1965). European writers like 
Andre Gide had begun to discover the evils of colonialism (Eshleman & Smith, 1983). In fact, 
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European thought was undergoing what Mudimbe (1988) terms an epistemological shift. 
Europe was discovering and exploring various forms of "unreason", in its growing 
disenchantment with "reason", thereby opening a space for Negritude to enter its discourse. 
Public awareness of Africa and black culture was rising, partly the result of a black 
cultural renaissance in America during the 1920's (Guibert, 1961; Spleth, 1985). The Negritude 
writers were inspired by an American writer, McKay, who wrote about the alienation of black 
intellectuals due to a loss of folk wisdom because of imitations of the "civilised" white. Instead 
of stifling their uniqueness, McKay urged them to see their "backwardness" as preserving a vital 
resource (Eshleman & Smith, 1983). They read ethnological studies such as that ofFrobenius 
who conceived of an African essence - or soul - permeating all aspects of black culture 
(Eshleman & Smith, 1983; Senghor, 1986). 
The time was ripe for these black writers to gain full entry into the French world, 
through a literature that proclaimed the unique values that Africa had to offer Europe. The fact 
that they did gain entry is attested by the warm reception they received from prominent French 
writers such as Sartre, "the High Priest of postwar letters" (Eshleman & Smith, 1983, p. 7) and 
Andre Breton, leader and theorist of the surrealist movement (Reed & Wake, 1965). In an 
introduction to an anthology of Negritude poetry, Sartre (1976) saw the movement as an 
antithesis following the thesis of the colonial situation and preceding the synthesis in which all 
oppressed peoples would triumph over their oppressors. He opens the anthology as follows: 
What would you expect to find, when the muzzle that has silenced the voices of black 
men is removed? That they would thunder your praise? When these heads that our 
fathers have forced to the very ground are risen, do you expect to read adoration in their 
eyes? Here ... are black men standing, black men who examine us; I want you to feel, as 
I, the sensation of being seen. For the white man has enjoyed for three thousand years 
the privilege of seeing without being seen .... Today, these black men have fixed their 
gaze upon us and our gaze is thrown back in our eyes. (Sartre, 1976, pp. 1-2) 
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Cesaire's Negritude 
The point of departure of Cesaire's ( 1959, 1969, 1983) writing was a particular 
Martiniquan position of alienation (Eshleman & Smith, 1983). Antilleans had been colonised 
for three centuries and had no direct access to African culttire. Their alienation was an 
alienation from themselves, not from their past (Reed & Wake, 1965). Cesaire coined the term 
Negritude as an act of self-affirmation, "a decision to affirm and take pride in those things for 
which the Negro has been despised ... principally and symbolically, in his black skin .... Cesaire 
accepts the white man's myths about the Negro and glories in them" (Reed & Wake, 1965, p. 
10). The initial goal of the movement was a renewed awareness of being black and a positive 
acceptance of one's destiny, history, and culture. Cesaire had contact with African culture only 
through books which mirrored colonial views of African culture as antipodal to western values. 
The black culture of Negritude was thus initially spelled out as 
not the control of nature by reason and science but a joyful participation in it; not its 
control by technology but a coexistence with other forms of life; not the Christianity of 
the missions but the celebration of very ancient pagan rites; not the praise of individual 
achievement but the fraternity and communal soul of the clan, the tribe, as well as the 
love of ancestors. (Eshleman & Smith, 1983, p. 7) 
Both Cesaire and Senghor were criticised for racial overtones in their early formulation 
of Negritude (Scheub, 1972). The word itself focuses on blackness, not Africanness, and has 
been interpreted as an anti-racist racism (Sartre, 1976). Both later defended themselves from 
this accusation by emphasising the cultural identity of Negritude as part of a universal 
humanism (Eshleman & Smith, 1983; Reed & Wake, 1965; Senghor, 1966). The racial 
connotation was, however, compou~ded by uncompromising attacks on white culture made by 
both Cesaire and Damas, and to a lesser extent by Senghor (Scheub, 1972). Despite these 
attacks, Negritude was a modem movement, and Cesaire ended with what seems a revised 
"cannibalised" version of modernism (Eshleman & Smith, 1983). In defiance of European 
popular imagery, Cesaire emphasised a symbolic cannibalism as part of his African heritage: 
"Its symbolism carries to its fullest degree the idea of participation; it symbolically eradicates 
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the distinction between the I and the Other, between human and nonhuman ... finally, between 
subject and object" (Eshleman & Smith, 1983, p. 13). 
As a modernist, Cesaire (in Eshleman & Smith, 1983) viewed poetry as an antidote to 
scientific knowledge, which "numbers, measures, classifies, and kills" (p. 8). Drawing on Jung 
and Freud, as well as anthropology, he searched for an escape from oppression (viewed in terms 
of a kind of repression) in myth and image. He drew upon classical myths, mostly myths of 
transformation, but re-situated them in the context of black culture. Of all the Negritude 
writers, Cesaire is closest to surrealism, whose goals were parallel to that of Negritude. 
Surrealism's basic premises were a return to childhood, an idealisation of madness, Freudian 
free associations, anticlericalism, eroticism, and the occult (Eshleman & Smith, 1983). It was a 
yearning for wholeness, an identification with the universe, the female, the foreign, the animal 
and vegetative, the unconscious; an inclusion of what had been relegated to the Other by 
knowledges of modernity. 
Cesaire, like Senghor, carried, and bestowed on himself, an almost messianic role, as a 
bridge between Europe and Africa. As both political and poetic spokesman for his people, he 
made the universal human black (and vice versa) and made the African an elemental human in 
whom all humans could recognise themselves: 
Cesaire was paradoxically putting the finishing touches to an image of man toward 
which Europe itself had been groping in the wake of Rousseau, Diderot, and the 
Enlightenment and which continued to develop through nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century anthropology. In expanding Man's image, he gave the white world, 
which had educated him, a hundredfold more than what he had received from it. 
(Eshleman & Smith, 1983, pp. 19-20) 
Senghor's Negritude 
In contrast to Cesaire, Senghor had a more direct experience of African culture, through 
memories of early childhood experiences, in a traditional African Islamic community as the son 
173 
of a Catholic trader. For Senghor, indigenous culture was less a mythical, remote past than a 
recently lost, romantic paradise, that could still be revived to make a contribution to the future 
of not only Africa, but also the West (Moore, 1980; Reed, 1963). 
Senghor's work includes the formulation of a uniquely African cosmology and 
epistemology (chapter 2). Where Cesaire gloried in what the African was not, Senghor (1965, 
1966) gloried in what he was, and presented this view as a positive contrast to the European. He 
positively reframed the negative Other of Europe and at times turned Europe into an Other in 
terms of Africa: 
Let us consider first the European as he faces an object. He is ... an objective 
intelligence, a man of will, a warrior, a bird of prey, a steady gaze. He first distinguishes 
the object from himself He keeps it at a distance. He freezes it out of time, and, in a 
way, out of space. He fixes it, he kills it. With his precision instruments he dissects it in 
a pitiless factual analysis. As a scientist, yet at the same time prompted by practical 
considerations, the European makes use of the Other that he has killed in this way for his 
practical ends. He makes a means of it.... He destroys it by devouring it. "White men 
are cannibals", an old sage from my own country told me a few years ago. "They have 
no respect for life". It is this process of devouring that they call "humanizing nature". 
(Senghor, 1965,p.29) 
Whereas Cesaire's Negritude was a confirmation of self, Senghor's was a confirmation of 
culture: "The sum total of the values of the civilization of the African world" (Senghor, 1965, p. 
31 ). That he asserts these values through a (mis )appropriation of the terms of colonial 
ethnographic discourse may be read from the following passage on "the African apprehension of 
reality": 
The African is as it were shut up inside his black skin. He lives in primordial night. He 
does not begin by distinguishing himself from the object, the tree or stone, the man or 
animal or social event. He does not keep it at a distance. He does not analyse it. Once 
he has come under its influence, he takes it like a blind man, still living, into his hands. 
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He does not fix it or kill it. .. he fingers it, he feels it. ... 
He lives with the Other in a communal life, lives in symbiosis: he is born-with and 
thereby knows the Other. Subject and object are dialectically confronted in the very act 
of knowing one another. It is a long caress in the night. .. the act of love, from which the 
fruit of knowledge is born. The African might say, "I smell, I dance the~- I am". 
(Senghor, 1965, pp. 20-32) 
Like Cesaire, Senghor was offering Europe an alternative view of humanity and 
non-scientific ways of knowing which it was searching for at the time. However, Senghor's 
Negritude was ultimately concerned with a larger unity between African and European 
knowledge. He affirmed Africa's contribution to a process of mutual assimilation in the face of 
France's arrogant one-way process. African values were affirmed in terms of their contribution 
to a new world civilisation, which he termed La Civilisation de lVniversel, an idea inspired by 
the philosophy ofTeilhard de Chardin and the New Physics (Senghor, 1965, 1966). This 
civilisation would ultimately transcend the limitations of Africa, Europe, and the Arab world 
(Scheub, 1972; Reed & Wake, 1965). As such, Negritude became one ingredient of a new unity: 
The civilization of the twentieth century cannot be universal except by being a dynamic 
synthesis of all the cultural values of all civilizations. It will be monstrous unless it is 
seasoned with the salt of Negritude. For it will be without the savour of humanity. 
(Senghor, 1965,p. 98) 
Senghor's leaning towards synthesis and cultural assimilation, which contrasts with the 
views of many of his contemporaries (Moore, 1980), may be related to Senegal's relation with 
France, which had for a long time been closer and more equal than almost any other colony 
(July, 1968). Assimilation had many benefits, despite its alienating effects. As spokesman of 
his country, Senghor's position reflected its close ties with France, while offering Negritude as a 
contribution towards mutual assimilation (Moore, 1980). The dominant metaphor in Senghor's 
work, of the rising Phoenix of Egyptian mythology, embodies its core narrative: Destruction and 
alienation (the present), followed by purification and Negritude (the past), and, finally, 
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resurrection and synthesis (the future) (Scheub, 1972). Reed and Wake (1965) summarise 
Senghor's position as follows: 
It is not so much unity as the process by which things become one, the process of mutual 
contribution, of synthesis and symbiosis into a wholeness which is more complex and 
more capable of freedom, so that unity and uniformity are not the same but incompatible 
conditions, that has most deeply interested Senghor's poetic imagination and his 
meditations on the nature and destiny of human culture. (p. 26) 
The Psychology of Negritude 
The point of departure of Negritude is the experience of otherness: Alienation, 
inferiority, self-hatred, and shame flowing from a state of dependence on a dominating culture, 
which is also extremely attractive, resulting in the "pathology of the uprooted man": A divided 
self (Irele, 1965a, p. 503). The cultural hybrid suffers from spiritual instability, intensified 
self-consciousness, restlessness, and malaise. Negritude, as a reaction to these experiences, 
embodies a revolt against the dominating culture, a rediscovery of self-identity, self-affirmation, 
and self-differentiation, in a renaissance of the myths of indigenous Africa. It involves "a quest 
for the self, with a conquest of a lost identity as the prize" (lrele, 1965a, p. 511 ). 
The Legacy of Negritude 
Ire le ( l 965a, 1965b) views Negritude as a watershed that marks the emergence of a 
modem African consciousness, by contrasting it with African messianic religious movements, 
which remain largely traditional, but borrow from the West. The reverse is true of Negritude: 
Despite its championship of a non-rational tradition, it remains rigorously rational. 
Senghor's Negritude, for example, is an anti-intellectualism mediated by the intellect, 
and the whole movement is expressed through a western mould which absorbs African 
realities.... It marks a "desacralisation" of African collective life, an attitude which is 
spontaneous and no longer imposed, and out of which have begun to flow new currents 
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of ideas for tackling present-day African problems. (Irele, 1965a, p. 522) 
Although Negritude continues to serve as a point of reference in African intellectual 
debates, it is generally viewed as a necessary movement whose time has nevertheless passed. Its 
image of Africanness fitted too neatly into European expectations and was too close to colonial 
discourse and the myth of the noble savage for the comfort of many (Simone, 1993; Steeves, 
1973). Negritude was rejected by many Anglophone writers, like Soyinka, who was critical of 
its romanticism and dismissed it by stating that "the tiger does not have to proclaim its tigritude" 
(Eshleman & Smith, 1983, p. 7). The concerns of Negritude were never as close nor as pressing 
to Anglophone intellectuals, who were colonised by a policy of indirect rule, leaving traditional 
culture largely intact, than to the assimilated Francophones. 
Similarly, the black South African educated elite were more concerned with being 
allowed full entry into the white world, than with re-asserting an African identity (Moore, 1980). 
Whereas African Negritude writers were brought up amid traditional cultures still rich and alive, 
most South African writers formed part of an urban, industrialised culture and rejected the 
traditional culture that was artificially relegated to the Homelands, symbols of stagnation and 
oppression (Moore, 1980; Mphalele, 1959, 1964; Reed & Wake, 1965). They tended to 
associate Negritude with racism and an imposed cultural identity. Rather than questioning 
themselves or doubting their identity, they blamed the system and the regime (Foster, 1993b). 
Some of the most scathing attacks on Negritude came from South Africa. Mphahlele (1964) 
criticised its elitism, its failure to challenge white authority, and its romanticism: 
Who is so stupid as to deny the historical fact of negritude as both a protest and a 
positive assertion of African values? All this is valid. What I do not accept is the way in 
which too much of the poetry inspired by it romanticizes Africa - as a symbol of 
innocence, purity, and artless primitiveness. I feel insulted when some people imply that 
Africa is not also a violent continent. I am a violent person, and proud of it because it is 
often a healthy human state of mind; some day I'm going to plunder, rape, set things on 
fire; I'm going to cut someone's throat; I'm going to subvert a government; I'm going to 
organize a coup d'etat; yes, I'm going to oppress my own people; I'm going to hunt down 
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the rich fat black men who bully the small, weak black men and destroy them ... 
This is only a dramatization of what Africa can do and is doing. The image of Africa 
consists of all these and others.... So we are told only half - often the falsified half - of 
the story of Africa [by Negritude].... I refuse to be put in a Negro file - for sociologists to 
come and examine me.... If African culture is worth anything at all, it should not require 
myths to prop it up.... And if you thought that the end of colonialism was the end of 
agony, then it is time to wake up. (p. 625) 
Mphahlele ( 1964) is asserting another African reality: That of oppression and liberation; a 
world of force and violence that had found a home not only in South Africa but in French 
colonies like Algeria as well as postcolonial African states; a world far removed from the 
assimilated unity of Senegal and France, which could converse in literary language across 
cultural divides. In the world of oppression, it is not poetry and myth but action and violence 
that liberates. 
Oppression and Liberation 
The most dominant narrative of African resistance is that of the movement from 
oppression to liberation. This narrative, carrying a strong Marxist imprint, emerged directly 
from the colonial scenario, has inspired the Black Consciousness (Adam, 1973; Biko, 1978; 
Ranuga, 1986) and Black Power movements (Hirschmann, 1990; West, 1990), and has 
influenced movements in psychology such as Black Psychology (Houston, 1990; Jackson & 
Sears, 1992; Jones, 1980; Myers, 1993; Nobles, 1976; J. L. White, 1984), the psychology of 
oppression (Bulhan, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1985; Nicholas, 1993a, 1993b; Nicholas & 
Cooper, 1990) critical psychology (Dawes, 1986; Ivey, 1986; R. Miller, 1989; Whittaker, 1991), 
and materialist psychology (Couve, 1986; Manganyi, 1991). The work ofBulhan (1985) and 
McCulloch (1983) on Fanon has influenced various authors in the relevance debate in South 
Africa (Anonymous, 1986; Couve, 1988; Manganyi, 1973, 1977, 1981). There is also a new 
generation of African intellectuals, including social scientists, who are rediscovering Fanon in 
their disenchantment with postcolonial excesses of African states (Dacy, 1986; Jinadu, 1986). 
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This section focuses mainly on the psychological dimensions of the oppression-liberation 
narrative, as described by two actors in the colonial drama, whose work has extended the 
boundaries of psychology to include aspects of colonial power/knowledge. 
The Context 
In the 1950's, two men met each other in Tunis: Albert Memmi was director of an 
institute of child psychology; Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist at the local hospital and writer for 
the Algerian liberation movement. Both were committed to the North African struggle for 
liberation, yet both were outsiders to the contesting camps: Memmi, though a native Tunisian of 
Berber background, was a Jew; and Fanon, a black West Indian of Christian background; both 
were outsiders within a Muslim majority. Both were culturally assimilated Frenchmen through 
their education and further studies in psychiatry (Fanon) and philosophy and psychology 
(Memmi) in France, yet both were outsiders among the French as colonials of a different "racial" 
origin. Both found themselves hovering in the middle echelons of stratified colonial societies, 
simultaneously identifying with the coloniser and the colonised. (Cassirer, 1973; Caute, 1970; 
Geismar, 1971; Memmi, 1973; S. G. Miller, 1991; Zahar, 1974.) 
Both were confronted in North Africa with a form of colonialism that was far more 
brutally oppressive than that of Senegal (Levine, 1986), and both sought to establish how the 
phenomenon of oppression shape the psychological and cultural personality of the oppressed, as 
well as the possible ways in which the oppressed "can break out of the circle of oppression and 
give substance to the ideal of a universal humanism" (Cassirer, 1973). 
Memmi's Psycholo~ of Colonialism 
Memmi (1965) views the coloniser-colonised relationship as a reflection of the larger 
colonial system of political, economic, and cultural dominance. The colonial situation invades 
the self-constitution of individuals and creates a colonised personality as it creates a coloniser 
personality, a process which may be compared to Foucault's (1977) descriptions of the swarming 
of disciplinary mechanisms. These personalities are then tied into a relationship of mutual 
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dependence. The only escape from this position is the destruction of the colonial system. 
Portrait of the Coloniser 
The coloniser poses as noble adventurer and righteous pioneer, but is drawn towards the 
colony by economic gain and privileges vis a vis the colonised. 
Jobs and positions will be reserved for him in advance; the tests will be given in his 
language, causing disqualifying difficulties for the colonized ... he always receives 
preferential treatment.... From the time of his birth, he possesses a qualification 
independent of his personal merits or his actual class. He is part of a group of colonizers 
whose values are sovereign. (Memmi, 1965, p. 12) 
However, the coloniser cannot ignore the colonised. 
He must constantly live in relation to them, for it is this very alliance which enables him 
to lead the life which he decided to look for in the colonies; it is this relationship which 
is lucrative, which creates privilege. He finds himself on one side of a scale, the other 
side of which bears the colonized man. (Memmi, 1965, p. 8) 
Memmi (1965) differentiates between the coloniser who accepts, and the coloniser who 
refuses colonialism. The coloniser who accepts is heir to privileges he would defend at all 
price, due to his mediocrity within his own culture. "It is the mediocre citizens who set the 
general tone of the colony. They are the true partners of the colonized, for it is the mediocre 
who are most in need of compensation and of colonial life" (Memmi, 1965, p. 50). The 
coloniser finds himself in an ambiguous position. Never totally convinced of his legitimacy, 
aware of being an usurper, he has to create an identity for himself that justifies this position. 
"One attempt can be made by demonstrating the usurper's eminent merits, so eminent that they 
deserve such compensation. Another is to harp on the usurped's demerits, so deep that they 
cannot help leading to misfortune" (Memmi, 1965, pp. 52-53). He may go further, to wish the 
disappearance of the usurped, whose very existence causes him to take on the role of usurper. 
180 
But, paradoxically, the more he hurts them, the more he assumes the role of oppressor. The 
coloniser is progressively dehumanised by identifying himself with the colonialist apparatus 
(Sartre, 1965). 
This is where the knowledges of colonial science play an important role. Ultimately, 
only racism can save the coloniser from being confronted with the impossibility of his position. 
Colonial racism is built from three major ideological components: one, the gulf between 
the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences 
for the benefit of the colonialist; three, the use of these supposed differences as standards 
of absolute fact. (Memmi, 1965, p. 71) 
The colonial relationship "is what it is because they are what they are, and neither one nor the 
other will ever change" (Memmi, 1965, p. 72). The impossible situation of the coloniser who 
accepts, is a product of a pre-existing colonial system. A person who could have been a 
moderate democrat in the home country, "will surely be transformed into a conservative, 
reactionary, or even colonial fascist.... The colonial situation manufactures colonialists, just as 
it manufactures the colonized" (Memmi, 1965, pp. 55-56). 
If the coloniser r~jects the ideology of colonialism, he finds himself in a contradiction 
because he daily profits from those privileges he denounces. If he speaks out, he is rejected as a 
traitor by his own people. He then turns towards the colonised. "Refusing the colonizers, 
damned by them: let him adopt the colonized people and be adopted by them; let him become a 
turncoat" (Memmi, 1965, p. 72). However, he finds that he is not one of them and has no real 
desire to be. "He has another civilization before him, customs differing from his own, men 
whose reactions often surprise him, with whom he does not feel deep affinity" (Memmi, 1964, p. 
24 ). In addition, his liberal political beliefs are challenged by the fierce nationalism of the 
colonised, which excludes him. He becomes "unbearably embarrassed" in the face of terrorism 
and political assassination, and tries to rationalise these. "He can't approve acts of the colonized 
which he condemns in the colonizers because these are exactly why he condemns colonization" 
(Memmi, 1965, p. 31 ). He discovers that the nationalism of the oppressed has a strong religious 
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(Islamic) element, and that he may have no place in the new order. His role collapses, leading 
to withdrawal and, ultimately, silence. Memmi explains this in terms of the colonial system: 
Colonial relations do not stem from individual good will or actions; they exist before his 
arrival or his birth, and whether he accepts or rejects them matters little. It is they, on 
the contrary which, like any institution, determine a priori his place and that of the 
colonized and, in the final analysis, their true relationship.... He shares a collective 
responsibility by the fact of membership in a national oppressor group. Being oppressed 
as a group, the colonized must necessarily adopt a national and ethnic form of liberation 
from which he cannot but be excluded. (Memmi, 1965, pp. 38-39) 
The In-betweens 
The colonial system consists of a hierarchy where, between the coloniser and the 
colonised, exist other nationals, candidates for assimilation, the recently assimilated as well as 
the representatives of the authorities recruited among the Muslim themselves: The Jew "found 
himself one small notch above the Moslem on the pyramid which is the basis of all colonial 
societies" (Memmi, 1965, p. xiv). He identified both with the French and the Muslims, leading 
to a profound ambivalence. 
The recently assimilated in-betweens often place themselves in an even more superior 
position towards the colonised than the coloniser himself 
They push a colonial mentality to excess, display proud disdain for the colonized and 
continually show off their borrowed rank.... Such is the history of the pyramid of petty 
tyrants: each one, being socially oppressed by one more powerful than he, always finds a 
less powerful one on whom to lean, and becomes a tyrant in his tum. (Memmi, 1965, pp. 
16-17) 
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Portrait of the Colonised 
The colonised suffers deprivations that are primarily economic but also social and 
personal, by being defined as inferior. He both hates the colonisers and admires them 
passionately. He internalises the mythical portrait of the colonised created by colonial discourse 
and tends to view himself as part of a unanimous group, removed from its own history; as part 
of a community denied of growth and vitality. There are two possible reactions, tried in 
succession or simultaneously: Assimilation in order to become different from the myth, or an 
attempt to reconquer indigenous values that are denied under colonialism (Memmi, 1965). 
Initially, the colonised fall back on traditional values and religion. These, though 
providing a refuge and identity, are ineffective in dealing with colonial realities because they do 
not carry power within the structure of the colonial world. "All effectiveness and social 
dynamics ... seem monopolized by the colonizer's institutions" (Memmi, 1965, p. 103). The local 
culture becomes petrified and static, encased in colonialism. "As long as he tolerates 
colonization, the only possible alternatives for the colonized are assimilation or petrification" 
(Memmi, 1965, p. 102). The colonised who chooses assimilation, usually through education, 
finds himself in an alienated world that excludes his own culture and language, and is still 
refused entry into the adopted culture. By adopting its values, he paradoxically has to condemn 
himself, which he may try to do by hiding his past, traditions, and origins. However, he also has 
to defend these. Ultimately, assimilation is impossible. 
Revolt is the only way out of the colonial situation, and the colonized realizes it sooner 
or later. His condition is absolute and cries for an absolute solution; a break and not a 
compromise. He has been tom away from his past and cut off from his future, his 
traditions are dying and he loses the hope of acquiring a new culture.... He possesses 
nothing, is no longer anything and no longer hopes for anything.... How can he emerge 
from this increasingly explosive circle except by rupture, explosion? The colonial 
situation, by its own internal inevitability, brings on revolt. For the colonial condition 
cannot be adjusted to; like an iron collar, it can only be broken. (Memmi, 1965, pp. 
127-8) 
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The coloniser is actively rejected on his own terms. "The colonized fights in the name of 
the very values of the colonizer, uses his techniques of thought and his methods of combat. It 
must be added that this is the only language that the colonizer understands" (Memmi, 1965, p. 
129). Enter the colonised's defensive racism and xenophobia, as well as the Other image - now 
proclaimed and glorified. "Suddenly, exactly to the reverse of the colonialist accusation, the 
colonized, his culture, his country, everything that belongs to him, everything he represents, 
become perfectly positive elements" (Memmi, 1965, p. 138). Even the terms of revolt are 
profoundly enmeshed in the colonial situation. "In the midst of revolt, the colonized continues 
to think, feel and live against and, therefore, in relation to the colonizer and colonization" 
(Memmi, 1965, p. 139). 
Like Fanon, Memmi calls for a transcendence of the colonial situation: 
Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts men, 
both colonizers and colonized. To live, the colonized needs to do away with 
colonization. To become a man, he must do away with the colonized being that he has 
become. If the European must annihilate the colonizer within himself, the colonized 
must rise above his colonized being. (Memmi, 1965, p. 151) 
Fanon's Manichean Psychology 
Fanon's view of colonialism largely confirms that ofMemmi, but extends into an explicit 
theoretical psychological critique. It further exposes the destructive effects of European 
power/knowledge and challenges its epistemes and technologies of power, paradoxically while 
being caught up in these same power/knowledges. 
A central problem in his work is: How to transcend the dualisms created by the 
Manichean world of colonialism. For Fanon (1967a), man is rooted at the core of a "Manichean 
world .... from which he must be extricated" (p. 8) and has to " ... give up projecting on to the 
world an antinomy that coexists with him" (p. 8). This antinomy is described from three 
overlapping angles in his work: White/black (racism), the coloniser/colonised (colonialism), 
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and the oppressor/oppressed (oppression). Like a hologram, these dualisms repeat themselves 
on the level of communities, societies, groups, and individuals. The Manichean world is 
reflected and mirrored within society and manifests itself in intrapsychic conflicts. This world 
is rooted in colonial history and entails a mutual influencing process between the races that is 
described as follows: "White and black represent the two poles of a world, two poles of 
perpetual conflict: a genuinely Manichean concept of the world" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 33). Not 
only Fanon's theories but also his actions were directed towards extricating himself, and 
humanity, from these dualisms, and towards exposing their alienating and violent effects 
(Bakker, 1993). 
Black Skin White Masks 
Fanon's central argument, like that ofMemmi, is that colonialism leaves nothing 
untouched. The imposition of the colonising culture leads to an inferiority complex in the 
colonised, which, historically, has an economical dimension: "One is white above a certain 
financial level" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 32). Efforts at overcoming this predicament result in an 
"arsenal of complexes" (p. 23) and "psychic alienation" (p. 36): 
The Negro enslaved by his inferiority, the white man enslaved by his superiority alike 
behave in accordance with a neurotic orientation. Therefore I have been led to consider 
their alienation in terms of psychoanalytical classifications. The Negro's behaviour 
makes him akin to an obsessive neurotic type, or, if one prefers, he puts himself into a 
complete situational neurosis. In the man of colour there is a constant effort to run away 
from his own individuality, to annihilate his own presence. Whenever a man of colour 
protests, there is alienation. Whenever a man of colour rebukes, there is alienation. 
(Fanon, 1967a,p.44) 
Inferiority leads to overcompensation (Fanon, 1967a), by adopting the culture and values 
of the coloniser - assuming a white mask: "The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in 
proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards" (p. 14). The result is a 
social hierarchy, like that described by Memmi, ranging from black to white. This cultural 
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imposition and resultant social hierarchy are intimately related to the Manichean world of racial 
perceptions: 
The white man is sealed in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness.... There is a 
fact: white men consider themselves superior to black men. There is another fact: black 
men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal 
value of their intellect. How do we extricate ourselves? (Fanon, 1967a, p. 9) 
The colonised "becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 14 ). 
The white mask is assumed, firstly, through acquiring the language of the coloniser, for "to 
speak means ... above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization.... The 
Negro of the Antilles will be proportionally whiter - that is, he will come closer to being a real 
human being- in direct relation to his mastery of the French language" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 13). 
This attempt is ultimately unsuccessful as it alienates him from his own culture. Authentic 
relations become impossible. This manifests itself on all levels of social interaction, including 
the relationship between the sexes, so that Martiniquans customarily "dream of a form of 
salvation that consists of turning magically white" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 33). One way of obtaining 
that salvation, a second form of white mask, is to fall in love with the "whiteness" of men and 
women whiter than themselves. A third is through education. However, the educated black may 
receive at best a paternalistic acceptance and remains caught in the paradox of a dualistic world. 
The white mask hides an anger, for ultimately the black is confronted by an "indifference, this 
automatic manner of classifying him, imprisoning him, primitivizing him, decivilizing him, that 
makes him angry" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 24). 
Colonial Neurosis 
Fanon (1967a) investigates the extent to which psychoanalytic theory can be applied to 
understand colonial society as a situation where the colonised necessarily has to exhibit 
"neurotic" and alienated behaviour. In non-colonial societies, the root of pathology may usually 
be traced to the family environment. However,"- and this is a most important point - we 
observe the opposite in the man of colour. A normal Negro child, having grown up within a 
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normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world" (Fanon, 
1967a, pp. 101-102). The Negro child learns from an early age to identify with and to share the 
symbols of the white world, where 
the Wolf, the Devil, the Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, the Savage are always symbolized by 
Negroes or Indians; since there is always identification with the victor, the little Negro, 
quite as easily as the little white boy, becomes an explorer, an adventurer, a missionary 
"who faces the danger of being eaten by the wicked Negroes". (Fanon, 1967a, p. 103) 
During socialisation, the black child comes to view the Negro not only as inferior, but as the 
personification of the id. This may later lead to various forms of conflict. The child may have 
to choose between European society and its "black and savage" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 106) family. 
Alternatively, he may view himself and his family as essentially "white", but upon contact with 
Europeans, find himself perceived as a symbol of darkness. The black's feeling of inferiority is 
conscious: "In him there is none of the affective amnesia characteristic of the typical neurotic" 
(Fanon, 1967a, p. 107). When faced with the white world, the Negro undergoes a sensitising 
action: "If his psychic structure is weak, one observes a collapse of the ego. The black man 
stops behaving as an actional person. The goal of his behaviour will be The Other (in the guise 
of the white man), for The Other alone can give him worth" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 109). 
Fanon (1967a) stresses that this situation arises in a colonial culture where the only view 
of the world is white and where no "black voice" yet exists. Here the collective unconscious 
contains the archetype of "the uncivilized savage, the Negro who slumbers in every white man" 
(1967a, p. 133). Fanon criticises Jung for assuming that the collective unconscious is racially 
determined: "Jung locates the collective unconscious in the inherited cerebral matter. But the 
collective unconscious, without having to fall back on the genes, is purely and simply the sum of 
prejudices, myths, collective attitudes of a given group" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 133). The collective 
unconscious is culturally acquired, and in the case of the Negro, it is "the result of what I shall 
call the unreflected imposition of a culture" (Fanon, 1967a, p. 135). Any black growing up in a 
colonial country, will acquire this collective unconscious. 
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It is nonnal for the Antillean to be anti-Negro. Through the collective unconscious the 
Antillean has taken over all the archetypes belonging to the European. The anima of the 
Antillean Negro is almost always a white woman. In the same way, the animus of the 
Antilleans is always a white man. (Fanon, 1967a, pp. 136-137) 
Fanon (1967a) criticises Jung for omitting blacks from his psychology: "This is where Jung was 
an innovator: he wanted to go back to the childhood of the world, but he made a remarkable 
mistake: he went back only to the childhood of Europe" (p. 134). 
Fanon (1967a) also utilises aspects of Adlerian psychology in his analysis. Due to the 
inferiority that the Negro feels historically, he is characterised by a desire to dominate the other, 
to overcompensate. 
The Negro is comparison ... he is constantly preoccupied with self-evaluation and with 
the ego-ideal. Whenever he comes into contact with someone else, the question of 
value, of merit, arises. The Antilleans have no inherent values of their own, they are 
always contingent on the presence of the Other. (p. 149) 
According to Adlerian individual psychology, all Antilleans are neurotic. This is where Fanon 
(1967a) departs from Adler: 
It is not just this or that Antillean who embodies the neurotic fonnation, but all 
Antilleans. Antillean society is a neurotic society, a society of "comparison". Hence we 
are driven from the individual back to the social structure. If there is a taint, it lies not in 
the "soul" of the individual but rather in that of the environment. (p. 151) 
Fanon (1967a) finally considers a Hegelian resolution to this ambiguous position. Both 
blacks and whites have to transcend their history, for both are slaves to their respective pasts. A 
transcendence of the past implies a transcendence of the black/white dualism: 
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The Negro is not. Any more than the white man. Both must tum their backs on the 
inhuman voices which were those of their respective ancestors in order that authentic 
communication be possible.... Superiority? Inferiority? Why not quite simply attempt 
to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself? (p. 165) 
Black Identity 
Fanon's (1967a, chap. 5) essay The fact of blackness is a subjective exploration of the 
problem of black identity, which is rooted in the black man's contact with the white world. As 
long as he is among the frame of reference of his own people, the "problem of being black" (p. 
77) remains something to be understood intellectually; to be protested against. However, the 
black man cannot just be black, "he must be black in relation to the white man" (p. 77). 
Fanon (1967a) exposes the effects of the intrusive gaze of western knowledge on its 
objects, by describing how he had to "meet the white man's eyes" (p. 78): "In the white world 
the man of colour encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily schema. 
Consciousness of the body is solely a negative activity. It is a third-person consciousness" (p. 
78). He finds himself but an object in the midst of other objects. He is an object imbued with 
certain characteristics by the white man 
who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories. I thought that what I 
had in hand was to construct a physiological self, to balance space, to localize 
sensations, and here I was called on for more .... 
"Look, a Negro!" It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made 
a tight smile. "Look, a Negro!" It was true. It amused me. "Look, a Negro!" The circle 
was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my amusement. "Mama, see the Negro! 
I'm frightened!" .... I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter had become 
impossible. (Fanon, 1967a, p. 79) 
Fanon (1967a) contrasts this position to that of the Jew, who can go undetected despite racial 
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stereotypes; ultimately he is known through his acts. "He belongs to the race of those who since 
the beginning of time have never known cannibalism" (p. 82). In contrast, the black man cannot 
go unnoticed. 
I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not to the "idea" that others have of 
me but of my own appearance.... I am being dissected by white eyes, the only real eyes. 
I am fixed .... I slip into comers, I remain silent, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. 
(p. 82) 
The eyes of the white man are "objective", cutting away "slices of his humanity" (Fanon, 19671, 
p. 82). The white man has a "shameful science" (p. 85) with which he discovers racially-linked 
characteristics: "He went through my pockets. He thrust probes into the least circumvolution of 
my brain. Everywhere he found only the obvious" (p. 91). Fanon is expressing the effect of 
otherness created by the "objective" gaze of colonial biological science. 
The Negro comes to his own defense. First, through reason. "As a good tactician, I 
intended to rationalize the world and to show the white man that he was mistaken" (Fanon, 
1967a, p. 84). However, his intellectual probings are answered with the "unreason" (p. 84) of 
colour prejudice, expressed in the "reason" of race science. Finally, since "no agreement was 
possible on the level of reason, I threw myself back towards unreason .... I had chosen the 
method ofregression" (p. 87). He reads Senghor and Cesaire (a former teacher of his) and finds 
a new weapon: "Had I read that right? I read it again with redoubled attention. From the 
opposite end of the white world a magical Negro culture was hailing me. Negro sculpture! I 
began to flush with pride. Was this our salvation?" (p. 87). The irony in the passage is not 
coincidental, for it is a black Frenchman speaking. The new weapon, Negritude, is an 
unfamiliar one. On the one hand, it offers a positive interpretation of his difference: "The white 
man was wrong, I was not a primitive, not even a half-man, I belonged to a race that had already 
been working in silver and gold two thousand years ago" (p. 92). Negritude becomes a weapon 
of self-assertion: "I put the white man back into his place; growing bolder, I jostled him and 
told him point-blank, 'Get used to me, I am not getting used to anyone'" (p. 93). On the other 
hand, the educated Martiniquan cannot avoid mistrusting Negritude: 
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From every direction I am assaulted by the obscenity of dances and of words.... Black 
magic, primitive mentality, animism, animal eroticism, it all floods over me. All of it is 
typical of peoples that have not kept pace with the evolution of the human race. Or, if 
one prefers, this is humanity at its lowest. (Fanon, 1967a, p. 89) 
His ambivalent flight into Negritude finally proves unsatisfactory when the white man reacts in 
patronising, though rational manner, to the claims of Negritude: 
In a society such as ours, industrialized to the highest degree, dominated by scientism, 
there is no longer room for your sensitivity .... Oh certainly, now and then when we are 
worn out by our lives in big buildings, we will tum to you as we do to our children - to 
the innocent, the ingenuous, the spontaneous ... the childhood of the world. (Fanon, 
1967a,p.93) 
The essay concludes on the following note: "Without a Negro past, without a Negro 
future, it was impossible for me to live my Negrohood. Not yet white, no longer wholly black, I 
was damned" (Fanon, l 967a, pp. 98-99). The Manichean world has allowed no escape. The 
essay clearly portrays its experiential effects. 
Pathologies of Liberty 
Fanon's clinical articles are concerned with the central question of the relationship 
between the individual and the colonial social environment. He severely criticised the French 
medical system's inability to deal with the apparent psychosomatic problems of North African 
migrants, due to a disregard of cultural, economical, and situational factors (Fanon, 1967d). As 
head of a mental hospital in Algeria, he later defined psychopathology as a pathology of liberty, 
reflecting a gradual realisation that the colonial situation was, as such, pathogenic, creating a 
situation where the freedom of the colonised was curtailed (Dequeker et al., 1955). 
This theme was further explored in his critique of ethnopsychiatry. Fanon and Sanchez 
(1956) refute a belief that was widely and scornfully held amongst psychiatrists in Algeria, that 
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Muslims venerate all their mentally ill. Their article is an illustration of the principle of cultural 
relativity and contrasts western attitudes to mental illness with those of Muslims. They criticise 
the insensitivity of western doctors in denying the existence of a coherent system of values in 
the Muslim community. One consequence of such a denial is ineffective treatment methods. 
Attempts to apply European diagnostic and therapeutic techniques to Muslim patients often 
proved futile. Muslim women reacted with confusion and inarticulation when faced with the 
Thematic Apperception Test. Fanon and Geronimi (1956) conclude that "there is no 
homogeneity between what we are presenting to the sick person, and what she knows" (p. 368). 
Similar discoveries of cultural non-recognition were made when Fanon and Azoulay ( 1954) 
attempted to apply a sociotherapeutic approach in a ward of Muslim men and failed. Many 
Europeans would have ascribed this to the "constitutional laziness" of Muslims. Fanon and 
Azoulay, however, ascribe the failure of the programme to cultural insensitivity due to the 
French assimilationist policy. 
In his later writings Fanon (1967b, 1967c, 1967f, 1973b) focuses more directly on the 
causative role of the colonial system in psychopathology and criminality. Exposed to poverty 
and a breakdown in traditional social and cultural structures, the native becomes especially 
sensitive to mental illness. 
In the period of colonization when it is not contested by armed resistance, when the sum 
total of harmful stimuli overstep a certain threshold, the defensive attitudes of the natives 
give way and they then find themselves crowding the mental hospitals. There is thus 
during this calm period of successful colonization a regular and important mental 
pathology which is the direct product of oppression. (Fanon, 1973b, p. 201) 
Within the colonial world, the mental hospital becomes an extension of the oppressive 
system and serves as an instrument of social control. The native is "cured" when he is reinstated 
into colonial society as part of the "social background" (1973b, p. 200). In his letter of 
resignation before joining the liberation forces, Fanon (l 967c) states the logical conclusion of 
his argument; a counterargument to the close association between madness and the Other 
developed by colonial discourse: 
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Madness is one of the means man has of losing his freedom. And I can say, on the basis 
of what I have been able to observe from this point of vantage, that the degree of 
alienation of the inhabitants of this country appears to me to be frightening.... If 
psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be a stranger to 
his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his 
own country, lives in a state of absolute depersonalization. (p. 53) 
In the same way that mental institutions become instruments of oppression, western 
science often serves the interest of the oppressors. Fanon ( 1973b) launched an attack against 
ethnopsychiatric research which "proved" biological limitations of Africans, making them 
inherently lazy, violent and inclined to criminality. The laziness of the Algerian (prior to the 
war ofliberation) was one of the only weapons enabling him to "sabotage the colonial machine" 
(Fanon, 1973b, p. 238). It is the "concrete manifestation of non-cooperation, or at least of 
minimum cooperation" (p. 238). His attitude towards the oppressor's laws and other aspects of 
colonial rule is similarly passive resistant. The high incidence of crime amongst the oppressed 
is the outcome of economic oppression and the destruction of the social and cultural values of 
the oppressed: 
Under the colonial regime, anything may be done for a loaf of bread or a miserable 
sheep.... For a colonized man, in a contest [sic] of oppression like that of Algeria, living 
does not mean embodying moral values or taking his place in the coherent and fruitful 
development of the world. To live means to keep on existing. (Fanon, 1973b, p. 249) 
The aggression towards the coloniser is redirected towards the fellow-colonised. 
The Algerian, exposed to temptations to commit murder every day - famine, eviction 
from his room because he has not paid the rent, the mother's dried-up breasts, children 
like skeletons, the building-yard which has closed down, the unemployed that hang 
around the foreman like crows - the native comes to see his neighbour as a relentless 
enemy. (Fanon, 1973b, p. 248) 
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In Fanon's clinical writings both the mental patient and the oppressed are alienated from 
themselves and society. His sociotherapeutic approach assumes that therapy entails 
disalienation, liberation, and reintegration into a social structure. Similarly, the oppressed will 
become disalienated to the extent that they can create new social structures through the struggle 
for liberation. The paradoxes of assimilation and Negritude can only be transcended through a 
growing political awareness (Fanon, 1973b). Within the North African context at the time, the 
only path to liberation was through war. Fanon not only joined this war, but analysed its 
psychological effects. 
Decolonisation and Liberation 
Fanon (1967t) argues that through the war ofliberation, "the Algerian has brought into 
existence a new, positive, efficient personality" (p. 102), replacing the alienated, guiltridden, 
inferior victim of colonialism. This personality is both the product of the growth of the 
liberation movement and a precondition for it: 
An authentic national liberation exists only to the precise degree to which the individual 
has irreversibly begun his own liberation. It is not possible to take one's distance with 
respect to colonialism without at the same time taking it with respect to the idea that the 
colonized holds of himself through the filter of colonialist culture. (Fanon, l 967f, p. 
103) 
Psychological, cultural, and political renewal go hand in hand. Fanon ( l 967b) tells of a 
"new kind of Algerian man" (p. 18), who has added a "new dimension to his existence" (p. 18) 
through the struggle for liberation. This new dimension includes new attitudes toward 
previously scorned aspects of western technology, as well as new attitudes and behaviour within 
the traditional Arab cultural customs. The rigid dichotomy between Arab and western cultures 
that had existed before the war was breaking down. Before decolonisation, western technology 
and knowledge were viewed with suspicion and rejected. 
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The colonial situation is precisely such that it drives the colonized to appraise all the 
colonizer's contributions in a pejorative and absolute way. The colonized perceives the 
doctor, the engineer, the schoolteacher, the policeman, the rural constable, through a 
haze of almost organic confusion. (Fanon, 1967b, p. 102) 
Fanon (1967b) blames colonialism for this confusion. Western experts were also colonisers, and 
even educated Africans were implicitly aligned with the colonisers. "Science depoliticized, 
science in the service of man, is often non-existent in the colonies" (p. 121 ). Resistance to 
western science and technology was not caused by an inherent flaw in the native: "The notions 
about 'native psychology' or of the 'basic personality' are shown to be vain. The people who take 
their destiny in their own hands assimilate the most modem forms of technology at an 
extraordinary rate" (Fanon, 1967b, p. 126). 
However, decolonisation is "always a violent phenomenon" (Fanon, 1973b, p.27), simply 
because colonialism is always a violent phenomenon. Decolonisation is only possible through a 
dialectical process where the violence of the coloniser is opposed by the violence of the 
colonised. The result is the destruction of the colonial system and its values, which is a 
prerequisite for the emergence of a new society and a new humanity. The destruction of this 
world occurs within Manichean constructs. The peasant who initiates the violent struggle does 
not think objectively, for experience has taught him that "objectivity is always directed against 
him" (Fanon, 1973b, p. 61). He thinks in absolute terms: "The last shall be first and the first 
last" (Fanon, 1973b, p. 28). The Manichean world imposed by the settler through violent means 
is returned to him through violent means: "To the saying 'All natives are the same' the colonized 
person replies 'All settlers are the same' .... To the theory of the 'absolute evil of the native' the 
theory of the 'absolute evil of the settler' replies" (Fanon, 1973b, pp. 72-73). A cycle of violence 
results. 
By claiming the violence which had previously ruled over them, the natives actively 
create their own history. "Violence is thus seen as comparable to a royal pardon. The colonized 
man finds his freedom in and through violence" (Fanon, 1973b, pp. 67-68). Fanon goes as far as 
saying that violence is "a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and 
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from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect" (pp.73-74). 
However, Fanon does not imply that violence is not a destructive process. He elaborates on both 
the physical and psychological trauma it inflicts (Fanon, 1973a) and blames colonialism for the 
existence of this suffering - the war being a natural outcome of it. Nor does he assume the 
automatic replacement of colonialism with a Utopia. In fact, he warns at length against the ills 
befalling recently liberated African states, including neocolonialism, racism, religious 
discrimination, autocratic rule, and other forms of oppression (Fanon, l 973b, chap. 3 ). 
Fanon (1973b) concludes his last book with an urgent appeal to the Third World to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of Europe. He admits that European thought had contained many 
solutions to the great problems of humanity. However, Europeans' theories of humanity and 
spiritual values, were not matched by their actions: "When I search for Man in the technique 
and style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders .... 
Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual disintegration" (Fanon, l 973b, p. 
252). The "false humanism" of Europe has to be replaced by a newly invented, unique 
humanism, to be created in the future. 
In Fanon's earlier writings, Manicheanism could only be overcome by a humanistic 
transcendence in internal consciousness. His later writings imply that change is only possible 
through the violent overthrow of the colonial system. This contention mirrored the extent of 
Manicheanism in the Algerian context at the time: In a totally dualistic world, it is not possible 
to remain neutral. Fanon ultimately fails to transcend this world, while exposing the violence 
inherent in its processes of power/knowledge (Bakker, 1993). Like Memmi (1965), he shows 
how liberation was formed out of the same epistemic clay as oppression. 
Conclusion 
Nonwestern peoples have an objective existence in the world and, happily, they impose 
themselves increasingly on our narratives, affecting their substance, disrupting their 
harmony, and refusing to acknowledge their self-appointed sovereignty. In the 
postmodern age, the empire strikes back. (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 38) 
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The unsettling knowledges of resistance depicted in this chapter may have us not only agree 
with these statements but also question them. Who are today's "nonwestem peoples"? Is the 
African intelligentsia nonwestem? To whom belong "our knowledges"? African knowledges of 
resistance have provided certain conditions of possibility for these ambiguities to emerge. The 
fixed grids and hierarchies of the Enlightenment have been replaced by shifting and ambiguous 
meanings, a reflection of "a process in which signifiers were set afloat, fought over, and 
recaptured on both sides of the colonial encounter" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991, p. 18). 
Though clearly locatable within the dominant western post-enlightenment discourse 
(Irele, 1983; Mudimbe, 1988), African narratives of resistance have contributed to a growing 
chorus of voices of marginal Others who have unsettled the core of modem power/knowledge 
(Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha & West, 1990; T. A. Parry, 1993). They have posed deconstructive 
and reconstructive challenges to the dominant view of what is human, displacing the 
Eurocentric notion of "civilised man" by expanding its denotative ranges and/or by redefining 
this notion (Outlaw, 1990), thereby challenging the dominant Eurocentric narratives which have 
guided not only philosophy but also psychology. Lyotard's (1983) thesis that the two great 
narratives of emancipation and Enlightenment have lost their legitimising power and are 
increasingly being replaced by smaller, local narratives is born out by these observations. Said 
(1989) extends Lyotard's thesis to a historical context that includes both Europe and its colonies. 
Such a view exposes the crisis of modernism as being not only the result of the demands of 
various European Others to be taken seriously, but also of the emerging counter-narratives of 
liberation of colonised Others. African counter-narratives reveal the western narratives of 
Enlightenment and emancipation as "so much windy hypocrisy" (Said, 1989, p. 224), demand an 
abandonment of fixed ideas of settled cultural identities, and present Others not as ontologically 
given but as historically constituted. They unite the western and non-western worlds into a 
plural destiny for mankind, erode exclusivist biases, and "provide us with new narrative forms 
or ... with ~ ways of telling" (p. 225). 
However, the recent resurgence of narratives of emancipation and Enlightenment in the 
African context in the form of a new scientism, may also cast doubt upon Said's reinterpretation 
ofLyotard's thesis of the demise of the grand narratives. Said (1993) admits that colonial 
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resistance was often cast in the form of European narratives of emancipation. The question 
remains whether these counter-narratives challenge some of the most pervasive mythologies 
created by the dominant knowledge. They leave virtually intact the Modem episteme and 
especially its technologies of power. As such they do not challenge the dangers inherent in this 
episteme (Irele, 1986), but employ them in the service of what may become new forms of 
imperialism. 
The dominant psychology emerging from African resistance is a modem psychology. Its 
key words, including Negritude, black personality, alienation, and liberation, all hail from the 
centrality of the individual as historical actor (Mudimbe, 1994). This psychology of resistance 
searches for a value-free science that has rid itself of ideologies or struggles to replace one 
ideology with another; it romanticises and reifies, but also at times ignores culture; it is 
pervaded with the hermeneutics of suspicion of Marxist and psychoanalytic thought; it draws on 
modem western metanarratives of legitimation, though it also attempts to replace these with 
new metanarratives; it reifies the subject and the notion of the individual self, construes new 
forms of normalisation, and by implication new Others. 
Similarly, the dominant views of power embodied in these knowledges reflect a myth of 
the Modem age: That power is a monolithic, oppressive force, seated in governments and 
political systems, and speaking in ideologies. From this perspective, it follows that psychology 
is an oppressive force; an extension of this political power. Liberation is construed in terms of 
the unmasking of ideologies, political action, practices of self-formation, liberation from 
repression, and violence. Such views of power and liberation fit neatly into the colonial world 
and have effectively challenged its visibly oppressive powers. These views of power may, 
however, be ineffectual in resisting its more insidious manifestations and the hegemony of its 
knowledge, and in preventing its metamorphosis into new forms. Epistemological imperialism 
is alive and well, not only in psychology (MacGaffey, 1981; Mudimbe, 1988; Said, 1993; 
Serequeberhan, 1991 ), and African intellectuals are continually invited to sacrifice their power 
on the altars of the dogmas and doctrines of either traditionalism or liberation ideologies (Sono, 
1994). 
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The dominant African discourse of resistance has emerged from "the margins of African 
contexts ... its axes as well as its language have been limited by the authority of this exteriority" 
(Mudimbe, 1988, p. 176). Mudimbe (1994) draws our attention to the its "unconscious" (p. xiv) 
- the primary, popular, local discourses of African peoples that have been silenced, converted, or 
translated by conquering western discourses. At the centre of efforts to liberate them, the mute 
remain largely mute. 
The knowledges of resistance depicted in this chapter have served and may continue to 
serve as a liberatory force in psychology. However, they have fought ideologies while serving 
hegemonies. The final chapter searches for further avenues of liberation through a 
reconsideration of power/knowledge, liberation, and psychology. 
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CHAPTER7 
TOWARDS A LIBERATED PSYCHOLOGY IN AFRICA 
Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just 
others, that we ourselves are an "other" among 
others. (Ricoeur, cited in Mudimbe, 1988, p. 21) 
The archaeology that was presented in the preceding pages speaks for itself. Each reader 
will draw from this archaeology different connections to the current situation of psychology in 
Africa. This is but one of many potential archaeologies of psychological knowledge in Africa. 
If it has served as a point of departure for the reader to construe further archaeologies and/or to 
construe his or her own narrative of liberation upon its field of emergence, it has served its 
purpose. 
This chapter presents some of the author's personal reflections on liberation and 
psychology in Africa. It does not draw final conclusions, nor does it "impose regularities under 
the pretence of discovering truth. That great game is finished" (Cooper, 1981, p. 61). It 
attempts, instead, to present possible points of departure for further exploration, which could 
lead to further conversations and the construal of alternative narratives of relevance. The 
chapter includes some tentative observations on the present field of power/knowledge in Africa, 
comments on the relevance of psychology in terms of these observations, reconsiders liberation 
in terms of power/knowledge, and offers a number of pointers toward further exploration. 
The Gods of Africa 
The various archaeological strata of power/knowledge depicted in this study may be 
viewed as currently co-existing in continually evolving and various forms over unequally 
dispersed fields in Africa. In many respects, Africa is still poised between a-modem and 
modem power/knowledges, while having contributed to the demise of modernism (Said, 1989). 
Mazrui (1986) describes the current African landscape as a battlefield of the gods of Africa, who 
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have both religious and secular faces. The most universally present is the indigenous legacy, 
followed by a deeply rooted Islam, an indigenised Christianity, and "less deeply but still widely 
distributed is the western tradition, discernible among at least the elites ... but with a 
trickle-down effect on other strata of African populations" (Mazrui, 1986, p. 34). The battle 
between Africa's gods has scarred its landscape: 
The euphoria of the early years of independence has been replaced by the agonies of 
failure. Political instability is widespread, food production has declined, numbers of 
refugees are expanding.... The old revolution of rising expectations has indeed been 
replaced by a new revolution of deepening frustrations. (Mazrui, 1986, p. 49) 
African intellectuals are struggling to deal with these urgent concerns, mainly by 
searching for overarching ideologies and metanarratives to encompass the diversity of 
knowledges of Africa. As we have seen in the previous chapter, many have attempted to forge a 
synthesis between the African gods, but harmony is nowhere in sight at national or continental 
levels, although, locally, many Africans daily forge a workable unity between diverse 
power/knowledges. Hountondji (in Mudimbe, 1988) presents the African intellectual dilemma 
as follows: 
The problem ... as regards our attitude towards our collective heritage is how to respond 
to the challenge of cultural imperialism without imprisoning ourselves in an imaginary 
dialogue with Europe, how to re-evaluate our cultures without enslaving ourselves to 
them, how to restore the dignity of our past, without giving room to a passeistic attitude. 
(p. 174) 
The intellectual response has consistently fluctuated between metanarratives of 
reclamation and liberation, romanticism and scientism~ the central axes of modem knowledge. 
At present, the attempt to create myths which would give meaning to hopes of improvement, 
"seems to hesitate between two principle sources, Marxist and traditionalist, and to worry 
endlessly about the evidence about the superiority of the Same over the Other and possible 
virtues of the inverse relationship" (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 96). Liberation is increasingly sought in 
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the acquisition of technological power through science, though indigenous and religious 
knowledges continually undermine efforts at subjugation by the imposition of these and other 
developmental ideologies and overarching metanarratives of modern knowledge. 
Liberation remains a central concern in African thought. Intellectuals agree that colonial 
rule has been replaced by a new economic and academic imperialism by the West (Bulhan, 
1993a; Irele, 1986; Makinde, 1982; Mazrui, 1986). Academic and professional research and 
training remain heavily dependent on western models, traditions, culture, and finance (Awa, 
1986; Jansen, 1991; MacGaffey, 1981). The settler-colonial relation continues (Jansen, 1991; 
Makinde, 1982). As Serequeberhan (1991) points out, in a rather oversimplified way, 
contemporary Africa finds itself encased between two contradictory and complementary forms 
of estrangement: That of the westernised and non-westernised sections. 
In a paradoxical and distorted manner, these two segments of African society mimic and 
replicate the estranged and estranging violent dialectic of the colonizer and the colonized 
described so well by Albert Memmi. But in this case the roles of colonizer and 
colonized are played by the native, cast on both sides of this antagonistic relation, by 
reference to the culture of the former colonial power. Power or empowerment is thus a 
function of European culture which manifests itself in and legitimates the power of the 
neocolonial elites of postcolonial Africa. (Serequeberhan, 1991, p. 9) 
Paradoxically, the African intellectual elite also finds itself oppressed by some African 
political elites, as attested by the marginality in the power structure of certain African states of 
critical philosophy and social science departments (Mudimbe, 1988), furthering their 
dependence upon western academia. Many intellectuals are concerned with liberation from 
oppressive African regimes, who are viewed as replicating colonial relations with African 
peoples (Cesaire, 1959; Hountondji, 1983; Irele, 1986; Mphahlele, 1964; Mudimbe, 1988; 
Soyinka, 1967). In the words ofHountondji (1983): 
On the one side, there is force - a brute, blind, savage force, a direct heir to colonial 
violence - trying to dictate to the minds and hearts of all; on the other, there are the bare 
(/ 
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hands of men and women so exploited and mystified that they make themselves active 
accomplices of their executioners: this is as close as you can get to a true description of 
the real face of contemporary Africa. ( p. 170) 
According to Mazrui (1986), these oppressive powers are not only heir to colonial violence, but 
in certain cases strengthened by indigenous traditions in western guise. Ancient and modem 
forms of power (chapter 5) have fused: The patriarchal tradition has been reinforced by both 
Islam and Europe; the warrior tradition is now wearing a uniform; sages, marabouts, and kings 
have become western educated presidents. Allegiance to one's ancestral unit, now called 
ethnicity, has been, paradoxically, strengthened by the arbitrary and divisive boundaries imposed 
by colonialism and the new nation states. In some cases it has turned into ethnic nepotism; in 
others into a healthy resilience of the values of collective sharing and responsibility (Mazrui, 
1986). 
Such a fusion between different power/knowledges blurs the boundaries between the 
layers of African knowledges co-existing in the present. Mudimbe ( 1988) rejects the dominant 
binary discourse that opposes traditional versus modem, oral versus written, and agrarian versus 
industrialised communities. Although in Africa a great deal of attention is given to the 
evolution implied and promised by the passage from the former to the latter, Mudimbe (1988) 
argues that such a presupposed jump from one extremity (underdevelopment) to the other 
(development) is in fact misleading and that between the two extremes there is an intermediate, 
diffused space. 
It is in this diffused, marginal space that most Africans live. Today most are left mute 
within the dominant knowledge, and, like many people the world over, live in in-between 
worlds that cannot be classified into generalisations such as "western", "Islamic" or 
"indigenous". Africans are not passive recipients of knowledges; they are active participants in 
creating their cultural worlds, and consistency is a luxury that few can afford. While 
intellectuals are debating ideologies and politicians are nurturing nationalisms, Africans forge 
strategies of survival from diverse elements and "undo expectations of what survival in dire 
conditions is supposed to look like" (Simone, 1990, p. 163) by employing "millions of small 
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individual efforts operating without master schemes or abstractions" (p. 171 ). In a "multiplicity 
of expressions, cultural practices, and worldviews" (p. 165), they daily re-invent social networks 
and re-construct rituals and loyalties. 
While various African neo-colonial nationalisms are growing and transferred into 
"barriers ... frontiers, police forces, customs and exchange controls" (Said, 1993, p. 307), 
Davidson (in Said, 1993) points to the people's own solution to this "carapace accepted from the 
colonial period" (p. 308): 
What the peoples think upon this subject is shown by their incessant emigration across 
these lines on the map, as well as by their smuggling enterprises. So that even while a 
"bourgeois Africa" hardens its frontiers, multiplies its border controls, and thunders 
against the smuggling of persons and goods, a "peoples" Africa works in quite another 
way. (p. 308) 
Davidson (in Said, 1993) may be providing a metaphor regarding failed efforts at imposing 
overarching knowledge systems, ideologies or theories on African people, who keep escaping 
from these impositions by reverting to subjugated local knowledges, complex reworkings of the 
old and the new. "To be governed people must be counted, taxed, educated, and of course ruled 
in regulated places (house, school, hospital, work site) ... as Michel Foucault argued" (Said, 
1993, p. 327). It is exactly these forms of disciplinary control, and its technologies of power 
such as psychology, that Africa escapes from, through small daily strategies of survival which 
sometimes coalesce in large-scale mass movements, like the ones inaugurating South Africa's 
shift to democracy. The prize is the conservation of various forms of autonomy and competence 
(Le Roux, 1987) in the face of various forms of domination. The cost, however, is often dear. 
"All of this vicarious autonomy comes at an enormous price in terms of concrete indices of 
well-being. But on the level of the social body - its characteristics, desires, resiliences and 
productivity- a much more ambiguous picture emerges" (Simone, 1993, p. 83). 
The cost, in terms of indices of well-being, is what is perceived by western media and 
re-circulated into Africa (Awa, 1986; Said, 1993). In "today's electronic Colosseum", Africa and 
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the Third World remain spectacle; images of "Bacardi rum beaches" are coupled with those of 
starvation, famine, and bloodshed and of patronising aid from the West (Pieterse, 1992). Africa 
is increasingly viewed through the perspectives of pathology and/or therapy (Said, 1993) and 
situated within a language of risk (Le Roux, 1987). "Condemned to irrelevance, its substance is 
simply a surface on the television screen and in World Bank reports. We who watch fail to see 
life, fail to see what's at risk is not only bodies, but passions, wisdoms, resiliences, cosmologies, 
humours, assemblages and visions that survive the death of bodies" (Simone, 1993, p. 89). 
In contrast, the media image of the New South Africa now presented to the world, and 
Africa, projects a narrative of hope, a dream of a new Utopia of Enlightenment and liberation. 
Psychology has the potential to contribute its share to the discipline of this new order, emerging 
from another dream of a perfect society. As elsewhere in Africa, however, it has to contend 
with the gods of Africa in its struggle for relevance. 
Narratives of Relevance 
Psychology's response to the concerns of Africa is voice~ in its relevance debate, which 
reflects the dominant narratives of African discourse: Assimilation, reclamation, and liberation. 
Primarily, the relevance debate is an attempt at liberation from the role of oppressor, as well as 
from the role of oppressed, and thus part of the liberation narrative. It is simultaneously 
concerned with extending the domain of operation of psychology, which coincides with the 
assimilation narrative. It further embodies the reclamation narrative in its efforts to Africanise 
psychology. 
Like African philosophers, psychologists are searching for metanarratives, overarching 
ideologies, and syntheses between Africa's diverse knowledges. The relevance debate oscillates 
between the modem axes of romanticism and scientism. Writers like Bodibe (1994), Gobodo 
(1990), Holdstock (1981b), Laubscher and Mcneil (1995), Moghaddam (1987), and. Okonji 
(1975) tend towards the romantic side, by advocating the study and integration of African 
psychologies, worldviews, and philosophies into the main body of the field and drawing upon 
African metanarratives oflegitimation for psychology. Paradoxically, such an 
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ethnopsychological position is more eagerly sought out by the field of American Black 
psychology than anywhere in Africa (Houston, 1990; Jackson & Sears, 1992; Jones, 1980; 
Myers, 1993; Nobles, 1976; J. L. White, 1984). These authors have drawn parallels between 
recent ecosystemic thought, emerging postmodern trends, and an African worldview. Towards 
the scientist extreme are to be found the psychology of oppression (Bulhan, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 
1980c, 1985; Nicholas, 1993a, 1993b; Nicholas & Cooper, 1990) critical psychology (Dawes, 
1986; Ivey, 1986; R. Miller, 1989; Whittaker, 1991), and materialist psychology (Couve, 1986; 
Manganyi, 1991 ). These authors look towards narratives of liberation, prevailing scientific 
metanarratives, and modernisation to solve current problems. There are also various positions 
of in-betweenity on this continuum, including that of many African psychologists who find 
themselves stranded in a sterile middle-ground between their western training and the 
counterdemands oflocal contexts (Abdi, 1985; Boussat & Dupuy, 1975; Nsamenang, 1993). 
Like other African intellectuals, psychologists have described themselves as dependent 
on and legitimised by western institutions, marginal to political power, and culturally alienated 
from the society they attempt to serve. They even find themselves marginalised within the 
social sciences (Akin-Ogundeji, 1991). The central problem in this marginalisation appears to 
be one of legitimation, both by those who carry political and economic power, and those who 
are viewed as lacking in power. As technology of western secular power, psychology's power 
base remains outside Africa, while locally it competes with various indigenous psychologies. 
Lock (1981) defines "indigenous psychology" as 
the cultural views, theories, conjectures, classifications, assumptions and metaphors -
together with notions embedded in social institutions - which bear on psychological 
topics. These psychologies are statements about the nature of the person and his 
relations with the world. They contain advice and injunctions about the ways people 
should act, should feel, and how they can find happiness and success in life.... It can be 
contrasted with "specialist" psychologies, those developed by academic psychologists 
who favour scientific experiments, philosophers who favour abstract arguments and 
religious experts who develop esoteric understanding. (p. 4) 
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Lock's (1981) definition of indigenous psychologies is similar to what Bruner (1990) terms '"folk 
psychology', the culturally shaped notions in terms of which people organize their views of 
themselves, of others, and of the world in which they live" (p. 137), though Bruner's term is 
more encompassing. Among the westernised, modernised sections of Africa and the rest of the 
world, a large measure of congruence exists between the indigenous or folk psychologies of 
ordinary people and western "specialist" psychology, whose technologies of power have 
effectively swarmed into society. This dominant western psychology has, however, failed to 
colonise the folk psychologies of many ordinary people, who constitute themselves in terms of 
indigenous and/or religious knowledges. Their local, common-sense psychological notions are 
locally informed and validated by the "specialist" psychologies of indigenous, Christian, and 
Islamic religious experts, not western psychologists. As was illustrated in previous chapters, the 
"truth" of these knowledges is mostly validated in local narratives, not in the grand narratives of 
science. "In our society common-sense is born from 'science' but in traditional societies the 
inverse process is observable" (Lock, 1981, p. xi). The very notion of "modem science" is in 
itself a part of western common-sense ( Geertz, 1983 ). 
The marginality of psychologists, like that of other African intellectuals, may also be a 
source of power, offer avenues of escap~ from dominance and hegemony, and facilitate the 
crossing and re-crossing of boundaries and the charting of new territories (Said, 1993). 
However, to achieve the necessary legitimation from local contexts in order to proceed with this 
work, psychologists have to confront modem forms of power. In the previous chapter, we saw 
how the dominant narratives of liberation which inform psychology embody an implicit view of 
power as monarchic and juridical. This view of power has serious limitations in confronting 
modem forms of power, according to Foucault ( 1980a, 1980b ), who offers an alternative view of 
power, and by implication, of resistance and liberation, applicable to both psychologists and 
their subjects. 
Power/knowledge and Liberation 
Foucault (1980a) views power, like knowledge, as a field within which we exist. In the 
same way that a hegemonic field of knowledge is variously distributed, is produced in local 
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relations and engenders a variety of resistant knowledges at various points in its distribution 
(chapter 6), power exists by virtue of a myriad of active relations spread over the field of its 
operation. This field has no privileged centre, nor is it located within certain subjects or 
institutions. It exists as a process within relationships. 
Power's condition of possibility ... must not be sought in the primary existence of a 
central point. .. it is the moving substrate [sic] of force relations which, by virtue of their 
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and 
unstable.... Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength 
that we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society. (Foucault, 1980a, p. 93) 
Contrary to a Marxist view, power "is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared .... 
Power is exercised from innumerable points ... in the interplay of mobile relations" (Foucault, 
1980a, p. 94 ). Relations of power are imminent in other relationships such as economic 
processes, knowledge relationships and sexual relations. In contrast to Marx, Foucault (in 
Richer, 1992) locates oppression not within subjects, but between them. 
Analysis should take power as something that circulates. It is never localized here or 
there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as commodity or piece of wealth. 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. Individuals or classes 
are the vehicles of power, not its source. (p. 114) 
The question of the "who" of power relations is a deflection from the field where power 
operates. "Multiple fields of power dynamics - economic, scientific, religious, for example -
might temporarily form dominating cohesions, but those are rarely produced by the same bad 
guy at the top of the heap" (Richer, 1992, p. 114). Foucault's position de-centres the subject; 
makes it difficult to do witch hunts or create Manichean constructs of otherness and violence. It 
emphasises the responsibility of all in perpetuating different forms of power and stresses that 
analysis should not concern itself with the regulation and legitimation of a centralised power, 
but with "power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it 
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becomes capillary, that is, in its most regional and local forms and institutions" (Richer, 1992, p. 
114). 
Foucault (1984) questions the notion of ideology, because it "always stands in virtual 
opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth.... The second drawback is that 
the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject" (p. 
60). He further rejects the notion of power as being repressive. Power "forms knowledge, 
produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the 
whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression" 
(Foucault, l 980b, p. 119 ). A repressive view of power implies that it is dependent on a state 
apparatus. Although the state plays an important part in power relations, power relations extend 
beyond the state, which can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. 
The state is suprastructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the 
body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth. True, these 
networks stand in a conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of "metapower" 
which is structured ... around a certain number of great prohibition functions; but this 
metapower with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where its is 
rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations. (Foucault, 1984, p. 
64) 
What makes power a productive rather than a repressive force is its close affinity with 
knowledge. Political structures rely on the power of the currently available ensemble of 
discourses on truth to construct their policies. The regime of truth dictates to governments and 
subjects alike which discourses are acceptable and true (Foucault, 1984). Modem power 
functions as a "'political economy' of truth" (p. 73). Anonymous power, in terms oflanguage 
rules and pre-existing epistemic fields, determine what can be said and not said, thought and not 
thought. 
This leaves us with the question of liberation. If beheading the king has ceased to be a 
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solution, how do we liberate ourselves? Power fields are transfused with resistances (Foucault 
(1980a). 
The other side of power's pervasiveness is precisely the omnipresence of the resistance it 
discovers. No ruse of reason can guarantee ultimate triumph to the system of power that 
is at work and its adversaries are as scattered, as multiple and as heterogeneous as power 
itself. The opposition to power is the twin of its birth, an opposition that is constituted, 
with different intensities at various times.... Power cannot be considered a massive, 
irresistible force since so many within a specific society, so much within a particular 
individual have to cooperate for it to function. (Bemauer, 1981, p. 405) 
We can never be ensnared by power; we can always modify its grip, in the same way that we 
live within the dominant knowledge while rewriting its narratives. As knowledge is actively 
created within a dominant hegemony, the existence of a field of power depends upon local 
relations (Foucault, 1980a). 
Their is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or 
pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a 
special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent.... They are the odd term in 
relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.... Are there 
no great radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more 
often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance.... And it is doubtless 
the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes revolution possible. (p. 
96) 
For Foucault (1984), liberty is to be found in practice, not in some overarching ideology 
or theory. He is profoundly suspicious of claims to universal truths or universal theories of 
liberation. "There is nothing that is functionally - by its very nature - absolutely liberating. 
Liberty is practice" (Foucault, 1984, p. 239). One may initiate a project with the aim of 
modifying constraints, loosening or even breaking them, but no project can assure liberty 
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automatically. Consequently, there are no general rules for a general liberation. However, 
resistance is possible at a micro-political level and constituted through action appropriate to 
each specific context. 
Where does this leave psychology as "expert" knowledge? Foucault (1984) rejects the 
dominant model of the "universal intellectual" as conscience of mankind, such as the Marxist 
revolutionary. Instead Foucault (1984) envisions a "specific intellectual" (p. 68) who refrains 
from absolute truth claims or generalisations of claims to justice but who is deeply involved in 
mastering the specific power dynamics of the particular institution in which he labours. 
Foucault (1980b) criticises Marxists for identifying their position with a standpoint of 
sovereignty within a quest for the status of science: 
Which theoretical-political avant ~arde do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it 
from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it? .... You are 
investing Marxist discourses and those who uphold them with the effects of a power 
which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has reserved for those 
engaged in scientific discourse. (p. 85) 
It is the potential of such knowledge to suppress conflicting voices and lives, to exclude and 
normalise, that Foucault (in Rouse, 1994) saw as a major danger. In contrast, Foucault proposes 
the emancipation of knowledges from subjection to the hierarchical power of science, to render 
them " capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, 
formal, and scientific discourse" (Foucault, l 980b, p. 85). The danger in psychology is exactly 
its silencing of voices by the coercion of its attempts at a theoretical, unitary, and formal 
scientific discourse. 
The dissent of the intellectual derives from knowledge of the intricate manner in which 
the power of a specific, local context, operates; a knowledge that only a participant can have 
(Foucault, 1980b ). Such a participant can identify and give a voice to those who are oppressed 
by its power/knowledge, and can work to open a space for their dissent to be heard, rather than 
speaking for them. Another way of conceptualising this stance, is to describe it as the 
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excavation of the local knowledges that have been subjugated by the dominant knowledge of a 
specific context/institution. By subjugated knowledges, Foucault (1980b) refers to 
a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath 
the required level of cognition or scientificity. I also believe that it is through the 
re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges ... a popular knowledge ... a particular, 
local, regional knowledge ... that criticism performs its work. (p. 32) 
Such knowledge is not concerned with the vindication of ignorance or non-knowledge, or the 
opposition of romanticism with scientism, but rather with "the insurrection of knowledges that 
are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of 
the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised 
scientific discourse" (Foucault, 1980b, p. 84). 
Such a position contrasts with that of the radical humanist critique of psychology, which 
holds as its logical conclusion that the only way of producing a "non-oppressive" psychology is 
through the removal of state power - through changing the system (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, 
Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984). Such a psychology attempts to alleviate oppression by spurring 
people on to be conscious of themselves as active beings who bear responsibility for 
emancipatory action. It implies that intellectuals can transform the reality of the oppressed 
(Lather, 1992). However, such a position carries the danger that researchers with liberatory 
intentions impose meanings on situations, instead of constructing meaning through negotiation. 
The danger is to see oneself as a redeemer of social and political life (Lather, 1992). From a 
Foucauldian perspective, the desire to "understand" and "change", to predict or emancipate, may 
all be ways of disciplining the body, normalising behaviour, and administering the life of 
populations. All forms of knowledge define, categorise, and classify. The question is whether 
research subjects, or the oppressed that we want to liberate, share our norms and whether 
research practices can be viewed rather as inscriptions of legitimation than procedures that bring 
us closer to some truth (Lather, 1992). 
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From this point of view, as Henriques et al. (1984) have pointed out, psychology is not a 
monolithic force of oppression which constrains and enchains individuals. Rather, because of 
its insertion in modern social practices, it has helped to constitute the very form of modern 
individuality. As was put forth in chapter 5, psychology is productive of subjectivities as well as 
objects. "It is by producing explanations as well as identifying problems that psychology 
contributes to specific political positions" (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 1). Psychologists cannot 
escape their own constitutive power, they can only be constantly aware of how they are shaping 
action. If psychology remains only a dividing, normalising, positivist science, it remains an 
instrument of the dominant power/knowledge network, disempowering local and subjugated 
knowledge. If it should become less of a "discipline" and less (dis )empowered by the clinic and 
its medical normalising gaze, it could become more of a healing art. By de-centring, it could 
allow space for the power of subjugated local and erudite knowledges to resurface instead of 
searching for and trying to impose a tyranny of universal truth. There are no general rules 
governing the role of the psychologists in resistance. Expertise exists within in a specific, local 
realm and the rules for appropriate action are defined locally. The psychologist could, however, 
avoid speaking for others and allow space for subjects to use their own voices in a process of 
self-creation. What may emerge, instead of a universal knowledge and truth, is multiple 
knowledges, multiple truths, a multi-verse (Maturana, 1975) of psychologies specific to local 
contexts. 
Does this imply "liberation"? We live in a world and a continent obsessed with 
liberation. The fulfilment of the Enlightenment promise of universal liberation is now 
demanded by all those Others historically excluded from it. The narrative of liberation is one of 
the grand narratives of the Enlightenment, an attempt to liberate individuals from the claims of 
religion, state, social class, race, and gender, "indeed from any claim that arbitrarily denies 
personal choice" (T. A Parry, 1993, p. 428). The modern dream ofliberation has created not 
only material well-being and technological advances, but also the loneliness of individualism, 
massive impersonal social and economic forces, normalising technologies of power, and the 
tyranny of the belief in one objective reality. Is that what we are clamouring for in our demand 
for liberation? In the postmodern age, individuals experience themselves as having "maximum 
freedom and minimum personal power" (T. A Parry, 1993, p. 431) in the face of the effects of 
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the dominating power/knowledge. Modem freedom was conceived of so as to emphasise the 
rights of the individual self, while mutual obligation or the rights of the other to limit these 
personal rights to self-expression or gratification, were increasingly overlooked. "No provision 
had ever been made within the agenda of modernity, for any inherent limitation on the exercise 
of individual freedom" (p. 431 ). Without such mutual obligation, the other became the Other; 
God, Death, the earth, women, and "natives" were marginalised. The danger in such a ilniversal 
view of liberation is that it always enslaves at another level. It may be less dangerous to proceed 
with caution from a position of commitment to resistance, and to search for ways to overcome 
the dangers of modernism. 
Postmodern Journeys of Exploration 
Many Africans feel that Africa should enter more fully into the modem technological 
age in order to survive. However, many are also aware, as was Foucault, of the various forms of 
subjection and incapacitation that tend to insidiously accompany advances in technical mastery 
(Makinde, 1982). As this archaeology has shown, western psychology has tended to be the 
handmaid of advances in technological development and modernity. It was instrumental in 
bringing modernity about, by constructing the modem, liberated subject and western 
individuality (Venn, 1984 ). It is, in fact, so firmly rooted in modernity that it is hard to view it 
in another context. Maybe it is necessary, in fact vital, for modernity and western psychology, 
in tandem, to enter further into African society. But how to prevent a repeat of the colonial 
tragedy? Is modernisation and technological advancement inevitably oppressive? Psychology 
today has at its disposal the advantage of postmodern hindsight. Through an exploration of the 
postmodern byways of modem thought, it may yet escape from the many ways in which modem 
power/knowledge has confined it, and the world, to an "epistemological hostagehood" 
(Auerswald, 1992). 
The term postmodern does not refer to a coherent school of thought, a philosophy or a 
unitary discipline - these very concepts are at odds with postmodern thought (Waugh, 1992). 
There appears to be general agreement, though, that 
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postmodernity refers to an age which has lost the Enlightenment belief in emancipation 
and progress through more knowledge and scientific research. Postmodern society 
consists less of totalities to be ruled by preconceived models than by decentralization to 
heterogeneous local contexts characterized by flexibility and change. (K vale, l 992a, p. 
2) 
Lyotard (1984) defines postmodern simply as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv). 
Counter-movements to the Enlightenment, such as romanticism, are as old as Enlightenment 
itself, but whereas, in the past, "the critique of reason was accompanied by an alternative 
foundationalism (of the Imagination), Postmodernism tends to claim an abandonment of all 
metanarratives that could legitimate foundations for truth" (Waugh, 1992, p. 5). In contrast to 
romanticism and the knowledges of resistance depicted in chapter 6, postmodern thought is 
non-oppositional; it does not mean anti-modern, but refers descriptively to what comes after 
modernism (Kvale, 1992a). It embodies neither a reverence for the past nor a modern erasing of 
traditions and starting anew from a tabula rasa. The approach is rather that "of re-use and 
collage, of taking up elements of tradition and recycling them in new contexts" (Kvale, 1992a, p. 
7). It is thus sympathetic to both extremes of the reclamation-scientism continuum in African 
thought, while transcending the limitations of both. Postmodern thought offers avenues of 
liberation from the oppressive aspects of modern knowledge, without negating its liberating 
potential. 
Postmodern thou~ht replaces a conception of a reality independent of the observer with 
notions of language as actually constituting the structures of a perspectival social reality. 
The modern dichotomy of an objective reality distinct from subjective images is 
breaking down and being replaced by a hyperreality of self-referential signs.... The 
dichotomy of universal social laws and the individual self is replaced by the interaction 
of local networks. Postmodern thought has evolved an expansion of reason, it has gone 
beyond the cognitive and scientific domains to permeate those of ethics and aesthetics as 
well. (Kvale, l 992a, pp. 2-3) 
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Due to the entrenchment of psychology in modernity, the question inevitably arises 
whether a postmodern psychology is a contradiction in terms. An answer is not yet forthcoming, 
but if psychology itself is viewed as a construct situated in language and validated socially, the 
question may be irrelevant from a postmodern perspective. Kvale (1992b) and Polkinghome 
(1992) point out that current psychological practice is already moving towards postmodern 
thought by focusing on situated knowledge, with an openness to the heterogeneous and 
qualitative knowledge of the everyday world, and validation through practice. Social 
psychologists (Henriques et al., 1984; Michael, 1990; Parker & Shotter, 1990; Shotter, 1992) 
have reinterpreted individualistically conceived topics in terms of postmodern formulations. 
The Soviet historical cultural school after Vygotski come close to social constructionism and 
offers ways out of modernist dilemmas, as recognised by Manganyi (1991). There also exist 
trends in practical psychology which are close to postmodern conceptions of knowledge, such as 
systemic therapy, system evaluation, and participative and action research models (Kvale, 
1992b ). These have in common a view of knowledge as heterogeneous, qualitative, and 
linguistic, and view legitimation of knowledge as a process through local and practical 
knowledges and narratives (Kvale, 1992b, p. 49). These lines of thought exist on the peripheries 
of psychology; they have been marginalised. One task of a relevant psychology would be to 
excavate more of these context-sensitive approaches, a process that is already under way in the 
relevance discourse. 
In postmodern psychologies, concepts such as consciousness, unconsciousness, and 
psyche recede into the background and knowledge, language, culture, and myth appear in the 
foreground. "There is a move from the archaeology of the 'psyche' to the architecture of current 
cultural landscapes" (Kvale, 1992a, p. 15). Postmodern thought breaks with major assumptions 
about the subject matter of modem psychology, by a decentring of the self, a move from the 
inside of the psyche to the text of the world, and an emphasis on practical knowledge (K vale, 
1992a, p. 1 ). 
An important advantage of postmodemism (in contrast to romanticism) is that it does not 
argue against investments in technology and technological inquiry. As such it in no way 
disconfirms what has been identified by many Africans as a priority. "It is not technology (or 
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'knowing how') that is called into question by postmodern thought, but the truth claims placed 
upon the accompanying descriptions and explanations (the 'knowing that')" (K. J. Gergen, 1992, 
p. 26), not the terms (aptitude, evaluation, psychotherapy) produced by psychology, but their 
objectification and reification, and, above all, the manner of their validation, which is not to be 
sought in external grand narratives of truth, but in the practical, local context that includes 
subjects. Technology is placed directly and openly in the service of values. 
A frequent criticism of postmodemism is its "rampant relativism" (Kvale, 1992a, p. 8). 
However, the polarisation of objectivism and relativism, as we have seen in previous chapters, is 
a modem issue. Both an absolute objectivism and subjectivism are untenable, as all realities are 
intersubjectively generated. Postmodern thought would accept epistemic relativity, where all 
beliefs are socially produced, while rejecting moral relativity. Moral questions, such as 
oppression, domination, and power, have to be addressed locally, and morally validated in local 
processes. Postmodern thought recognises cultural pluralism, while exposing power and 
promoting activism. The postmodern psychologist can become an active participant in a 
morally and ethically constituted enterprise, with others, while recognising the relativity of truth 
at an epistemic level of analysis. 
Postmodern thought is, however, dangerous. It is, in itself, largely still a western 
endo-cultural enterprise, and the main body of its literature tends to ignore the problems of 
cultural translation (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991). Its esoteric language and concern with 
epistemological issues may alienate its users from more local languages and concerns. Said 
(1993) offers the following description of intellectuals who have been colonised by 
postmodemism: 
Cults like post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism, deconstruction,. 
neo-pragmatism, transport them into the country of the blue; an astonishing sense of 
weightlessness with regard to the gravity of history and individual responsibility fritters 
away attention to public matters, and to public discourse .... Racism, poverty, ecological 
ravages, disease, and an appallingly widespread ignorance: these are left to the media 
and the odd political candidate during an election campaign. (p. 303) 
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The danger is real. However, it is not postmodemism that produces anomie, it is the legacy of 
the modem age (T. A. Parry, 1987). Whereas modem thought created or at least failed to deal 
adequately with most of these obstacles, postmodern thought offers alternative responses. If it is 
possible to negotiate a trajectory between epistemology and poverty, relativity and racism, 
deconstruction and disease, the postmodern psychologist may be better equipped than his/her 
predecessor in dealing with public concerns. 
An Ecological Holodigm 
One response to the epistemological hostagehood imposed by the dominant modem 
knowledge is the emergence of what has been termed the New Epistemology of ecosystemic 
thought, or the ecological holodigm (Auerswald, 1992). Being an extension of western 
scientific thinking, rooted in experimental work, it provides a response to the call of African 
intellectuals for advanced scientific thinking, while avoiding many of its pitfalls, emerging from 
the dominant Cartesian-Newtonian worldview of the Modem age (Keeney, 1979), which is 
based on dualistic thinking (Manicheanism) a subject-object split (othering), a hierarchical 
structuring of reality and the assumption of one, objective truth, independent of the observer 
(solipsism), allowing intolerance of difference, cultural imposition, and violence. Side-taking, 
mutual blame systems, pejorative exclusion, polarisation, and violence are inherent in such an 
epistemology (Auerswald, 1992). 
In contrast, the emerging ecological epistemology (Auerswald, 1992; Bateson, 1979) 
emphasises ecology, relationship, whole systems, interrelation, and context. The observer is 
assumed to be part of the observed, reality is viewed as co-created by participants in interaction, 
society is viewed in terms of mutual, circular influencing processes, and multiple and relative 
truths are assumed to co-exist. Such an epistemology allows a tolerance of differences and 
opportunities for dissolving conflict through post-political thinking (Auerswald, 1992). 
Recently, ecosystemic epistemology has expanded to include textual analogies and the 
imbeddedness of human interactions in language, by which humans construe realities (Le Roux, 
1987). The focus has shifted from systems concepts borrowed from computer analogies, which 
tend to be an extension of the "mechologic" (Auerswald, 1992) of Newtonian science, to 
218 
ecological and textual analogies, bringing the paradigm closer to the human sciences. 
An ecological holodigm transcends the limitations of both scientism and romanticism. 
Although it poses the danger of being embraced as a new overarching metanarrative, it has the 
advantage of controlling the excesses of western science through the integration of ethical and 
aesthetic concerns (Bateson, 1979). It offers congenial companionship to indigenous African 
holistic knowledges (Bodibe, 1994 ), with the advantage of integrating holism with scientific and 
technological concerns (Auerswald, 1992). However, many ecosystemic models tend to neglect 
spiritual, religious, and political domains of experience. A concern with systemic patterns of 
connection may engender a new hermeneutics of suspicion, creating alienated relationships. 
The meta-theoretical stance of ecosystemic thinking, its hovering in layers of description upon 
description, of patterns within larger patterns, may effectively remove the observer from 
imbeddedness in the local. 
Although cybernetic and ecological models of human behaviour enable us to view our 
everyday life situations as connected with and mutually caused by a series of 
successively larger operations, the wide-spread diffusion of this framework may lead to 
substantial declines in individual initiative, activism, and risk-taking. Increasingly, 
individuals come to see the world in terms of a certain universality, where differences in 
world view, articulating diverse social positions in the world system, blur into one 
another. (Simone, 1993, p. 90) 
The greatest danger of ecosystemic thinking is its relativity. Its emphasis on circular 
patterns of causation, and sometimes total rejection of causation concepts, tend to obscure 
power imbalances. According to Dell (in Fish, 1990) 
systems theory is a very powerful conceptual tool, but it has limitations. I very much 
doubt that it can provide us with an adequate understanding of human violence. For that, 
psychology will be necessary. Violence exists in the domain of human lineal experience, 
not in the domain of systemic explanation. (p. 35) 
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However, Fish (1990) offers a reminder that ecosystemic thought also includes linear causality, 
depending on the level of analysis employed. It appears that systemic thinking should be 
tempered with a continual crossing of levels of analysis. The danger is to remain in the realm of 
systemic explanation, without continually descending to the level of human lineal experience, 
where urgent realities of oppression and liberation await action. 
Constructivist Alternatives 
Although there is no unitary approach that may be labelled "constructivism" (Van der 
Watt, 1993), various theoreticians and philosophers have contributed to the postmodern idea 
that knowledge is co-constructed by human interaction, that humans are observing systems who 
distinguish meaning in words and symbols through language, and that humans do not have 
access to one objective reality, only multiple constructions of reality by multiple observers. 
Maturana (1975), for instance, proposes to displace the concept of an objective, unitary universe 
waiting to be discovered, with that of a "multiverse", where many observer "verses" co-exist, 
each valid in its own right. 
The social constructionists, such as K. J. Gergen (1994), emphasise the social and 
historical co-creation of knowledge and the imbeddedness of current knowledge in a community 
of co-observers. 
The key ideas here are that knowledge, including psychological theory, is a cultural 
artefact and historical product; that the production of human knowledge is a social 
enterprise; and that this occurs "in relationship" .... What is most important about human 
action is meaning and how it is communicated; that the assignment of meaning to action 
is mediated and constructed socially; and, finally that we are born into a world of given 
and evolving sign or meaning relationships (culture). (Dawes & Donald, 1994, p. 19) 
Re-enters the spectre of relativism. Social constructionists answer with a new kind of 
pragmatism: That all views are not equally valid from a social perspective, and that the 
psychologist actively enters into this perspective. An implication of a constructivist view of 
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psychology as productive of cultural discourse opens liberating possibilities. This allows the 
psychologist to escape from blindly reflecting the cultural values of society, and the hegemony 
of the dominant knowledge, and instead to become part of the construction of its discourse 
(Shotter, 1975). "Rather than simply recanting the taken-for-granted presumptions of the 
culture, the psychological scholar is in an optimal role to transform this discourse - and, by 
implication, the culture itself Rather than 'telling it like it is' the challenge for the postmodern 
psychologist is to 'tell it as it may become"' (K. J. Gergen, 1992, p. 27). Gergen proposes the 
concept of "generative theory", or theory designed to unseat conventional thought and thereby 
open new alternatives for thought and action, so that scholars can contribute to the symbolic 
resources available to people to carry out their lives together. "By demystifying the great 
narrative of modernism, it attempts to bring psychologists and society closer together" (K. J. 
Gergen 1992, p. 28). However, moving closer to society implies losing some of the 
pseudo-security and pseudo-power of living closer to truth than ordinary people. 
To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others as sharing a nature 
with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult achievement 
of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local example of the forms human life has 
locally taken, a case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of mind ... 
comes. (Geertz, 1983, p. 16) 
Open-en<led Analogies 
Instead of representing society and humans as machines or quasi-organisms, as modem 
science and early systems theory tend to do, it may be possible to explore alternative analogies. 
Recently, the social sciences have started viewing social life in terms of serious games, dramas, 
ritual processes or texts ( Geertz, 1983 ). The choice of analogy employed depends upon the 
unique circumstances of the scientist. These analogies offer alternative, less alienating 
constructions of problems and possible solutions, which counter the normalising tendencies of 
modernistic psychology (M. White, 1990). Game theory opens the possibility of devising 
countermoves and strategising in power games; drama of revising roles or selecting alternative 
dramatic forms; ritual process analogies may facilitate change between developmental stages; 
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textual analogies open a space for the authoring of alternative stories (M. White, 1990). All 
these analogies may live more comfortably with African indigenous and religious knowledges 
than those of Newtonian science, as they do not propose objective realities but attend to all the 
various meanings that may be ascribed to behaviour across time. Africa has numerous local 
analogies waiting to be discovered and to enter psychological discourse. Gilbert, Van 
Vlaenderen & Nkwiti (1995) offer a recent example of research employing a local metaphor. 
Rediscovering Narrative 
The analogy between social process and text allows us to build narratives into our 
theories. It shows how we create and read meaning, in the same way that texts are written and 
read, and stories told and retold. In a world of multiple epistemologies, narrative provides us 
with an analogy that crosses the barriers between science, religion, culture, common-sense, and 
ideology. In Lyotard's (1984) terms, it bridges the artificial gap created by modernism, between 
narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge. It creates "experience-near", rather than 
"experience-distant" concepts (Geertz, 1983, p. 57) that are easily translatable, while providing a 
mode of thought fully as legitimate as that of abstract logic, which can offer validation to the 
subjugated local knowledges of Africa, hitherto invalidated or romanticised by the modem 
scientist knowledge. 
The narratives we live are partly retellings of narratives derived from the discursive 
practice of our historical era (Bruner, 1986), or epistemes in Foucault's terms. They are 
"instances of never-ceasing reflexivity" (p. 149). For instance, the story of exploitation, 
resistance, and resurgence is not confined only to Africa; it is the story of the world today. 
From this point of view, Bruner argues that a narrative approach dissolves the sharp distinction 
between subject and object. The psychologist as well as the subject/object of psychology are 
shaped by the same dominant narratives. Even if they belong to different cultures, they share at 
least certain narratives dealing with intercultural relations (such as that of exploitation, 
resistance, and resurgence). Through their interaction, they retell and create narratives; they do 
not only copy existing knowledge, but co-create it. It is through interaction, through creating 
and living stories together, that we can attain relevance. According to Bateson (1979), a story is 
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"a little knot or complex of that species of connectedness which we call relevance .... I would 
assume that any A is relevant to any B if both A and B are parts or components of the same 
'story"' (p. 22). 
Psychology's lack of relevance to date in the African context may be related to the fact 
that it has largely failed to create narratives that encompass large segments of the experience of 
its subjects; psychology and the narratives by which Africans live have not always become part 
of the same story. Psychology is dominantly situated within the logico-scientific mode of 
thought, creating alienated relations with its subjects. Following Lyotard (1984), the narrative 
mode, in contrast, is concerned with the particulars of experience and the connectedness of 
events across time. It "subjunctivizes" reality (Bruner, 1986), privileges lived experience rather 
than constructs, classifications and normalisations; includes rather than excludes the dimension 
of time, so that it does not search for reliable, universal truths; uses implicit rather than 
technical meanings, and installs multiple perspectives (M. White, 1990). In contrast to an 
extrinsic legitimation through metanarratives, narrative knowledge contains its own intrinsic 
legitimation. "Narratives themselves contain the criteria of competence and illustrate how they 
ought to be applied" (K vale, 1992b, p. 34 ). A narrative viewpoint may be the entry point for 
psychology to attain the legitimation it needs in local contexts. Such a psychology, which 
Bruner (1990) terms a "culturally oriented psychology" (p. 19 ) enters readily into the ordinary 
narratives of any culture. 
Whereas the logico-scientific mode represents personhood as a passive arena that is 
reactive to impersonal forces, the narrative mode locates a person as protagonist-participant in 
her own world. In such a context, persons (including psychologists) can participate with others 
in the re-authoring of their lives, relationships, and work, which makes resistance possible. The 
challenge is to revise our narratives and to co-create new narratives that allow for more 
liberatory outcomes. 
Although narrative structures organize and give meaning to experience, there are always 
feelings and lived experience not fully encompassed by the dominant story (Bruner, 1986). We 
saw this in colonial narratives of assimilation. However, dominant narratives may be displaced 
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by new dominant narratives, in historical breaks. 
Only when the new narrative becomes dominant is there a re-examination of the past, a 
rediscovery of old texts, and a recreation of the new heroes of liberation and resistance. 
The new story articulates what had been only dimly perceived, authenticates feelings, 
legitimizes new actions, and aligns individual consciousness with a larger social 
movement. (Bruner, 1986, p. 143) 
Fanon would agree, so would most New South Africans. However, no dominant narrative, in 
fact no narrative, can fully encompass the experience of all. Narratives continually co-exist, 
change with every retelling, and are shaped by historical and cultural changes. Every narrative 
carries power - the power to exclude, victimise, and make Other, but also the power to resist. 
The point is to be sensitive to how our narratives are shaped by dominant narratives, and to be 
aware that "with each retelling the context varies, the audience differs, the story is modified, 
and ... retellings become foretellings" (Bruner, 1986, p. 153). 
Subjugated Knowledges and Untold Stories 
One way to challenge the isolation of the knowledges of professional disciplines from 
the field of discontinuous knowledges, to overcome the scientism of psychology, and to attain 
local legitimacy is to excavate subjugated knowledges. Previously established erudite 
knowledges that have been written out of the record (Foucault, 1980b) can be resurrected 
through scholarship, and truth claims challenged through their resurrection. Such knowledge 
may be discovered in the erudite traditions of African thought, Christianity, Islam, and 
psychology itself. 
The time has come for psychology to excavate and reaffirm knowledges of collectivism 
in order to "promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality 
that has been imposed on us for centuries" (Foucault, 1982, p. 216). Alternatives to the lonely, 
self-contained individualism of modernism have to be sought. Alternatives such as "embedded 
individuality" (Sampson, 1990, pp. 123), that is, "being an individual by virtue of one's 
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connections and inter-connections" (p. 124), and "social individuality" (Shotter, 1990, p. 155) 
have been proposed. These concepts do not build upon firm boundaries that mark territories 
separating self and other. Abandoning individuality and attempting to re-create the 
communality of traditional life, may, however, be as maladaptive (Le Roux, 1987) as promoting 
the myth of the self-contained individual. The search beckons. 
Further knowledges that demand excavation are ethics, in order to escape from the 
essentially a-moral "objective observer" stance of modernism and refashion "psychology as a 
moral science of action" (Shotter, 1975, p. 84), and aesthetics, to transcend the fragmentation 
and isolation of modernism and designate "the pattern that connects" (Bateson, 1979, p. 17). 
Foucault's "ethic of aesthetics" (Bernauer & Mahon, 1994, p. 153) may be an antidote to 
psychology's normative limitations. However, as Bateson (1979) has warned, an overemphasis 
on aesthetics may be dangerous. "Rigour alone is paralytic death, but imagination alone is 
insanity" (p. 233). 
The local, popular, indigenous or regional knowledges that are currently in circulation, 
but are deprived of a space in which they could be adequately performed, can be resurrected 
through interaction with local communities and individuals. Religion, literature, and art offer 
further opportunities at uncovering subjugated narratives that can inform psychology. 
Psychologists can look towards the fringes, the shadows, the mute, the current Others, to 
challenge existing norms, but we have to remember that those who are mute in our stories may 
speak eloquently in other stories and other languages, and that some prefer not to speak. 
The excavation of subjugated knowledges can offer another point of entry into the 
history of struggle and conflict; a potential source of criticism that does not depend on the 
approval of established regimes of truth. Rather than proposing alternative ideologies or 
overarching truths, the uncovering of untold stories offers a continual source of resistance 
against the effects of centralised powers. "This is not a political activity that involves the 
proposal of an alternative ideology, but one that challenges the techniques that subjugate 
persons to a dominant ideology" (M. White, 1990, p. 29). Examples of informative untold 
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stories resurfacing can be found in Foster (1993b), Gebhard (1991), Keegan (1988), Simone 
(1990) and Straker (1992). 
Empowerment and Legitimation 
Empowerment has become the catchword of liberation. Uncovering untold stories may 
be empowering, but there are questions to be asked, such as who is being empowered, and 
whose interest the empowerment serves. Silence can also be empowering, by not giving a voice 
to ideas that have oppressed (Bhavnani, 1990). Certain strategies of power and survival of the 
oppressed, once given a voice, may be disempowered by being absorbed by the dominant 
discourse. Said (1989) cites studies that investigate the forms of resistance to domination 
employed by dominated groups that, paradoxically, disempower these groups by publishing their 
secret knowledge of resistance. In such a situation, although the researcher may "present a 
brilliant empirical as well as theoretical account of everyday resistances to hegemony, he ... 
undercuts the very resistance he admires and respects by in a sense revealing the secrets of its 
strength" (Said, 1989, p. 220). 
The power of silence (Bhavnani, 1990) is often overlooked in the clamour for 
"indigenisation". By "integrating" indigenous local knowledges, science can reify, freeze, 
normalise and objectify. The paradox of scientific power/knowledge is that it may destroy by its 
intrusive presence, as illustrated in the following postmodern narrative of Baudrillard (in Lather, 
1992): 
Ethnology almost met a paradoxical death that day in 1971 when the Phillipine 
government decided to return to their primitive state the few dozen Tasaday discovered 
deep in the jungle, where they had lived for eight centuries, undisturbed by the rest of 
mankind, out of reach of colonists, tourists, and ethnologists. This was at the initiative 
of the anthropologists themselves, who saw the natives decompose immediately on 
contact, like a mummy in the open air. For ethnology to live, its object must die. But 
the latter revenges itself by dying for having been "discovered", and defies by its death 
the science that wants to take hold of it. (p. 88) 
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Problems with empowerment arise when the source of legitimation of knowledge is 
located outside the field of enquiry, so that we end up "representing" those we want to liberate 
through our knowledge. Community psychology is especially vulnerable to this danger. As 
Butchart and Seedat (1990) have pointed out, the dominant models of community work 
disconfirm ordinary people "because their commonsense is not significant enough to be 
considered in the construction of theory. Between 1974 and 1987, only two articles in The 
Journal of Community Psychology examined communities' own accounts of psychosocial 
problems" (p. 95). Foucault has taught us the indignity of being represented and of being 
interpreted. We cannot continue to believe that we know "our" subjects and clients better than 
they know themselves. The most we can do is to offer our perspective, be it a statistical or an 
interpretative one, to them, in a mutual conversation and dialogue legitimised by locally 
co-created narratives. As long as psychologists export knowledge only to external sources of 
legitimation, they will not earn themselves expert status in the communities they serve. 
Legitimacy has to be plural, local, and context-specific for empowerment to be conceivable. 
Multiple Perspectives 
Does this imply that all generalisations and global views have to be abandoned? 
Postmodern thought tends toward an emphasis on the specific. It stresses heterogeneity rather 
than homogeneity, local rather than global patterns and configurations, the exception rather than 
the rule, the fringe rather than the centre. "The local interaction, the communal network, is the 
point of departure; universal laws and unique individual selves are seen as abstractions ... we 
may here talk of a contextual relativism where legitimation of action occurs through linguistic 
practice and communicative action" (Kvale, 1992b, p. 34). 
Faced with the "radical variousness of the way we think now" (Geertz, 1983, p. 161), it 
may be necessary to attempt some form of escape from the modem polarities of the universal 
and the specific, the objective and the subjective. This study, due to its archaeological nature, 
necessarily had to work with generalisations and large configurations of epistemes and powers. 
However, it may be dangerous to do the same when working on a different level. Whether to 
use generalisations (the West/Africa) or more specific, local terms, depends on the level of 
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analysis (Pieterse, 1992) and the context of the research. It may be necessary to move between 
macro- and micro-levels of analysis and validation (Dawes & Donald, 1994) or to negotiate "a 
continual dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global 
structure in such a way as to bring them into simultaneous view" (Geertz, 1983, p. 69) in order 
to arrive at double descriptions (Bateson, 1979) and co-created outcomes. 
The world is a various place, ... various between little traditions and great, various 
between colonial thens and nationalist nows; and much is to be gained, scientifically and 
otherwise, by confronting that grand actuality rather than wishing it away in a haze of 
forceless generalities and false comforts. (Geertz, 1983, p. 234) 
A New Critical Stance 
A constant critical stance is imperative in order to deal with both psychology's past and 
its present, to de-objectify existing "realities" in psychology, to demonstrate their social and 
historical embeddedness, and to explore their implications for social life. It is not possible to 
remain neutral on questions of value, as in the modernist frame, and the psychologist has to 
conjoin the personal, the professional and the political (K. J. Gergen, 1992). This requires a 
constant vigilance; a being "on guard against idees recues all too easily handed down in the 
profession" (Said, 1978, p. 326). It requires being both discreet and concrete, by focusing on the 
specific situation at hand, not the rituals, preconceptions, and doctrines of either psychology or 
the field of "African studies". 
Postmodern thought offers a new critical tool in the form of deconstruction, a term 
derived from the work of Derrida (in Parker & Shotter, 1990) who shows how texts can be 
subverted, by being revealed as containing hidden, internal contradictions. Deconstruction 
excavates the hidden presuppositions of a text, the suppressed terms that give them their 
meaning and supposed objectivity (Michael, 1990), and is similar in certain respects to 
Foucault's archaeologies. Derrida's project allows the re-assertion of the suppressed terms, to 
show how they are always covertly incorporated into a text, shaping the present(ed) terms 
through their absence. The intermediate goal of deconstruction is to overturn the hierarchy of 
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present and absent terms; the eventual aim is to neutralise the opposition by, for example, 
developing a transcendent term. We have seen how both Senghor and Fanon have partly 
deconstructed the colonial text. 
However, in practice, deconstruction is often reduced to only a method or technique of 
critique. Such a limited view has been criticised by Norris (1987) for assuming that meaning 
can be grasped in the form of some proper concept - an idea that Derrida aims to deconstruct. 
Norris ( 1987) proposes another view of deconstruction: "The dismantling of conceptual 
oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can then be reinscribed 
within a different order of textual signification" (Norris, 1987, p. 19). The danger inherent in a 
reductionist view of deconstruction is the illusion that 
there is little left for the intellectual to do, but to demystify or deconstruct the illusory 
claims to knowledge made by the uninitiated. The task for the critic is to unmask the 
pretence behind the propositions - demonstrating the knowledge maker to be a fool after 
all. (M. Gergen, 1992, p. 183) 
As such, it becomes but a repetition of the hermeneutics of suspicion of modem thought; 
another move in the modernist games of academic elites, who produce discourses that are 
alienating to both fellow-academics and subjects. Its counterpoint should be an emphasis on the 
constructive and reconstructive potential of knowledge (M. Gergen , 1992, p. 183 ). We are 
again faced with the problem of the alienating effects of professional discourses, which give 
currency only to the voice of the professional. 
No matter how benevolent one as a psychologist may be towards those one studies, no 
matter how concerned with "their" liberation, with "their" betterment, with preventing 
"their" victimisation, etc., the fact is that "their" lives are made sense of in terms which 
do not in fact make sense to "them" .... What seems to be required is the deconstruction 
of the whole (Enlightenment) project of an intellectual elite discovering the basic 
principles of mind and society. (Parker & Shotter, 1990, p. 13) 
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The danger of professional critical discourse is that it may alienate not only our subjects, 
but also fellow-professionals, who may be marginalised and made Other by a normalising 
critical discourse. 
Living with Otherness 
Others are plural. Many analyses, by focusing on a generalised Other, objectify and reify 
otherness. Pieterse (1992) argues that there is no "the Other", for such a view implies a stable 
"we". 
There are~ - there are many, and their identities vary according to time, location, 
and the status, gender, relationships and so on of the labelling groups. To generalize and 
pontificate about "the other" means losing sight of this multiplicity and complexity, 
homogenizing the process of othering, introducing an essentialism of otherness, and 
creating a static dualistic relationship between Self and Other, us and them. (pp. 
233-234) 
It is not possible to disregard Same/Other, them/us distinctions and a position of 
relativity does not remove otherness. 
No one can escape dealing with, if not the East/West division, then the North/South one, 
the have/have-not one, the imperialist/anti-imperialist one, the white/colored one. We 
cannot get around them all by pretending they do not exist.... Yet an openly polemical 
and right-minded "progressive" scholarship can very easily degenerate into dogmatic 
slumber, a prospect that is not edifying either. (Said, 1978, p. 327) 
Every grouping, every subculture construes otherness. The centre is, however, less fixed in the 
postmodern world. 
We are all natives now, and everybody else not immediately one of us is an exotic. What 
looked once to be a matter of finding out whether savages could distinguish fact from 
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fancy now looks to be a matter of finding out how others, across the sea or down the 
corridor, organize their significative world. ( Geertz, 1983, p. 151) 
In the psychology relevance debate, the colleague down the corridor is often denied the respect 
accorded to "the native", and the culture (of psychology) of the critic, reified in opposition to 
that of the colleague. 
It is more rewarding - and more difficult - to think concretely, sympathetically, 
contrapuntally, about others than only about "us". But this also means not trying to rule 
others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly 
reiterating how "our" culture or country is number one (or not number one for that 
matter). (Said, 1993, p. 336) 
It may be useful to view every person as representing another culture and epistemology 
and every conversation as cross-cultural, as suggested by Lifschitz (in Lifschitz, Kgoadi & Van 
Niekerk, 1992). But how can agreement be reached or conflicts solved without reverting to 
hierarchies and classifications? In contexts "where dissensus is chronic, probably worsening, 
and not soon to be removed ... [where] agreement about the things that are fundamental ... is 
rather spectacularly absent" (Geertz, 1983, p. 224), such as the battle-field of African gods or 
that of psychologists arguing about relevance, the "standard discourse" (p. 222) which scientists 
usually imagine themselves to have, proceeding under a set of rules and criteria of how to go 
about settling issues and solving conflict, may not carry the weight these scientists expect. 
"Standard discourse", a concept derived from the work of Richard Rorty by Geertz (1983), 
embodies agreed-upon criteria for reaching agreement. Such criteria disappear in a world 
populated by multiple others, situated within different sets of rules. In contrast, "nonstandard" 
discourse abandons hope for agreement, and searches for communicative, locally agreed-upon 
outcomes. In such discourse, "exciting and fruitful disagreement" (Geertz, 1983, p. 223) is 
recognized as a no less rational process. Such non-standard discourse may result in productive 
"working misunderstandings" (p. 233), which may not be as secure a position as authoring 
normalised truths, but may be the best we can do anyway, as an other in a world of others, at 
least in terms of a constructivist view of knowledge (Maturana & Varela, 1992). 
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Between Danger and Curiosity 
The position of the psychologist that emerges from the preceding explorations is an 
ambivalent one, situated between the inevitable danger of creating new imperialisms and the 
expanded constructive possibilities of power/knowledge. Archaeologising psychology in Africa 
forces an awareness of the potential dangers lurking in psychological practice and urges the 
psychologist to a continual deconstruction and reconstruction of knowledge, while also urging 
him or her to act. It demands "a pessimistic activism that expects to find domination and 
control in the most innocent places, especially in the innocent places" (Richer, 1992, p. 116). 
Danger is the link between truth, power and ethics. Freedom and power/knowledge are active 
states. Any new formation of power/knowledge inevitably carries with it multiple dangers. 
Foucault (in Rouse, 1994) shows that there is no choice but to confront them: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not 
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to 
do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think 
that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the 
main danger. (p. 112) 
An awareness of danger is inevitable if there is an awareness that "there is no discipline, no 
structure of knowledge, no institution or epistemology that can or has ever stood free of the 
various sociocultural, historical, and political formations that give epochs their peculiar 
individuality" (Said, 1989, p. 211 ). All knowledge feeds into, connects with, impedes, or 
enhances active processes of dependency, domination, or hegemony. However, awareness of 
the historical field of emergence of psychology may offer new avenues of resistance and 
liberation from what many would describe as "the sterility of thought, the restricted and bleak 
horizon" of psychology in Africa, to borrow from Foucault (in Norris, 1994, p. 207) in a 
discussion on the current state of philosophy. Our knowledges may not offer the 
pseudo-security of objective truth, but they do offer a plethora of possible alternative realities 
and practices. An expansion of the historical boundaries drawn around psychology, to a 
multiverse of possible psychologies, may free psychologists to new applications of existing 
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knowledges and an extension of their creativity. It may open a space for a new form of critical 
curiosity, a postmodern reworking of an Enlightenment value by Foucault (in Norris, 1994): 
And then there is an immense curiosity, a need or desire to know. Curiosity is a vice that 
has been stigmatized in turn by Christianity, by philosophy, and even by a certain 
conception of science. The word, however, pleases me. To me it evokes something 
altogether different: it evokes "concern", it evokes the care one takes for what exists and 
could exist; a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us; a certain 
relentlessness to break up the familiarities and to regard otherwise the same things; a 
fervour to grasp what is happening and what passes; a casualness in regard to traditional 
hierarchies of the important and the essential. I dream of a new age of curiosity. We 
have the technical means for it; the desire is there; the things to be known are infinite; 
the people who can employ themselves in the task exist. ( p. 207) 
Such curiosity may find application in a myriad of ways in the multitude of Africas and 
psychologies that are being construed and may be construed in the future. The technical means 
exist; the psychologists who are creating these psychologies may already have the qualities 
necessary to the task. What are these qualities? At the risk of construing an oppressive norm, it 
may nevertheless be informative to be curious and speculate on the personal qualities of a new 
African psychologist that emerge from this archaeology. 
Towards a New African Psychologist 
It is relatively easy to delimit what a relevant African psychologist is not: Certainly not a 
missionary, saviour, power-broker or victim of dominant power/knowledges; not someone who 
hides behind expert knowledge or objectifies others; never only a technician. But how to 
describe this new psychologist in positive terms? His or her foremost qualities, as discussed in 
the previous section, are a propensity to live with a constant awareness of the dangers of 
knowledge and an unsatiable curiosity (in Foucault's sense of the term). For the rest, he or she 
appears somehow enigmatic and tends to elude precise formulations, maybe because he or she 
consistently refuses the dictates of either/or thinking, lives beyond the margins of conventional 
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truths and certainties, and feels comfortable within domains of multiplicity and ambiguity. 
A new African psychologist possibly differs from his or her predecessor in that he or she 
values and prioritises everyday lived experience and its expression in local narratives above 
metanarratives, grand abstractions, sweeping generalisations, and taken-for-granted truths, be 
they the current dominant truths of a certain cultural or organisational milieu, or that of a 
dominant western psychology. However, he or she also respects the adherence of others to 
many of these truths, and does not launch attacks against or make Other those who think 
differently. 
An immersion in everyday life and lived experience presupposes a personal involvement 
in such experience. This psychologist functions above all as a person among other persons, not 
as an elitist expert who objectifies others. This is a streetwise, experience-wise person, who is 
fully immersed in the everyday concerns of the community where he or she works. It is a person 
who tends to include, rather than exclude, persons of all walks of life in the task at hand, and 
who values the contributions of all towards the construal of resolutions to problems that are co-
defined by all participants. It is a person who enjoys working with others to search for positive 
outcomes within co-created, open-ended narratives. 
Does he or she then become only a spokesperson for others; a servant to the current 
concerns of the systems he or she serves? Does he or she disregard all expert knowledge? 
Again, our psychologist escapes either/or reasoning: Being involved in and legitimised by a 
community does not exclude the possibility of contributing original or expert knowledge. We 
can look towards African societies for models so as to form an image of the relationship 
between the new psychologist and the community. First, there are indigenous healers and 
diviners, who are granted the status of experts by the community, have to continually work to 
maintain legitimacy, are central to the total life of the community, facilitating transitions and 
adaptations to changing conditions, while retaining a marginal position (as part of a community 
of marginals - the professional body), and contributing innovative knowledge. There is the 
African sage (Oruka, 1990), who guards traditional wisdom but also adds innovative, individual 
thinking to this wisdom, offers practical solutions to everyday problems, and contributes 
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edifying narratives to guide the community. There is the African story-teller, who not only re-
tells ancient tales but adds individualised variations, and adapts the tale to each particular 
audience, so that it always brings news of difference. There is the African hero, who obtains 
this status by transcending the limits of dominant knowledge and practices, but always to the 
ultimate benefit of the community. There is the Islamic holy man, who, again, depends upon a 
local community for legitimisation through practice, and serves as sage, healer, educator, 
translator, and intermediary between the community and the dominant knowledge, while 
facilitating the translation of this knowledge into local forms. There is the prophet of the 
African churches, who heals, integrates, initiates new communal bonds, and facilitates the 
creation of contexts where wholeness and renewal become possible. 
It may be argued that many African experts also become, like psychologists, extensions 
of oppressive dominant traditional knowledges, and thereby fail to provide conditions for 
innovative and regenerative alternatives. However, for the purpose of the present discussion, we 
will concentrate on innovative African experts, who function in and by virtue of a community, 
form part of a body of experts, but derive their transformative and regenerative power from a 
certain marginality that escapes the limitations of the dominant knowledge. All view life 
holistically and their work as sacred. Maybe a new African psychologist is also a person with a 
calling, who recognises the sacred, the numinous, and the mysterious as part of life, prefers 
holistic to dualistic thinking, and values intuitive, aesthetic, ethical, as well as rational ways of 
knowing. Like other African experts, he or she has proven his or her ability to co-create new 
meanings within transformative contexts, whether these contexts are created in a private 
practice, community, university, hospital, or other organisation. Like other African experts, a 
new psychologist does not compete with other experts or try to colonise their knowledge. He or 
she may simultaneously be subversive of dominant narratives that exclude or subvert, and 
respectful of traditional and local, subjugated narratives that people live by. 
Educationally, this psychologist has been provided with knowledge that is always 
contextualised, and taught to re-situate all existing knowledge within local contexts. Such 
education is primarily aimed towards the extension of the self-in-relation-to-others of the 
student, not the extension of dominant power/knowledges. He or she is taught to value this self 
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as primary source of knowledge, rather than "external, objective facts". Perceptually, he or she 
becomes a sensitive reader of contexts, not in terms of idealised imposed meaning systems, but 
in terms of local meanings and the self, so as to discern those narratives and meanings which are 
sanctified and precious to local participants, and to be able to guard these. For, paradoxically, it 
is only by conserving what is most valuable and sacred to a person, family, organisation or 
community, that renewal can become possible (Le Roux, 1987). Conceptually, this psychologist 
views existing theories as historical narratives that may or may not prove constructive if retold 
in new contexts, and tends to prefer holistic to dualistic conceptualisations. Executive skills 
include a willingness to enter fully and actively into local concerns and contribute, as marginal 
participant, narratives that offer the possibility of constructive outcomes. 
This psychologist appears, paradoxically, as a humble expert; a marginal person who 
nevertheless easily forges links with a wide variety of people; a care-ful risk-taker; a subversive 
conservationist; irreverent of dogma and traditional hierarchies but respectful of people and 
their personal experience; a pragmatist, yet acutely aware of the limits and dangers of action 
without reflection; curious, yet comfortable with not knowing. He or she is not a consumer but 
a creator of knowledge; appreciates diversity rather than enforces sameness; confirms rather 
than disconfirms or disqualifies; readily enters problematic territories as a participating actor 
and meaning-maker. 
Above all, a new African psychologist does not objectify and reify the role of "the 
psychologist" in terms of some universal norm, but thinks in terms of self (a multiple self) in 
relation to (multiple) others. This self is constituted of meanings defined both by the 
community and the individual, as well as its uses in practice (Bruner, 1990), and is recursively 
connected with other selves. This psychologist is aware of the self and others as partially 
constituted by dominant knowledges and cultural constraints, and thinks recursively, so that the 
multiple, indeterminate self, with all its historical limitations and advantages, is included in 
explanations. Although this psychologist is often deeply immersed in a field of specialisation 
and technical expertise, this knowledge is always viewed as part of an encompassing recursive 
meaning system. Ultimately, this psychologist values wisdom, knowledge integrated with 
everyday life, above technical expertise. This attitude does not imply a rejection of technical 
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expertise or of the existing body of psychological knowledge, but integrates these into social 
processes, so that their value are gauged by their validation in a specific contexts of meaning 
and not only in grand narratives of science. A new African psychologist uses technology as a 
tool, an extension of self, and refuses to be seduced into becoming a tool or extension of 
dominant technologies and power/knowledges. He or she constantly re-adjusts expert 
knowledge in terms of feedback from others, in a continuing, creative process of weaving ever-
changing meanings into new forms. 
A new African psychologist may be less concerned with extending the domain of 
psychology than with extending the self, for it is from the indeterminate domain between self 
and other that power/knowledge evolves. Such a psychologist has moved beyond technology 
towards art and wisdom; has refused the constricting role of technologist of modem power so as 
to become a facilitator of processes of conservation, regeneration, and transformation. 
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CODA 
This study, like all knowledge, delimits a terrain of meaning that is limited by its 
recursive context. It emerges from a society that is in the midst of dramatic changes; where 
previously established hierarchies of power and knowledge are being overturned, where 
narratives of resistance are turned into new dominant narratives, and where the periphery is 
drawn towards the centre. This study reflects this process, as it, too, challenges dominant 
narratives, excavates subjugated knowledges of resistance, and draws peripheries towards the 
centre. Its subject matter, psychology in Africa, and the struggle of African psychologists with 
relevance, has long existed only at the margins of psychology. However, as the New South 
Africa has been drawn back into the world, this study attempts to forge links between the local 
struggles of African psychologists and those of their colleagues who function closer to the centre 
of psychology. 
This study, like all knowledge, is but another narrative which recursively reflects upon 
the self of its author. It is the narrative account of my search for relevance, from a position 
which is marginal to the dominant narratives of assimilation, resistance, and resurgence that 
characterise South African psychology, and which aims to expose the potential of dominant 
narratives to oppress and exclude. This marginality manifests itself in the wide-angle approach 
of the study, which relativises existing knowledge, searches for overarching, holistic patterns of 
meaning, deconstructs, and reconstructs. Such an approach also has definite limitations and 
dangers, however. A wide-angle lens cannot include the texture of local realities nor address 
specific local problems. Working with overarching generalisations, such as strata of knowledge, 
may reify these same generalisations. Exposing and dwelling upon processes of domination 
may fix rather than loosen the constraints of the dominant narrative of domination and 
liberation. The postmodern slant of this narrative may limit its accessability to those most in 
need of liberating narratives. However, all knowledge is partial; no narrative can tell the whole 
story; no single instrument create a symphony. This study offers a theme to serve as source for 
further development and variation. A next chapter may take up the challenge to translate this 
theme into many local vernaculars, and, hopefully, be followed by many chapters telling of 
many other journeys towards relevance. 
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